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Abstract 
Investing in Stereotypes: 
Comic Second-Sight in Twentieth Century African American Literature  
 
Irvin Hunt  
 
“Investing in Stereotypes” unearths a tradition of humor that may initially sound counter-intuitive: 
it sees stereotypes as valuable. Zora Neale Hurston, Ralph Ellison, Charles Wright, and Suzan-
Lori Parks reveal the way racial and sexual stereotypes paradoxically complicate their subjects in 
the very attempt to simplify them. The compulsive repetition of stereotypes and the contradictory 
meanings that stereotypes embody create absurdly comical effects that are, in the hands of these 
writers, surprisingly humanizing. To unveil the tensions in, say, Sambo, the happy plantation slave 
who is at once harmless and savage, completely known and enigmatic, is to invest in the 
stereotype’s comic implication that the subjects it hopes to fix are endlessly changing and 
exhaustingly complex—that those subjects are, in fact, human. Departing from the most common 
techniques used to resist stereotypes (inversion, exaggeration, and modification), investment, as I 
theorize it, is a comic form of engagement that enacts Du Bois’s concept of second-sight: the 
ability to perceive the blind-spots of another’s cultural perspective from the vantage point of one’s 
own.  
I begin the dissertation with Hurston because the sort of second-sight her characters 
practice is the precondition for Ellison’s democratic America, Wright’s empathic witnessing, and 
Parks’s sovereign communities. Hurston uses tactics of trickery, even more nuanced than Henry 
Gates’s field-framing concept of “Signifyin(g),” to encourage her readers to account for their 
 
    
cultural blind-spots by forcing them to move between the contradictions within a stereotype. For 
example, when the speaker of “How It Feels to Be Colored Me” vacillates between being 
“savage” and “cosmic” as she dons the Sambo stereotype, she creates epistemological 
uncertainty about the cultural knowledge the reader uses to racialize others. By helping people in 
conflicting positions of power understand their common humanity and their mutually limiting 
misrecognitions, comic second-sight can work to bridge social divides. “Investing in 
Stereotypes” shows why the humor of the oppressed deserves more than the scant scholarly 
attention it has received and also unearths a mode of oppositional consciousness crucial for the 
emancipationist project of African American literary studies.
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Foreword:  
What Is An Investment in Stereotypes? 
 
 
Contradictions are our hope!  
 ---Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Lawsuit  
  
 
n 1995, while thinking about Sarah Bartman and the exploitation of her body, Suzan-Lori 
Parks joked about Josephine Baker’s “rear end.” Bartman, the South African woman 
exhibited in nineteenth-century European freak shows for her “unusually large” posterior, 
had resumed center-stage in an international spotlight. Her remains (her skeleton and the wax 
mold of her body) had been kept on display at the Musee de l’Homme until 1976, and in 1995 
Nelson Mandela along with a cadre of human rights activists were demanding her repatriation. 
With all this in mind, Parks wrote in an essay “The Rear End Exists”: “Legend has it that when 
Josephine Baker hit Paris in the ‘20s, she just ‘wiggled her fanny and all the French fell in love 
with her.’ This achievement should be viewed in light of a deeper understanding, which is to say 
there was a hell of a lot behind that wiggling bottom” (11). Toward the end of the essay, Parks 
exclaimed, “The buttocks meet like a clenched fist. Black Power!”   
Parks sees Baker’s dancing “rear end” as a window into systems of oppression and 
strategies of survival. She puns, “Check it: Baker was from America and left it; African 
Americans are on the bottom of the heap in America; we are at the bottom on the bottom, 
practically the bottom itself, and Baker rose to the top by shaking her bottom” (11). One could 
view this “shaking” as shameful but  Parks reconfigures it as revelatory: “Baker’s bold bottom 
I 
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brought the rear to the forefront. She showed what holds the shithole. The hull of a ship. People 
in chains” (17). Parks contends that Baker turned what “is often a burden”—stereotypes of the 
black female body, into a “booty,” a “treasure” and a “gift” through which she claimed her 
history and reclaimed herself (14). Baker’s “bottom” became not only a sign of her American 
past and national identity, but also and more so a means of reinvention and the “acceptance” of 
herself—a recognition of a history of racism and an affirmation of her subversive humanity. 
“Baker herself said: ‘The rear end exists. I see no reason to be ashamed of it. It’s true that there 
are rear ends so stupid, so pretentious, so insignificant that they’re good for only sitting on’” 
(13).   
With Sarah Bartman in the backdrop (Parks was also writing Venus a play about the 
historical record of Bartman’s life), this comic rendering of Josephine Baker compels us to ask, 
how can the deployment of racial stereotypes function as a strategy to resist colonial discourse 
and to pleasurably survive beneath its tactics of objectification? What is the purchase of finding 
humor in yet another iteration of a black female stereotype or any racial stereotype for that 
matter? What can be gained in looking humorously at the way someone like Baker performs the 
stereotype of black sexuality as a means of seduction? To think of racial stereotypes, which 
always sexualize the body either by erasing or exaggerating sexuality, is to confront the 
intersection of terror and pleasure, the libidinal economy of racism. What value, then, can be 
ethically culled from racial stereotypes? And does this approach avoid the elicitation of a 
voyeuristic, racist gaze? In short, as Parks asks, “What do we make with the belief that the rear 
end exists?”   
These are the questions that propel this dissertation but, when I began, my inquiry was 
much simpler. With so much focus on the pain of the African American experience, I wondered 
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how does one account for the pleasures of African American life and would this account 
refashion our common sense around race and racism. In a panoply of studies, from Saidiya 
Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection to Abdul Janmohamed’s The Death-Bound Subject, black social 
like seems almost impossible and, where it emerges, it forcibly tends toward death. But what of 
vitality, happiness, and joy—what of pleasure? For pleasure, humor was an obvious place to look 
and largely an uncharted terrain. What I found over and over in this humor was shocking and, at 
first, a bit uncomfortable: African American authors were responding to a major tactic of racist 
discourse, stereotyping, but instead of trying to discredit these stereotypes they were redeploying 
them as humanizing. The very instruments of objectification were functioning as tools to 
highlight black humanity and stretch categories of the human. If a racial stereotype is designed as 
“a denial or a forgetting of the unremunerated labor of slavery,” then these stereotypes were 
spotlighting the darker corners of black history and the constitution of black humanity (Lott 6). 
Racial stereotypes, which always intersect with gender and class, were not being revealed as 
inherently absurd, but absurdly valuable.  
That authors, artists, comedians have discredited stereotypes, that they have raucously 
exaggerated them and therefore revealed their inherent absurdity, has been the recorded story of 
African American humor.  And resistance generally, even outside of this humor, is usually 
figured as reactionary, not counter-intuitive. In her preeminent study, Laughing Fit to Kill: Black 
Humor in the Fictions of Slavery, Glenda Carpio uncovers a tradition of humor in which a racist 
stereotype is fashioned into an image “that exaggerates the caricature” (26). Examining a diverse 
body of case studies, spanning two centuries and multiple forms of cultural production (novels, 
paintings, stand-up comedy routines, plays), Carpio claims that the point of comically crafting 
stereotypes is not only to provide relief, but perspective by incongruity, perspective, that is, on 
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the reincarnations of slavery (“the reach of slavery’s long arm into our contemporary culture” 
(23)). This “hyperbolic mode” of “parody” ultimately aims “not only to lampoon racist 
ideologies but also to show the nonsensical nature of race and its identities” (16). What happens 
when humorists are not exaggerating the already exaggerated? What happens when the point is 
not to critique race but to reconstruct it and the comic method of that reconstruction is something 
subtler than exaggeration or hyperbole?  
When Parks puns on Baker’s “bottom,” she is not exaggerating. When she tells the reader 
“Call me LedgeButt,” and then describes the pain of hearing her childhood classmates shoot 
racial epithets at her, she is doing more than exaggerating the signification (11). Nor is she 
pandering to it. She is, what I call, investing in its discursive value. Stereotypes are no ordinary 
language signs. As Homi Bhabha persuasively argues, following Frantz Fanon and Edward Said, 
a stereotype operates like a fetish and therefore, unlike other language signs, it is compulsively 
repeated. Anxiously fetishistic, to stereotype is to recognize difference even as one denies it, a 
paradoxical double-act that Freud calls “disavowal.” Bhahba explains the way a racist fetish 
disavows as follows:  
[F]etishism is always a ‘play’ or vacillation between the archaic affirmation of 
wholeness/similarity—in Freud’s terms: ‘All men have penises’; in ours: ‘All men 
have the same skin/race/culture’—and the anxiety associated with lack and 
difference—again, for Freud, ‘Some do not have penises’; for us ‘Some do not 
have the same skin/race/culture.’ (107) 
 
The point I would like to make is that this disavowal is obvious in contradictions that inhere in 
individual stereotypes. The Venus Hottentot is both desirable and disgusting; the picaninny at 
once baby and beast; Sambo, completely known and dangerously enigmatic. ‘What is Sambo 
really laughing at’ has always been the question. When James Weldon Johnson reported on his 
three months of teaching black people in the purlieus of Georgia, it was as much their songs that 
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perplexed him as it was their laughter: “Why did they laugh so? How could they laugh so? Was 
this rolling, pealing laughter merely echoes from a mental vacuity or did it spring from an innate 
power to rise above the ironies of life?” (qtd. in Levine 298). The perplexity of Sambo’s 
laughter, like the perplexity of other racial stereotypes, demands that his image be drawn again 
and again, the resolution of its contradictions forever deferred.  
To invest in stereotypes is to parody an embarrassing contradiction at the heart of 
stereotypic discourse: stereotypes are designed to dehumanize their subjects, but in fact they 
often serve the opposite purpose, accentuating dialectically the very humanity they seek to 
occlude. By investing in stereotypes, which can be called a form of parody,1 the authors of this 
study—Zora Neale Hurston, Ralph Ellison, Charles Wright, and Suzan-Lori Parks—disclose the 
ways in which a stereotype, by virtue of its incessant repetition and its internal contradictions, 
shows that the people it designates cannot be pinned down. Always present in stereotypic 
discourse, these internal contradictions, like the stereotype’s recurrence, unwittingly intimate the 
complex humanity among the very people the stereotype hopes to simplify.  
I turn away from the sort of analysis of stereotypes that disclose the many ways they have 
been discredited. The comic works of Hurston, Ellison, Wright, and Parks suggest, to reiterate 
Bhabha’s charge, that “the point of intervention in colonial discourse should shift from the ready 
recognition of images as positive or negative, to an understanding of the processes of 
subjectification made possible (and plausible) through stereotypical discourse” (Bhabha 95, 
emphasis in original). Indeed, as French literary scholar Mireille Rosello claims in Declining the 
Stereotype, and as Bhabha points out in “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and 
                                                        
1 Linda Hutcheon defines parody as “authorized transgression”: “even in mocking, parody reinforces; in 
formal terms, it inscribes the mocked conventions onto itself, thereby guaranteeing their continued 
existence” (39). Hutcheon brings us to a question I take up in the chapters: to what extent does parodying 
discursive violence not defang but sharpen its tooth?  
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the Discourse of Colonialism,” “to judge a stereotyped image on the basis of a prior political 
normativity is to dismiss it, not displace it.” In the chapters that follow I do not develop a 
psychoanalytic critique, but show the subtle, yet comic ways stereotypes are deployed as 
strategies of indirect resistance and subject-formation.  
To bring these deployments to light, I put W. E. B. Du Bois in conversation with 
Sigmund Freud. Although never before paired, Du Bois’s concept of “second-sight” and Freud’s 
of “the comic” could be considered two sides of the same coin: they both operate by a 
comparison of oneself to another. Second-sight is the ability, from one’s own cultural vantage 
point, to illuminate what is opaque in another’s, or, put crudely, to “see America in a way that 
white America cannot,” as Du Bois writes in his 1926 “Criteria of Negro Art” (279).2 It is also, 
however, the ability to receive the same gift in return. In this way, it adds a culturally diverse 
context to Freud’s otherwise culturally homogeneous definition of the comic. Laughter, Freud 
claims, is the discharge of mental energy that builds up when reality exceeds one’s expectations. 
Yet noticing this excess, like understanding the holes of another’s perspective, depends on an 
empathic identification between oneself and the joke’s target. One of Freud’s main objectives in 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious is to dispute the predominant idea that laughter 
expresses a sense of superiority by arguing that it actually expresses empathy, the psychic faculty 
required for any inter-subjective comparison: “it is noteworthy that we only find someone being 
put in a position of inferiority comic where there is empathy—that is, where someone else is 
concerned” (244). To demonstrate the way stereotypes evoke a comic second-sight among 
                                                        
2 In “Ever Feeling One’s Twoness: ‘Double Ideals and ‘Double Consciousness’ in the Souls of Black 
Folk,” Ernest Allen contends, “ ‘second-sight’ suggests an expanded consciousness allowing one the 
ability to navigate two disparate cultures fluently, perhaps, or from the perspective of one’s own culture 
the skill to perceive in another what is opaque to its own practitioners” (65).  
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different people from contrary positions of power is ultimately to show that a pervasive form of 
discursive violence can also be the seat of interconnection. 
“Second-sight” and “the comic” are specific terms for me. I read second-sight as distinct 
from double-consciousness, even though Du Bois hardly makes this distinction explicit:  
The Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight 
in this American world—a world that yields him no true self-consciousness, but 
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar 
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Souls 8) 
  
The second sentence in the passage makes no reference to second-sight and “this double-
consciousness” seems to take its place as a synonym. Thus the standard reading has been that 
double-consciousness is almost synonymous with second-sight, both terms signifying the 
realization among the oppressed of how they are being seen by their oppressors and both being 
ambiguously a curse and a gift. Although he decided to “reject the thesis that second-sight is 
inherently negative” (In the Shadow 286), Robert Gooding-Williams, for instance, initially 
claimed that second-sight allows blacks to “see things as the white world sees them, but only at a 
price of self-estrangement” (“Philosophy” 107). Without even getting into the philosophies from 
which Du Bois pulls the concept of second-sight, one wonders on a purely logical level how 
second-sight could be self-estranging. Even if it were functionally synonymous to double-
consciousness, how could one notice another’s biases without also noticing what is “true”? How 
could one have insight into someone else’s blindness without also seeing what that blindness 
overlooks? On a psychological register overlooked is the “true self”; on a material one, 
overlooked are the structures of racism, the external barriers to social and economic mobility. If 
we grant that double-consciousness is afflictive, the sight it affords cannot be.  
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In the vein of Ernest Allen, Shannon Mariotti, Stephanie Shaw, and others,3 I interpret 
double-consciousness as describing the structural conditions that enable the formation of second-
sight, the “gift” availed from the affliction of “measuring one’s soul” by the “contempt and pity” 
of another.4 Like Shaw, I resituate second-sight outside of psychological pathology and show 
that it is the perspective when “black folks see their own ‘other’ rather than themselves as 
‘other’” (Shaw 190, n. 14). Consider its philosophical context. As Brent Edwards notes in his 
scholarly edition of Souls, and as Gooding-Williams elaborates, Du Bois derives second-sight 
from African American folklore and nineteenth-century theories of mesmerism.  
According to the folklore, a seventh son may see ghosts, while a child born with a 
caul (a veil-like membrane that sometimes covers the head at birth) will enjoy a 
second-sight (for he is ‘double-sighted’) that lets him see ghosts as well the 
future. According to mesmerism, a magnetized patient will tend to behave as if a 
veil had been drawn over her eyes, hiding from the view the outside world, even 
as a clairvoyant sight lets her see the future.  
 
Building off Gooding-Williams, I use second-sight to denote negotiations of the time, space, and 
perspectives of others, but unlike my interlocutors I take the “amused contempt and pity,” the 
amusement through which the dominant exert their domination, as an equally deliberate term. I 
demonstrate that second-sight redirects those amusements as it discerns their historical contexts, 
their evolving present, and hopefully their future end. It is not only the revelation of the weak-
points of racist discourse and its socio-economic structures, not only the disclosure of “the 
                                                        
3 See Nahum Dimitri Chandler, “Originary Displacement,” Boundary 2 (Fall 2000), 272-73; and Tom 
Lutz, American Nervousness, 1903: An Anecdotal History (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1991), 261-
75. On the difference between double consciousness, twoness, and second-sight, see Ernest Allen,  “Ever 
Feeling One’s Twoness: ‘Double Ideals’ and ‘Double Consciousness’ in the Souls of Black Folk,” 
Contributions in Black Studies 9 (1992), 55-69.  
 
 
4 In “On the Passing of the First-Born Son: Emerson’s ‘Focal Distancing,’ Du Bois’ ‘Second-Sight,’ and 
Disruptive Particularity,” Mariotti argues that second-sight allows one to “envision the future possibility 
where we exist as souls instead of races” (364).  
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failure of [racist] regimes ever fully to legislate or contain their own ideals,” as Judith Butler 
might say (Bodies 237). Second-sight is also the movement toward justice, a more inclusive 
future.  
 It is through the comic application of second-sight that this future begins to come into 
view. For Freud, the empathic identification that the humor presumes does not preclude an 
establishment of social hierarchies. Freud probably would not disagree with Vladimir Propp’s 
articulation of what is known as the ‘superiority theory’ of humor: “laughter is caused by the 
sudden revelation of some hidden flaw. When there is no flaw or when we fail to see it, we will 
not laugh” (36).  Freud would simply qualify this statement by reminding us that “the origin of 
comic pleasure lies in a comparison of the difference between two expenditures,” one made by 
another in comparison to the one we would imagine making if in the same situation. We laugh, 
for instance, when we see someone else exert more physical effort than needed (like picking up 
an empty box under the assumption it is full of books): laughter is “an innervatory expenditure 
which has become an usable surplus when a comparison is made with the movement of one’s 
own” (240).  We also laugh—and here is the sort of laughter that predominates my study—when 
we see someone else exert less mental energy than we would imagine ourselves giving for the 
same thought: “in the case of mental function, on the contrary, it becomes comic if the other 
person has spared himself the expenditure which I regard as indispensible (for nonsense and 
stupidity are inefficiencies of function)” (241). Whatever the case, the laughter can only emerge 
through an inter-subjectivity or in Du Bois’s terms a second-sight.     
 In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud articulates his conception of the 
empathy that makes laughter possible in strikingly similar terms to Du Bois’s second-sight. The 
connection between second-sight and the concept of the comic could not be louder than when 
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Freud states, “empathy plays the largest role in understanding what is inherently foreign to the 
self of other people” (qtd. in Pigman 249).5 Part of the reason Freud’s conceptualization of 
empathy and by extension the comic have not received more scholarly attention might be that 
James Strachey ambiguously translates the German. Strachey popularized the translation of “das 
Ichfremde anderer Personen” as not “foreign to the self of other people,” but “foreign to our ego 
in other people.” If Freud had meant to say empathy lets us understand what is ‘foreign to our 
ego,’ why would he not have used the more direct phrase “das fremde Ich”? If he had used it, he 
would have been unambiguously echoing the standard definition of empathy, which he inherits 
from Theodor Lipps. The analyst who singlehandedly transferred the theory of empathy 
(Einfulung) from psychological aesthetics to the center of psychology, Lipps argued that 
empathy allows us to realize that we have a self and that others exist. In Lipps’s line of reasoning 
empathy reveals to the empathizer what he cannot see on his own. Freud, however, radicalizes 
this standard definition of empathy by suggesting it reveals the blindness of the empathized, 
reveals, that is, “what is foreign to the selves of other people,” things they do not understand 
about who they are. As I see it empathy and the laughter it enables are functionally analogous to 
second-sight: they afford one the view of another’s unconscious.  
The modes and forms of humor—humor being the all-encompassing term in this 
dissertation—in which my authors explore and enact comic second-sight are various: trickery, 
burlesque, tall tales, the dozens, the absurd, and satire. No matter the particular form or mode, 
however, any discussion of humor necessarily brings forms of realism to mind. We have to think 
about realism (and this was my intention) because all laughter—the one point of consensus 
amongst all theories of humor—is a reaction to a cognitive impasse, wherein we perceive that 
                                                        
5 I am following George Pigman’s translation of Freud’s 1921 Group Psychology, printed in Pigman’s 
essay “Freud and the History of Empathy” (249).  
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another human being suddenly cannot fit our usual or normative definitions of the human. 
Whether automized and mechanical as Henri Bergson laments or exaggerated and caricatured as 
Bakhtin champions, the realness of the comic subject is always in question.6  
The contravention of this humor in African American realism works to redefine black 
humanity as predominantly sketched throughout African American letters. Part, but not all, of the 
humanity that the humor of this study captures, a part that realism often does not, is its unsullied 
and non-derivative experience of joy. Since the slave narratives or perhaps because of them, 
scenes of enjoyment have remained suspicious in African American literature. Saidiya Hartman 
describes the entanglement of terror and pleasure as characteristic of those “innocent 
amusements,” where slaves are depicted as dancing or conducting some manner of merrymaking 
on the plantation (Scenes 42). True, these scenes  “maintained relations of domination through 
euphemism and concealment,” relations that writers quite naturally hoped to unmask by 
emphasizing the violence done to the black body and mind. Also true is that this insistence on 
making visible the traumas of slavery and its aftermath, too often brushed off with crass jokes, 
has conditioned a limited perspective of both African American humor and the humanity it 
expresses. For instance, Cornel West writes, “the radically comic character of African American 
life—the pervasive sense of joy, laughter, and ingenious humor in the black community—flows 
primarily from the African American preoccupation with tragedy” (151). My aim is to unlock 
black humor from the ideological fetters of African American realism.  
                                                        
6 In Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, Bergson writes, “The comic is that side of a person 
which reveals his likeness to a thing, that aspect of human events which, through its peculiar inelasticity, 
conveys the impression of pure mechanism, of automatism, of movement without life. Consequently it 
expresses an individual or collective imperfection which calls for an immediate corrective, This corrective 
is laughter, a social gesture that singles out and repressses a special kind of absentmindedness in men and 
in events” (87-88). 
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The dangers of reiterating stereotypes of the contented slave invariably made realism the 
favored form in almost every major propagandistic use of narrative for the abolition of slavery 
and racial uplift. This avoidance of Sambo throughout the abolitionist, New Negro, Civil Rights, 
and Black Power movements produced a particular form of realism and a corresponding black 
humanity. As Jacqueline Goldsby observes, “once race and the depiction of physical pain 
became forged as an essential condition for African American writing of the ‘real,’ a literary 
aesthetic was established that conferred narrative value on the wounded or otherwise defiled 
black body as the expressive medium of authentic knowledge and experience” (186). One way 
the humor in this dissertation, the comic devices and sometimes plots, stretch the limits of the 
human is by dissociating the African American real from the pained body, the proof of black 
humanity from confessions of suffering.  
No author in this study is more intent on achieving this dissociation than Hurston. In my 
first chapter, I argue that the major discursive strategy organizing Hurston’s anthropological 
studies, her fiction, and cultural criticism published in the second quarter of the twentieth-
century is something more specific than “Signifyin(g),” the field-framing concept of Henry 
Louis Gates. Her work operates, rather, by a tactic I call deflection, the employment of ironic 
moves that invite a stereotypical interpretation of her characters only to throw that expectation 
off course.  As a way of resisting the primitivist desires of both her patron Charlotte Mason and 
the post-World War I publication industry, Hurston used deflection, for example, in “How It 
Feels to Be Colored Me.” There the speaker plays the role of Sambo, happily praising slavery as 
“worth the price… I paid for civilization.”  But she deflects the reader’s view of her as such a 
stereotype not only by asserting an impossibility—that of paying the cost of slavery herself—but 
most of all by abruptly closing the paragraph with, “It is quite exciting to hold the center of the 
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national stage with the spectators not knowing whether to laugh or to weep.” In so doing, she 
imagines a readership that is, as it were, epistemologically and affectively dumbstruck, uncertain 
how to respond to stereotypes of blackness. Encouraging the second-sight of moving between 
contradictory conditions of knowledge, deflection creates epistemological and affective 
uncertainty about the knowledge one uses to racialize others. 
I focus my second chapter around Ellison’s employment of the comic form to inspire 
historical memory and the psychological attitude toward a history of duress. I reorient the critical 
discussion on Ellison by demonstrating the centrality of humor to his vision of American history 
and by reinterpreting his employment of absurdist narrative form. Far from a tragic vision of the 
evolving present, Ellison’s form of the absurd reflects the ability of his subjects to see the 
underside of racism, to apprehend its ironies, and consequently survive its persistence. I show 
that Ellison appropriates his conception of the comic from Kierkegaard and Kenneth Burke, but  
in the years between his early short stories and late essays he advances a Freudian insight that the 
comic carries a “humanizing factor” even within “ethnic humor,” the humor of stereotyping: 
“there is something… about humor which makes it very very tricky. It tends to make us identify 
with the one laughed at despite ourselves” (“American Humor”). Through what he calls 
“extrasensory perception—or second-sight,” which he defines as inherently subversive to a racist 
regime, this “humanizing factor” prepares the way for equal social relations and fortifies the 
consciousness against unexpected racist aggressions and the necessary account of their context in 
American history. Thus for Ellison investing in stereotype is inseparable from his promotion of 
American democracy. 
I then move to little-known author Charles Wright, who has been read primarily in light 
of the problem of identity and the influence of existentialism. I, however, recontextualize him in 
 
    14 
major debates around welfare policies and their underlying ideologies, debates I argue that his 
second novel The Wig: A Mirror Image (1966) and his later work encapsulate and reorient.  I 
unearth and study the entirely neglected satirical articles that he wrote for The Village Voice 
between 1967 and 1973, which largely make up Absolutely Nothing to Get Alarmed About 
(1973), his third and final novel. With increasing radicalism and anger, Wright parodies the 
stereotypes propagated by culture of poverty theses popular during the Johnson and Nixon 
presidential years. He urges his readers to adopt a second-sight in which they discern their 
collusion in the domestic and international structures of capitalism that hide beneath culture of 
poverty stereotypes.  Because his columns for the Village Voice reflect a growing concern for 
international issues of poverty, Wright plays a significant role in the transnational turn in the 
humanities and the anti-poverty campaigns of the Civil Rights Movement. By extending 
Wright’s relevance beyond the gray cows of identity politics and the anterooms of existentialism, 
I hope to remove him for good from the margins of political history.  
I close with Suzan-Lori Parks’s theater of the absurd and read her 1990 Death of the Last 
Black Man in the Whole Entire World beside her other works. I argue that, in response to the 
dashed hopes of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements—the dismantling of 
desegregation, voting rights laws, and, most of all, the optimism for a freer future—Parks invests 
in stereotypes as a form of redress and replenishment of hope: she stretches positivist and 
exclusionary categories of the human. Here characters quite literally invest themselves in 
stereotypes: they embody them on stage as a counter-intuitive way of repossessing their bodies. I 
harness Heidegger’s theory of “The Thing” to read the way she expands black humanity to a 
thingliness that cannot be bought, sold, or killed. After unveiling in her first major production 
Imperceptible Mutabilities in the Third Kingdom the psychic dangers of trying to discredit 
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stereotyping discourse, Parks makes one of the loudest statements for investing in stereotypes. 
She stages second-sight between the characters in The Death—who together are an amalgam of 
things and humans—to promote an endlessly inclusive human community. It can be said that all 
the authors in this study, by breaking the enclosures of common-sense, by employing a counter-
intuitive strategy of anti-racist resistance, work to emplot a more inclusive society.  
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Chapter One  
  
Evacuating Sambo: 
Masks, Deflection, and the Laughing Sublime in Zora Neale Hurston’s Humor 
 
An Overview  
ora Neale Hurston describes the feeling she gets from a jazz band closing its set as 
follows: “I creep back slowly to the veneer we call civilization.”  Here Hurston is 
repeating the stereotype of the “jungle” black musician, one of many stereotypes that 
whites have carelessly or deliberately wielded so as to associate blacks with the antithesis of 
civilization.  It is no wonder that so many readers, like Alice Walker, have been exasperated with 
her. 
It has been just as obvious to readers that Hurston set herself against the predictability of 
racial stereotypes.  She writes, “I feel like a brown bag of miscellany propped against the wall.”  
One can always read her, like so many and perhaps all great authors, as self-contradictory.  But 
this does not explain the impulse to embrace racial stereotypes in the first place, an impulse 
which clearly goes beyond setting them up to be critiqued.  Playing with racial stereotypes is 
risky business. Their repetition threatens to perpetuate them, dehumanizing their referents and, 
what is perhaps worse, suggesting that the conditions of racialized oppression were benign and 
even pleasurable.  Why would Hurston be willing to run this risk?  Something else must be going 
on here. 
It’s a bit shocking to realize how mainstream and how complacent this stereotypical 
discourse of race was. Perhaps it was complacent because its strategy was so effective.  Sambo 
Z 
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smiles because of the absence of pain on the plantation; the wretched freeman frowns because of 
the absence of pleasure in freedom. In effect, black happiness was scandalously coupled with the 
experience of slavery. In 1930 historians Samuel Morrison and Henry Commager were merely 
echoing a long line of playwrights, biographers, and fellow historians when they wrote in their 
highly popular The Growth of the American Republic, “As for Sambo… there is some reason to 
believe that he suffered less than any other class in the South from its peculiar institution” (537).  
If Hurston wanted to show Southern blacks smiling and even laughing, the danger was that she 
would seem to be re-affirming the noxious Sambo myth. To open up the space for an irreducible 
and deep happiness, Hurston had to contend with Sambo.  
In response to an overwhelming call for a tragic realism by the major black newspapers, 
Hurston wrote “I am not tragically colored. I do not belong to the sobbing school of Negrohood 
who hold that nature somehow has given them a lowdown dirty deal” (“How” 153). She took as 
her antagonists those realist and naturalist writers who (naturally enough) wanted to discredit the 
Sambo stereotype, which as Joseph Boskin writes was “the most widely used of all black comic 
names” in the 1920s.  The contours of the “sobbing school” were outlined in two major 
prescriptive essays by Alain Locke and Jessie Fauset. Both construct the image of the New 
Negro as the inversion of Sambo, a black man full of merriment and empty of mind. In what 
became known as the manifesto for the New Negro Movement, Locke synonymously names the 
New Negro as the “Thinking Negro,” the conscious counterpoint to the passive  “Uncle Tom and 
Sambo,” both of whom “have passed on,” for “the popular melodrama has about played itself 
out” (4). Although Locke attempts to escape any accommodation of stereotypes, an escape he 
considers vital to the maturation of the New Negro consciousness (“through having had to appeal 
from the unjust stereotypes of his oppressors and traducers to those of his liberators… he has had 
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to subscribe to the traditional positions from which his case has been viewed”), he stumbles back 
upon them not least in the qualifier “New” but also in his critique of Southern folk humor: “a 
leaven of humor… has gone into the making of the South from a humble, unacknowledged 
source,”  but, he continues, “a second crop of the Negro’s gifts promises still more largely.” 
Since Sambo is commonly depicted as laughing on the plantation, folk humor recalls this image 
and is therefore diminished as another sign of passivity. The larger gift, then, is the New Negro 
becoming “a conscious contributor,” “a collaborator and participant in American civilization.” 
Contradictory to the imperative he cosigned with Du Bois to preserve folk cultural forms, Locke 
suggests the distance from folk humor measures the expanse of the New Negro’s mind.  
Fauset takes Locke’s inversion of Sambo to an extreme devaluation of the comic form.  
In her essay “The Gift of the Laughter,” which focuses exclusively on black humor as manifest 
on the minstrel stage, her subjects of study are black actors in black face. In arguing for an 
alternative way of seeing these performers, one that does not reduce them to “mere” funniness, 
she presents humor as an avenue into an essential and an essentially pained blackness. “The 
medium,” she begins, “through which the black actor has been presented to the world has been 
that of the ‘funny man’ of America” (165). The “new funny man,” she says, aligning him as 
perfectly congruent with the New Negro, is exactly the reverse. If his humor is ever “the 
radiation of good feeling and happiness,” it is only because he feels some primary, ontic wound. 
“This good feeling,” this “excessive… well-being”—indeed, this “supervitality” might “glow… 
from time to time,” but the times that enable it are always tragic (166). “The remarkable thing 
about this gift of ours,” she concludes, writing the words that would ring throughout the century, 
“is that it has its rise, I am convinced, in the very woes that beset us” (167). Humor and its 
expressions of happiness are reduced to tragedy. 
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She takes her argument even further, implying that a humor conveying joy is not true in 
itself; in fact, as such, it is convincingly false. She says it is the “hardships and woes suffered” 
that “introduced with the element of folk comedy some element of reality.” The syntax here is 
tricky. The first “element” is subtly pitted against the second, so that folk comedy, taken to mean 
happiness, contradicts reality, taken to mean “hardship.” Hardship, in other words, is the only 
real thing on the comic stage. The moments an audience witnessed an actor expressing “good 
feeling and happiness,” they were seeing the “portrayal of sheer emotion,” affect decoupled from 
intelligence and social context.   In addition, because for blacks or any “too-hard driven people” 
humor stems from heartache, she ultimately contends that all well-performed comic roles prove 
“the endowment for the portrayal of tragedy” (166-67). There is a difference between the 
argument that comedy always contains an element of tragedy, that they are the two faces of a 
single coin, and the argument that comedy derives from the tragic. If the “Caucasian in America 
has persisted in dragging to the limelight merely one aspect of Negro characteristics,” as Fauset 
declaims, she unwittingly reduces him to another. 
 Any reductive and simplified portrait countered the authenticity Fauset, Locke, and 
indeed Hurston strived to achieve. Hurston nuanced authentic depictions of black life not only by 
breaking the equation of happiness to mental vacuity and tragedy to intellectual depth. She 
defined the authentically black as the partly illegible, that which is difficult to read.7 With the 
                                                        
7 The opacity of her characters countered the demands of Bertram Lippincott of the J. P. Lippincott 
company, her primary publisher. Lippincott pressured her to make her writing as easily understood as a 
stereotype, to make her characters knowable to a white readership in terms that readership could easily 
take in, and this pressure was stamped in the advertisements for her books. Her 1938 anthropological 
study black life in Haiti and Jamaica Tell My Horse was advertised in the New York Times as “Voodoo as 
no White Person ever saw it!” (23). When she released Their Eyes Were Watching God in 1937, a review 
ad in the same paper quoted Clifton Fadiman of the New Yorker as testifying that “the Negro dialogue is 
the realest I’ve read in years” (20). Her first novel Jonah’s Gourd Vine was “a book no white person 
could write,” as Lippincott printed in the New York Herald Tribune (14).  The advertisements suggest that 
all these translations of what to a “white person” would be unintelligible if left to her own devices owed 
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possible exception of Susan Meisenhelder’s full length study of race and gender in Hurston’s 
corpus, the critical reception of her work has insisted that whether she accommodates or subverts 
stereotypical portraits of blackness, she manages to provide a window into black life. Hazel 
Carby’s critique typifies the tartest response to Hurston’s provision of access, what appears to be 
her use of stereotypes to make blackness legible to those positioning themselves as outsiders. 
Carby identifies Hurston’s rejection of the “sobbing school” as a problematic opposition to 
Richard Wright. While Wright’s characters are too large for the minstrel stage, Hurston’s, Carby 
implies, fit confidently front and center: “Whereas Wright attempted to explode the discursive 
category of the Negro as being formed, historically, in the culture of minstrelsy… Hurston 
wanted to preserve the concept of Negroness” (34). Her  “attempt [was] to make the unknown 
known” (34). Although Carby of course has a point, there are other ways of understanding 
Hurston’s hanging on to “the concept of Negroness.” Indeed, one could even say that her aim 
was the antithetical one; not making the unknown known, but preserving its unknowability, 
showing that it is impossible to fully know the black experience. In the process, she forced her 
readers to reflect on their own assumptions. 
 Hurston does not invert images of Sambo in opposition to a racist calculus.  In The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Francois Lyotard aptly calls this opposition  “a 
reactional countermove” that is no more than “the programmed effect in the opponent’s 
strategy.” Instead of making a programmed inversion, Hurston reveals that the logic of the 
                                                        
themselves to Hurston’s racialized way of knowing, which was not only her insider knowledge but a 
manner of observation particular to the black race. Nowhere is this unique perspective more evident than 
in the ad for her parodic novel Moses: Man of the Mountain: “The Negro has always had a special feeling 
for Moses,” a fact confirmed by one reviewer who wrote, “All primitive peoples have an inordinate love 
of magic or what appears to be magic and the African most of all” (Hutchinson 7). The expectations of 
readers, especially those familiar with her work, were primed for complete access to the mystical realm of 
black life.  
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stereotype is itself contradictory. She makes this point about contradictions in her essay “You 
Don’t Know Us Negroes,” a declaration addressed to publishers and readers hoping to see blacks 
as primitive and infantile. “Most outsiders… think,” she wrote, “that if a person opens his mouth 
to laugh, the casual bystander may glance down the laughing throat and see all the deep-set 
emotion, including the liver” (003). Placing the reader of the stereotype (the outsider) at one 
remove from the stereotypist (the casual bystander), Hurston marks the ignorance of both parties, 
blind to the enigma created by the picture of someone laughing. Sambo conceals more than it 
conveys, excites uncertainty as much as assurance. And his exaggerated smile and facial features 
intended to render the black body transparent or hyper-visible accomplish the reverse. 
Hurston translates this contradictory nature of stereotypes into three comic strategies that 
render her characters irreducible, strategies that, to pull on Lyotard again, “disorient… in such a 
way as to make an unexpected ‘move’” and thus have some influence “on the balance power”: 
masks, deflection, and the laughing sublime.  Masks differ in her work from, say, their 
instantiation in Paul Lawrence Dunbar’s. They do not “grin and lie,” as Dunbar suggests, 
because in giving no assurance about the truth they conceal we cannot as readers be assured 
enough to say that they “lie.” Hurston’s masks have no cracks, as it were, for, unlike Dunbar in 
his poem, she as a narrator in her fiction does not convey the sentiment or action that is being 
masked. Her second strategy, used in conjunction with masking, is to solicit expectations only to 
throw them off course, a strategic irony I therefore call deflection, “the action of turning away 
from a regular path” (OED). Finally, the laughing sublime, evoking both Kant and Paul Gilroy’s 
term “slave sublime,” names Hurston’s enlargement of the folk symbol for pleasurable laughter, 
“High John,” to an unimaginable and frightening expanse. Each of these strategies is a way of 
rendering her “folk” indeterminate and making her readers self-conscious about the assumptions 
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that go into their reading. Save for the sublime, which I will detail at the end of the chapter since 
it features in her later works, let me examine each in turn. 
Take, first, the mask.  In “How It Feels to Be Colored Me,” Hurston dons a sequence of 
different masks (mostly stereotypes, like the jungle musician we saw above). The essay is 
divided into four parts, each of the middle two drawing a distinct mask, until she finally 
commences the fourth section seeming, surprisingly, to take them off: “at certain times I have no 
race, I am me” (155). She is “the cosmic Zora” who, because of this Whitmanesque cosmic 
expanse, nobody fully “knows.” “Knows” is the word with which she closes, an interrogation of 
knowledge that urges us too look again at Zora as she appears in the preceding three sections. 
The first mask portrays herself as a child in Orange County before she was racialized, or, as she 
says,  “sent to school.”  There she “suffered a sea change,” as “a little colored girl” took the place 
of “Zora of Orange County” (153). Her schooling seems to have consisted of learning that people 
perceived blackness as a mark of an a-historic nature and a primitive savagery, the masks she 
dons, respectively, in the second and third section.  She dons these masks not in order to account 
for how it feels to be colored, but to account for how it feels to be colored—for the process that 
makes her so appear. She refuses to let her readers know what it means to be Zora, but she does 
let us know that whatever that feeling is, it is separate from the way she has been racialized. 
Hurston employs the device of deflection to signal that these personas are, indeed, masks.  
Clearly her readers expect otherwise.  She takes on the mask of a proslavery advocate, cutting 
from herself the history of slavery like the removal a failed kidney: “the operation was successful 
and the patient is doing well, thank you.”  She has no more roots in that past, she says, a past for 
which she “holds no malice,” for which, outrageously, she has nothing but “gratitude.” She 
explains these sentiments in her most provocative line, where she fittingly employs her ironic 
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deflection:  “Slavery is the price I paid for civilization,” she writes. That same civilization, 
however, she soon calls (as we saw above) a “veneer” (154). In this light we should read the 
sentence that follows, a cover-up of a harder and inaccessible truth: “It is a bully adventure and 
worth all that I have paid through my ancestors for it.” The truth, implied through her joking turn 
of phrase (“all… I have paid through my ancestors), is that this entire essay is one long extended 
trick. As such, it is a commentary on her indeterminability. She cannot pay now through 
ancestors necessarily absent. And if it is not she who paid, there is no way to measure slavery’s 
“worth.”  All these twists of irony make her position surprisingly unfixable. In a sentence that 
corroborates her deflective move and falsifies the primitivism she adopts in the following 
section, she announces with pleasure: “It is thrilling… quite exciting to hold the center of the 
national stage, with the spectators not knowing whether to laugh or to weep” (emphasis mine).  
Those “spectators,” the same word Fauset uses for the entertained audience at a minstrel show, 
will now entertain her. The play is “thrilling” because it is a play on expectations and “exciting,” 
from the Latin word “excitare,” because she herself “call[s] it forth” (OED). She has full control 
over her mask and the direction of the reader’s gaze. When Alice Walker said that this essay is 
“Hurston at her most exasperating,” I wonder if she would have seen it differently through the 
lens of Hurston’s humor (151).  
This is Hurston in 1928, being subtle.  By 1950 you could not miss her message. She 
was, by this time, trumpeting her discomfort with the easy knowability of blacks on the literary 
page. In an essay she published in The Negro Digest, “What White Publishers Won’t Print,”  she 
raises the question with tongue-and-cheek of why people believe the “internal life” of blacks is 
“non-existent.” “The answer,” she writes,  
lies in what we may call the American Museum of Unnatural History. This is an 
intangible built on folk belief.  It as assumed that all non-Anglo-Saxons are 
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uncomplicated stereotypes. Everybody knows all about them. They are lay figures 
in the museum where all may take them in at a glance. (170)  
 
Readers presume to easily “know all” not only because of a perverse simplification, but also 
because of the way they are directed to look. Indeed, the fact that she places these “figures” in a 
museum exhibit construes the problem of their being “lay” as perspectival. Something needed to 
be invented so that it would become impossible to take blacks in “at a glance.” Between 1928 
and 1950 Hurston was engaged in a project of humor that assured the inability of blackness to be 
“taken,” exploited, and to be “taken in,” misappropriated, the two threats simplification poses. 
Against the view of her biographers (particularly Robert Hemenway) that she became patriotic 
and conservative as she aged, I show that for twenty-two years she increasingly pushed her black 
characters out of reach from any reductive reading, radically countering the expectations of her 
readership on one front and the popularity of realism and naturalism on the other.  
 
Sambo’s Enigmatic Laugh  
In 1933 Hurston published one of her more famous short stories, “The Gilded Six-Bits.”8 
Many have complained about its apparent sexism, one reason for this being that it is a story 
about a marriage disrupted by a wife’s infidelity. What makes the story disconcerting is that the 
wife Missie Mae claims—and we have no reason to distrust her—that she slept with another man 
to procure money for her husband Joe. The man she sells herself to, Slemmons, flashes about the 
town his collection of “gold coins,” with the obvious phallic connotations. Slemmons brags 
about his own desirability in the eyes of white women. Joe then complains about Slemmons’ 
sexual prowess to Missie, saying that he feels he would be more desirable, more “man,” if he had 
                                                        
8 The last short story she published before her first novel, Jonah’s Gourd Vine, this is her most 
anthologized short fiction.  
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Slemmons’ money. The irony of it all, as Joe realizes after he laughs at the scene of Missie 
cheating on him, is that the coins are gilded.9 Making the story still more problematic is that 
when the couple reconciles, it seems to be over the sheer fact that Missie gives birth to her 
husband’s son. To look at such a sequence of patriarchal events on their own should certainly 
frustrate and can easily give the impression of having already been read. George Kent remarks 
on the ease with which a reader can interpret the story, take it in at glance, as it were, since even 
beyond its predictable gender issues, it displays a “certain simple-mindedness” of “really simple 
people” (Bell 225). Yet, as Nancy Chinn and Elizabeth Dunn argue, it is hardly a 
heteronormative,  “straightforward tale of love, betrayal, and reconciliation” (790).10 And 
character is the last thing in this story we could call “simple.”  
As much as the piece displays the problems of patriarchy it also engages the problems of 
reading. I want to draw our attention to the story’s use of laughter as a strategy of deflection and 
a type of mask—as ultimately Hurston’s mechanism for withdrawing her characters from any 
determined reading. Laughter ultimately becomes a mark of misinterpretation, a reflection not of 
character, but of the reader’s misguided sight. I am arguing that not only is the reconciliation 
between the couple not “straightforward,” as Chin and Dunn claim, but indeterminable, a fact 
that emerges after Joe utters his rupturing laugh. Indeed, it is the laugh he breaks forth when he 
discovers Missie May copulating with Slemmons that turns the story off course, that marks the 
                                                        
9 Hurston plays on this theme of empty material splendor throughout her career. Consider Moses, Man of 
the Mountain and Their Eyes Were Watching God.  
 
 
10 For other readings that complicate this seemingly simple story, see Dora Davis, “De Talkin’ Game: The 
Creating of Psychic Space in Selected Short Fiction of Zora Neale Hurston,” Tulsa Studies in Women’s 
Literature 26.2 (2007), 269-286; and Rosalie Baum, “The Shape of Hurston’s Fiction,” in Zora in 
Florida, ed. Steve Glassman and Kathryn Seidel (Orlando: University of Central Florida Press, 1994), 94-
109.  
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beginning of his withdrawal from the narrator’s perspective, the withdrawal, that is, from any 
disclosure of his psychological state. As we will see, it is also at this point that the symbols of 
their intimacy are reversed as symbols of their distance. Furthermore, they fail to be replaced 
with any signs of hope or proof of renewed intimacy. In a word, the story raises the expectation 
of their reconciled love, their healing, but then through laughter definitively undercuts it. 
Contrary to its interpretation even among critics who see its complexity, I posit that we leave the 
story knowing nothing about what will happen in Missie and Joe’s lives. The knowledge we have 
at the beginning about the nature of their relationship is completely obscured at the end.  
When Joe overturns that knowledge, that security we might have as readers, he does so in 
the act of laughing. Laughter, then, marks the rupture between an aesthetic of revelation and one 
of concealment. To be clear, it is not the laughter itself that creates the rupture, but the laughter 
that signals a rupture has occurred, a clash between what I am calling the story’s two 
temporalities: mythic and tragic time. There is nothing especially unique about these except for 
the first, which, as usual in Hurston, takes on an added element. We might define mythic time as 
joyful recurrence, delightful predictability, a time in which events not only repeat, but in which 
their repetition produces joy. Tragic time, of course, is precisely the opposite, ominous 
contingency, traumatic chance. The life the couple leads before the rupture is defined by ritual 
and ritualistic play. Everyday Joe returns home at the same time, throws coins at the front door to 
announce his arrival, and wrestles with his wife, making a “furious mass of male and female 
energy,” a symbol of edenic undifferentiation.  Even the grounds of their property represent their 
faith in the splendidly predictable nature of their lives: 
There was something happy about the place. The front yard was parted in the 
middle by a sidewalk from gate to door-step, a sidewalk edged on either side by 
quart bottles driven neck down into the ground on a slant. A mess of homey 
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flowers planted without a plan but blooming cheerily from their helter-skelter 
places. (86) 
 
The outlay of their yard is haphazard. Everything is planted without straight lines, in crooked 
design, because they trust the mythic turnout of their burgeoning life: “without a plan but 
blooming cheerily” (emphasis mine).  
 The tragic outcome of capitalistic desires nonetheless threatens to disrupt this pastoralism 
from the very opening of the story. The first lines read, “It was a Negro yard around a Negro 
house in a Negro settlement that looked to the payroll of the G. and G. Fertilizer works for its 
support.”  The insularity of their world, suggested by the triple repetition of the modifier 
“Negro” is soon to be invaded by the lusts of the market, “G. and G. Fertilizer” (hardly a subtle 
allusion to pregnancy).  Although this fertilizing company historically existed in Forest City, a 
town bordering Eatonville, the setting of the story, there was no company exactly by that name. 
“G. and G.” seems to signal gilded gold, for these are the only two words beginning with “g” that 
describe money throughout the narrative. With the company itself representing the money for 
which Missie staked the marriage, it also represents the money that could further their conjugal 
corruption, for Joe throws that same payroll at the door in the end, as in the beginning, his ritual 
of “singing metal on wood.” 
 Foreshadowed in the first line with the intrusion of the fertilizing company into the 
couple’s insularity, it is the clash of mythic and tragic temporalities that produce the climax of 
the story and Joe’s climactic laugh. As he witnesses the bedroom scene, “The great belt in the 
wheel of Time slipped and eternity stood still” (93). If Joe is suddenly aware of that “wheel,” a 
metonym for mythic time,  then “Time” is also aware of itself, for its own mechanism is broken. 
This double attentiveness thereby doubly underscores its object of sight: “the shapeless enemies 
of humanity that live in the hours of Time,” agents of contingency that “waylaid Joe.” Detained, 
 
    28 
“waylaid,” removed from both temporal developments, Joe laughs to return to them. At first he 
cannot move, since traumatized, despite his having “both chance and time to kill the intruder.” 
He cannot “take action.” “So he just opened his mouth and laughed.” Set apart from time, 
traumatically frozen, he laughs to return to time, which is both mythic and tragic. From now on 
his laughter is disturbing as much to Missie as it should be to us, for it reminds us that we cannot 
know which temporality he follows, how his life will take shape, what its fate will be. His 
temporal estrangement and subsequent reintegration is corroborated by the plot itself. At the 
moment he laughs at the trauma the movement of the narrative resumes: Joe acts. He grows into 
a monstrous figure, no longer “assaulted” but now assaulting, assaulting with his laughter.  
His indeterminacy between mythic and tragic time is reflected also in the breach between 
the narrator’s description of him and Slemmons’. Slemmons “considered a surprise attack upon 
this big clown,” who the narrator describes conversely as this “rough-backed mountain.” In 
Slemmons’ eyes, Joe  “stood there laughing like a chessy cat,” a figure of myth. The difference 
between the narrator’s perspective and that of Slemmons is the difference between Joe’s and his 
readers’, a distinction cemented by the story’s end. But it is also the duality expressed in Joe’s 
laughter, mythic progression, figured in the mythological figure of the “chessy cat,” and tragic 
fate, symbolized by Joe’s transformation into a mountain, “barring [Slemmons] from escape, 
from sunrise, from life,” all things that tragedy bars or negates.   
From here on out Joe’s laughter both conceals his psychic states and expresses his 
unlocatable nature in time.  Prior to the moment of narrative pause, Joe projects the point of view 
of the story, whereas at all points thereafter the focus moves to the mind of Missie May, and then 
finally to a white clerk obviously misreading Joe’s life through his laugh. Yet we only see May 
as she sees Joe, who becomes implacably self-protective. In other words, psychological access 
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becomes increasingly figured as inaccessibility, at one remove in his wife, then at twice remove 
in the white clerk, whose shop suggestively sits two towns away from Eatonville. Every point of 
view after the rupture inscribes the difficulty in reading Joe, a difficulty created precisely 
through laughing. After all, the two things that Missie May wants to escape, the two features that 
estrange him from her, that turn him to a “strange man in her bed,” are his eyes, his way of 
seeing her, and his laughter, his way of denying the possibility of seeing him. After suffering this 
estrangement from her husband, she planned “to be gone forever beyond the reach of Joe’s looks 
and laughs.”  
The distance between himself and his readers is largest when he arrives at the candy store 
and converses with the cashier. He remarks on Joe’s absence: “‘Ain’t seen you in a long time,’” 
he says, to which Joe replies, “‘Nope, Ah ain’t been heah. Been round in spots and places’” (98). 
The response is startlingly vague, leaving Joe not only undetermined in time but also in space. 
As he leaves with his goods, “The clerk turned to the next customer” and says, “Wisht I could be 
like those darkies. Laughin’ all the time. Nothin’ worries ‘em.’” (The man at the center of capital 
exchange stages a dehumanizing interpretation of blacks as primitive, a dehumanization, his title 
of “clerk” suggests, that is never disjoint from the gains of the market.) While this final scene 
“reveals Hurston’s indirect critique of the happy darky stereotype,” as Genevieve West notices, 
my point is that it also, more so, deflects the reader’s gaze (39). If Joe’s laughter is a mask, it is 
equally a feature of deflection, returning any of our assumptions about his life back to us. Put 
differently, because the story ends with the clerk’s erroneous reading, at the moment we are 
likely to reflect on what has taken place or, more pressingly, what will,  but also leaves us with 
no assurance about what the laughter hides, it invariably unsettles our own entry into the text, not 
only our reading of Joe but of his life with Missie.  
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The critical consensus is that the ending is positive, that all will be well with Joe and 
Missie.11 Critics have used Joe’s return to the practice of throwing coins at the front door to 
argue this point. But the readoption of this practice, the only thing that could possibly signal a 
return to some romance, however tarnished, is the very thing that disrupted their love from the 
start: the intrusion of capitalist gain. While at the beginning of the story he threw them nine 
times, at the end he nearly doubles it with “fifteen.” Chin considers this numerical symbol 
evidence of their recuperated love: “Both nine and fifteen as multiples of three include 
‘biological synthesis, childbirth and the solution of a conflict,’” she writes, quoting the 
mythologist J. E. Cirlot. “Nine is ‘the  triplication of the triple… the end-limit of the numerical 
series before its return to unity,’ while five is associated with… health and love, and spring, 
‘signifying the organic fullness of life as opposed to the rigidity of death.’”  The mistake Chin 
makes is in separating the mythical nature of the number from the tragic nature of its object (the 
system of capitalism). Manifestations of the market loom ominous throughout the story. Prior to 
the rupture Joe used to “let his wife go through all of his pockets and take out the things that he 
had hidden there for her to find,” but after, there were “no more pockets to rifle. In fact the 
yellow coin in his trousers was like the monster hiding in the cave of his pockets to destroy her” 
(95). His “payroll” is conflated with “the monster hiding in the cave”—money on which their 
happiness, remember, ironically “depended.” Intensifying the doubt of the comic reconciliation, 
Joe uses the same gilded coins that corrupted his marriage to buy it back. He brings Missie 
                                                        
11 In Down Home: Origins of the Afro-American Short Story, Robert Bone claims that the story “portrays 
the triumph of rural over urban values” (141). In Zora Neale Hurston and American Literary Culture, 
Genevieve West writes, all too assuredly, that “Huston’s narrative pulls readers, black and white, through 
a complex relationship and the humorous folk rituals that function to keep Joe and Missie’s marriage 
alive. Their relationship reveals the larger functions of humor, ritual, and folk traditions: to preserve and 
promote a healthy and whole community” (39). That the community is healthy is up to debate, 
inconclusively.  
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chocolate as a token of forgiveness. Perhaps it is at this point clear that the capitalist strand is 
important to trace because it parallels the indeterminate temporality of Joe’s laughter. As we do 
not know where he will end up, in the most abstract sense (happily or doomed), we do not know, 
in the more specific sense, what the ritual of throwing coins means for their marriage. After all, 
throwing these coins in a way that they are liable to be lost could also indicate his devaluation of 
their worth.  
Yet we do not need to turn solely to the story to see the dubiousness of their prospects. It 
is there ironically in the claims amongst critics that the signs of their future are good. For 
instance, Rosalie Baum asserts, “there probably can never be innocent romps. But Missie can 
move from creeping to walking to running; gradually her physical strength will return, as will the 
strength to their love. Someday there can again be laughter, bantering, and, at least, bittersweet 
romps” (102). The foundation of her argument is conjecture. If Hurston withholds any certain, let 
alone fortuitous, indications of their future, signs she could have evoked by the end (even the 
sun’s rising would have mitigated the ambiguity), she also withdraws any readerly assurance.  
Baum, however, is on firmer ground when she remarks that Hurston creates “short stories with 
all the potential for reducing her characters to mere ‘ciphers in… a cosmic storm…’  while 
refusing… to allow the naturalistic strategies she flirts with to render her characters’ lives 
insignificant or contemptible” (96).  Naturalism of narrative, the overdetermination of a 
character’s fate by the forces of the environment or the drives of her psychology, Hurston seems 
to see as a naturalism of readership. The readers are conditioned by the preponderance, Hurston 
claims, of what “white publishers… print” to read her characters in a particular way. Hurston’s 
achievement is, indeed, to “flirt” with the fulfillment of their expectations then abruptly 
undermine them, an aesthetic practice she elaborates in the text she released that following year.    
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Hurston’s Trickster Ethnography  
Hurston again questions what we can know about the people she promises to unveil in 
her first study of African American folklore Mules and Men, focusing on trickster tales and how 
they are told. She wrote within and against the assumptions that the advertisements and dusk-
jacket comments on the book elicited among her readers. For example, the publisher Lippincott 
describes Hoodoo as a practice of the “Southern darky” in a review Lippincott released to 
advertise the “imaginative” book in the New York Times. The review announced “I Can’t 
Remember Anything Better Since Uncle Remus!.” In another ad Lippincott states that the 
collection is “an astonishing revelation of the inner workings of the Negro mind, and of secret 
hexes and practices never before fully explained.” If, from reading the publications about the 
book, readers did not expect a subjective account that demystified the psychic life of black 
people, then from reading its preface written by the renown anthropologist Frantz Boas, they 
certainly would have.  
Ironically enough, at first Boas did not want to endorse the book because he thought it 
lacked scholarly distance, yet in the end, it was precisely this that he praised: “It is a great merit 
of Miss Hurston’s work that she entered into the homely life of the southern Negro as one of 
them and was fully accepted as such” (xiii). He continues, self-consciously: “Thus she has been 
able to penetrate through that affected demeanor by which the Negro excludes the White 
observer effectively from participating in his true inner life.” At the end of the paragraph he says 
again that this work is distinct for its portrayal of the “true inner life of the Negro.” This 
repetition of the same phrase regarding the Negro’s true life  reflects a long tradition of reading 
 
    33 
Hurston as providing access to an essential core. He finds a univocal truth in Hurston’s 
investigation and praises her for it.  
He goes on to locate that truth as something psychological, as something definitional to 
the psyches of blacks. What else would Boas have in mind when he speaks of a true interiority? 
Why else would he transition into the next paragraph with a clause that reads, “the material 
presented is valuable not only by giving the Negro’s reaction to everyday events, to his 
emotional life, his humor and passions” (emphasis mine)? Hurston, however, denies Boas’s 
interpretation on two fronts: she demonstrates the difficulty of generally accessing her subjects 
and specifically accessing their minds. Like Boas, later readers neglected to see the subtleties of 
what she was up to, charging that “Mules and Men both discovers the rural folk and acts to make 
known and preserve a form of culture that embodies a folk consciousness. The folk as 
community… exists principally as… a means for creating an essential concept of blackness” 
(Carby 40). Against his own suspicion of “whether any generally valid laws exist that govern the 
life of a society,” Boas praises Hurston for finding some, for, in a sense, stereotyping 
(Anthropology 15).  
As an anthropologist, Hurston’s main imperative was, of course, to correct the falsehoods 
about black people’s inner life. She even employs conventional techniques of cultural translation. 
She bookends the study with a “Glossary,” which defines the main trickster figures and some 
vernacular expressions. This is followed by an “Appendix” that sets the folk songs to a musical 
score, harkening back to the chapter on spirituals in Du Bois’s Souls of Black Folk.  But in these 
displays of authentic translation, Hurston is attempting to do something different from providing 
access to the minds of blacks and black life.  And nowhere is that more obvious than in her own 
“introduction” that qualifies if not wholly diverges from the truth Boas is excited to find.  
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Her aim is to introduce her subject’s trickster tales and the role she played in deriving 
them.12 For the most part, the tales are mostly intended to provoke laughter, which, in its turn, 
has a double function: it points to a joke or humorous situation and deflects the outsider’s eyes. 
However, sometimes nothing is funny and the only point of the laughter is to mask the tricksters’ 
emotions or conceal the humorous situation they find themselves in.  She explains the latter 
function through a concept called “feather-bed resistance” (2), but she discloses this “theory” in 
surprisingly little detail. Carla Kaplan describes it succinctly as “a strategy of double-speak, 
masking, avoidance, evasion, and silence” (226). Since Hurston obscures as she defines, 
complicates as she purports to clarify the way feather-bed resistance works, “it is impossible to 
tell whether the narrator is describing a strategy or employing one,” the strategy being one of 
deflection (Johnson, “Thresholds” 137).  I quote at length, highlighting the words that render her 
involvement in the lives of the “folk” ambiguous at best:  
Folklore is not as easy to collect as it sounds. The best source is where there are 
the least outside influences and these people, being usually under-privileged, are 
the shyest. They are most reluctant at times to reveal that which the soul lives by. 
And the Negro, in spite of his open-faced laughter, his seeming acquiescence, is 
particularly evasive.  You see we are a polite people and we do not say to our 
questioner, ‘Get out of here!’ We smile and tell him or her something that 
satisfies the white person because, knowing so little about us, he doesn’t know 
what he is missing. The Indian resists curiosity by a stony silence. The Negro 
offers a feather-bed resistance.13 That is, we let the probe enter, but it never comes 
out. It gets smothered under a lot of laughter and pleasantries. (2-3) 
 
To a large extent she wants the sonics of the laughter to remain encoded, hence she begins, 
“Folklore is not as easy to collect as it sounds.” When one hears the word folklore, she claims, 
                                                        
12 The “novelistic techniques” Hurston used in constructing her anthropological study places her, in some 
ways, at the forefront of her field.  According to Elizabeth Fine, these same techniques emerged in the 
1960s as characteristic of a mode some call “performance-centered collecting,” “a recognition of the role 
[the] audience” played (Chin, “‘The Ring of Singing Metal’” ).  
13 “Feather-bed” as a term is itself ironic, for it suggests the intimacy of the bedroom but enacts the 
distance of a foreign space. 
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one hears easiness, facility, and one of the reasons for this is the absence of sound. The page 
unfortunately cannot speak. Through textual transcription, black sound has been made all too 
easy to hear. It seems almost that the only way to preserve its authenticity is not to translate it, 
but to deny the possibility of its translation. The “probe,” her metonym for objectivity, the 
objectivity, that is, of translation, enters, but to no avail.  
Perhaps the most startling thing about this paragraph is its shift from the third to the first 
person. First she mentions outside influences,” “these people,” “they,” but then suddenly 
switches to a “we.” She unavoidably raises some questions for the reader: Where is she in her 
relationship to them? Who are we reading about? If she is their representative, then how much 
can we rely on her when, in the same paragraph, she labeled herself as someone apart? Many 
have faulted the book for her ambivalent objectivity. To the extent that this could be considered  
as a fault of scholarship, Arnold Rampersad considers it forgivable. The “key” to the book, he 
claims, is not what it says about her folk, but about herself: “the most fertile single device is the 
portrait of the narrator… her intimate psychology” (xxiii; xxii). To fall back on making the merit 
of the text its revelatory nature (if it does not reveal her people it at least reveals her), is to miss 
the fact that as she talks about feather-bed resistance, she demonstrates how it works. She is the 
probe, our eye as readers, that loses the perspective of what it promises to show. She makes the 
reader doubt the extent she herself was able to penetrate the laughter. For, after all, she also 
works as an outsider, one who is there to probe and discover. But if the probe never comes out 
then what do we make of the book? This question also emerges in the fact that when she 
mentions “outside influences” she implicitly identifies with us. In the end, then, she does not 
convince the reader that she has the “key” (Rampersad’s word), but unsettles her reader’s 
convictions that a key exists.  
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To make sure that her readers understand that this is the wrong space for “easy” reading, 
she continues, in the next paragraph firmly in the “we.” “The theory behind our tactics [of 
‘resistance’]: ‘The white man is always trying to know into somebody else’s business. All right, 
I’ll set something out the door of my mind for him to play with… He can read my writing but he 
sho’ can’t read my mind’ ” (3). This is one of two times in the book that she completely conflates 
her position with that of her subjects. In speaking with them as one voice, she cannot be any 
closer, but the irony is that this closeness is self-consciously staged. In the presentation of their 
united voice, she underscores herself as its sole author. For no one but herself is named as its 
speaker. Moreover, it is odd that she suddenly puts quotes around her own speech, an oddness 
that points more to her than anyone else. And if this is odd, then the following sentence is 
jarring: “I knew that even I was going to have some hindrance among strangers.” But was she 
not just in the first person plural? From a “they,” to a “we,” to a “we” that is an “I,” and finally to 
“strangers,” an exaggerated “they,” the journey through the humor will be, she demonstrates, as 
discombobulating as the humor itself. 
A good example of this indeterminate humor employing the technique of deflection is a 
trickster tale told early on. It goes without saying that these tales are jokes, but for the functions 
they served we should go to Lawrence Levine. He summarizes the three things scholars usually 
attribute to them. They were a “mechanism” “by means of which psychic relief from arbitrary 
authority could be secured, symbolic assaults upon the powerful could be waged, and important 
lessons about authority could be imparted” (Unpredictable 64). We can certainly see all these in 
the tales, but the lessons about authority becomes ones about legibility. The authority is 
definitive reading; the “assault” is on hermeneutic certainty. Here we have a story about Jack, a 
stock figure in these trickster tales, who, as Hurston explains in the glossary, “is the great human 
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culture hero in Negro folklore.” In the tale that follows, we see him in his usual role, escaping 
the harm of the devil, but we do not have to look closely to see that he is not responsible for his 
escape. The events quite clearly conflict with the speaker’s closing sentence: “so that’s why they 
say Jack beat the devil.” He does not “beat” him, however; his lover does, the devil’s daughter.    
To the extent that there is someone triumphant in this tale, someone whose superiority 
over somebody else makes us laugh, it is Beatrice, Jack’s paramour. The story goes that Jack was 
playing a sort of poker game and having no more money to put in the pot, he bet all the money 
on the table against his life. He lost, but his opponent, who then revealed himself as the devil, 
gave him the chance to win. He had to reach the devil’s home within twenty-four hours. The 
only way he could do so was by hitching on the back of an eagle, who, is, interestingly, gendered 
as female, a foreshadowing of the story’s real hero. Although he completes this task successfully, 
the devil gives him another: he orders him to cut down all the trees on the property. Again Jack 
needs a female to help him, which is when Beatrice comes in and tells him to put his head on her 
lap and “go to sleep” (50). When he awakes, the phallic trees in the forest are cut down. And 
what is more, the “roots” were “grubbed up and burnt.” The first two maneuvers that save Jack’s 
life are done by a feminine will. The second of these removes not only the signs of patriarchy, 
but more, the possibility that these signs, these trees, will grow again.  
We do not know for sure how Beatrice executes her magic, whereas in the other tales the 
trickery is clearly shown. The implication of the tricks occurring as Jack sleeps is that they have 
something to do with Jack’s dream. In the glossary, Hurston designates Jack as “the wish-
fulfillment hero of the race.” Suggestively, this is the only story in which he dreams, and the first 
story in which he appears in full (earlier a story begins about his eponymous twin John but is 
interrupted). We might, then, extend the implications of this story to others about Jack and 
 
    38 
certainly to the black unconscious, as figured in Hurston. That a female is a victor underwrites 
the parochially masculine figure of the trickster tale with a feminine magic. Put differently, if 
this is the hero of the race’s dreamscape, but the heroism belongs to a woman, then we would be 
right to wonder whether the representations of men are conversely the repressions of women, and 
further, whether it is the men who achieve the assaults on power or actually the women, or 
perhaps a combination of both. At the very least, because of the narrator’s ironic explanatory, his 
summary sentence, “so dat’s why dey say Jack beat de devil,” the reader is made to question who 
Jack is. And because of the tale’s position in the text as the first, in addition to the description of 
Jack as the symbol for the driving impetus behind all the race’s assaults on authority, the 
uncertainty of the story might be extended to all the trickster tales. Put simply, if this particular 
tale is a synecdoche for all others, then so too is its deflective uncertainty about how these 
figures exist in relationship to women, and how they execute their tricks in relationship to 
“devils.” This profoundly opens up the study of folklore: instead of its difficulty being about the 
collecting, it is about interpreting the transcribed. Folklore is not as easy to collect as it sounds 
because collecting the story is as difficult as figuring out what it means.  
Jack embodies the wish-fulfillment principle. This makes the instance of his dream in the 
story a metafictional commentary on all Jack tales. Four more tests from the devil ensue, and 
each one is achieved through the powers of Beatrice, two of which again happen while Jack is 
sleeping. By the end, Jack and Beatrice are on the run from the devil, and when he finally 
catches up to them, Jack hides in a log. He screams to the lord in fear, and the devil, thinking it is 
God himself, flees on his bull. But Jack cannot claim that even his accidental scream is the thing 
that saved him. The devil turned the bull around too abruptly. It “fell and broke his own neck and 
throwed de Devil out on his head and kilt ‘im” (53). Jack is thrice removed from the triumph,  by 
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Beatrice, by the bull, and finally by the devil, who ultimately beats himself with his own fear. In 
a sense, the story moves from comic escape to tragic self-defeat, neither of which Jack enacts. To 
the extent that the devil and his bull are tricked in the end, they are tricked by themselves. 
However, what makes this story remarkably unsettling to any fixed reading of trickster tales, to 
the presumption that they are always comprised of stock characters who win out in the end by 
their own powers, is not only that the devil is the agent of his own destruction, but that Jack falls 
asleep when he is supposed to be performing his tricks.  
With the speaker’s final line about Jack beating the devil, Hurston puts in relief the 
speaker’s interpretation of the humor, as much to suggest that it is wrong as to question what is 
right. After all, the speaker defers the interpretive authority to a mysterious “they.” At the 
moment he supplies an interpretation, he points the spotlight away to a distant other. The reader 
may think that “they” refers to blacks but why then would he position himself as the outsider? 
Does this deferral not interrogate what defines racial belonging, which is also to interrogate what 
defines blackness? Another question emerges when we see that the black folks around him, his 
listeners, are shocked about his mastery of the telling. Someone asks, “ ‘Boy, how kin you hold 
all dat in yo’ head?’ ” The listener expresses his wonder by inquiring about the workings of the 
speaker’s mind.  The mark of good telling is more than the tale itself. It is the extent it makes 
others ponder the mind, ponder the way the teller “hold[s]” it in his “head.” The “all that” of 
what he “hold[s]” is the interpretation he withholds.  
 If the trickster tales resist psychological access, a laughter that masks and deflects is their 
analogue. In the fourth chapter, Hurston explains the relationship between laughter and the 
psyche:  
The brother in black puts a laugh in every vacant place in his mind. His laugh has 
a hundred meanings. It may mean amusement, anger, grief, bewilderment, 
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chagrin, curiosity, simple pleasure or any other of the known or undefined 
emotions. (62) 
 
When Hurston says “vacant” she indexes the way black laughter is stereotypically read, as the 
definitive sign of intellectual vapidity. Her aim is to reverse that reading. Where one might see 
the absence of intelligence is the fullness of laughter and its excess of meaning.  Furthermore, to 
say vacant is to say open for occupancy, open to be stereotyped, yet the invitation is 
automatically deflected, for the space is already teeming full.   
Laughter here is opened up as ultimately indefinable. It “may” mean any of these affects, 
but her point is that it is always possibly anything, that it cannot be firmly defined. Its ceaseless 
ambiguity comes across in the randomness of Hurston’s list. But it is also there in the closing 
antithesis. Laughter may mean “any of the known or [the] undefined emotions.” Positioned in 
the antithetical position of the phrase, the undefined is also the “unknown.” In other words, if the 
sentence spoke plainly it would say, “any of the known or the unknown.” By overwriting 
“unknown” with “undefined” Hurston makes a point about reading.  If the absence of knowledge 
is the absence of definition, her point is that the unknown is specifically the inability to read, to 
make sense of the page, define the words. Simply put, that which is undefined, whether by 
context or glossary, is that which cannot be read, which in this case means cannot be known, i.e. 
the laughter. When we face “laughter” in Hurston, we confront the limits of our knowledge about 
black interiority. Reading mind through Hurston’s laughter is an epistemological dilemma.  
The laughter troubles Hurston’s ability to read, too. For example, as she attempts to find 
membership in the community at the beginning of her stay, she faces some difficulties, and the 
laughter makes nothing easier. At the “biggest dance” in the county, she felt oddly out of place. 
“I seemed to have no standing among the dancers,” she writes, a reflection on her skill as well as 
her instability on their common ground. She then walks outside “to join the woofers” (62), 
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people engaged in “a sort of aimless talking” (247). But again referring to her discomfort on their 
foundation, she admits, “I stood there awkwardly, knowing that the too-ready laughter… was a 
window-dressing” (62), “the old feather-bed tactics” (60).  
 If this is Hurston’s relationship to the people at the beginning, at the end she is much 
closer, but only ephemerally. The arc of the book’s narrative is an increasing intimacy with her 
subjects, but an ultimately unstable one. We then might expect her to be able to read their 
laughter with a bit more discernment the longer she dwells with them, an expectation foiled in 
the penultimate chapter. There she witnesses an argument between her closest friend Big Sweet 
and the “Quarter Boss,” a sort of policeman intruding in the dwelling spaces of the workers. 
Sweet tells the Boss that she plans to avenge the person threatening to kill someone she loves. In 
declaring this, she essentially renders his disciplining position ineffectual. To further mark the 
limits of his power, she then shows him the knife she plans to use. Although he takes the knife, 
he does not take her, and her audience takes that to signify the success of her exclamation: 
“Don’t you touch me, white folks!” One man responds, as everyone gathers “around” her, “You 
wuz noble… You made dat cracker stand off a you”. That Big Sweet is circled discursively and 
in action, that she is both the actual and symbolic center of the community, suggests that she 
made the “cracker stand off” them, too: it suggests that her heroism is completely theirs. She 
protects their living quarters. Although they do not own them they are now not wholly unsafe.   
During her interaction with the threatening Boss, somebody flees and when he returns after the 
Boss leaves, Hurston’s inquires why the guy “ ‘always steps off whenever he see dat Quarter 
Boss’ ” (153)? “Everybody laughed,” she writes, “but nobody told me a thing.” Hurston being 
seen as at least the specter of the Boss, for they are always aware of her as an amanuensis, 
laughter emerges as preemptive deflection. 
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 As much as laughter is used to deflect knowability so too is the narrative form of the text. 
The book is constructed in a conventional comic form: the picaresque, employed, as I read it, to 
highlight difficulties of psychological access. The travelling component constitutive of the form 
is captured from the very start. Hurston enters the Florida town, Eatonville, speeding across the 
city border in her Chevrolet. Soon after this, she fulfills the second condition of the form, the 
configuration of the protagonist as rogue or criminal. Hurston, no doubt, initially tells the people 
she endeavors to study that she is a fugitive on the run. Now we should probably note that 
Eatonville is a “pure Negro town,” “a Negro community,” lying adjacent to the white town of 
Maitland (Dust Tracks 1; Mules 13).  The possibility of penetrating it is therefore also the 
prospect of discovering an essence, yet that is quickly troubled. The first chapter begins, “As [not 
after] I crossed the Maitland-Eatonville township line I could see a group on the store porch” (7 
emphasis mine). Her entrance into their interior space is suspended as such. She does not enter 
and then see the porch; she sees the porch while she enters, the observation of porch-life 
occurring at a crossing. Such a subtle word, “as” instead of “after,” communicates a much bigger 
point, evidenced as we have seen by an abundance of other narrative decisions. The significance 
of this subtlety is twofold: first, from the very start of the story proper, the narrative after her 
introduction, she poses the question of whether or not her movement is one through their private 
space; and second, the distance she draws between herself and her characters, between her 
characters and us, is made with increasingly bold narrative devices, from the subtle to the 
explicit, adumbrating the arc of her anthropological project and what will be, I claim, her entire 
artistic career. The picaresque plot serves to emphasize the intimacy she does not reach in their 
laughter because its movement from place to place is seemingly in the text a movement to 
greater closeness. The places themselves, in other words, become gradually more intimate, from 
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a front yard, to an isolated pond, and finally to the “Juke,” what Hurston calls “the Negro 
pleasure house,” the “bawdy” place for close “sensuous” dancing  (“Characteristics” 66-67).      
The final event in the narrative is the counterpoint to the first, the entry. Someone attacks 
Hurston with a knife at a bar, and she is saved by a deus ex machina. To underscore the 
suddenness of this rescue (suddenness of any escape being a comic device), she says she felt she 
was “already” dying before the woman even attacked (179). As soon as her friend Big Sweet 
distracted her antagonist, she fled: “I was in the car in a second and in high just too quick.” 
Because the narrative develops as a progression of intimacy, this final event, escaping for 
survival, is a statement of caution. It communicates to the reader not only the dangers of 
conducting ethnography, but more generally of getting too close to her subjects. But it is also an 
inevitability inscribed in the narrative form. Picaresques usually end with the main character in 
flight. If the nature of this picaresque is defined by an attempt to enter, to excavate the Boasian 
“true,” then the comic form itself is a form of denial. As much as she is ejected from their 
territory, by writing in this form, she ejects herself, a dramatization of deflective humor.  
From the tall tales, to the laughter, to the comic form, Hurston’s humor gives the power 
of claim to the geographically dispossessed. The people she studies move from work camp to 
work camp as much as she does from town to town. They lease their homes with their own labor, 
a continuation of the conditions of slavery. They can be forcibly removed at any time. And one 
significant reason their “Boss” does not interfere with Big Sweet or with any of the violence they 
exact on each other is that he places such limited value on their lives. Earlier in the narrative, she 
writes, “Negro women are punished in these parts for killing… but only if they exceed the 
quota” (60). This is why any readily available agency for protecting one’s personal space—
psychic and geographic—any agency for making expropriation, occupation, or confinement 
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impossible is vitally important. Their social customs and psychic landscapes are solely theirs to 
claim.  
In closing I would like to return to the question of authenticity, of unveiling the true. To 
say Hurston uses humor as a distancing mechanism, a deferral of knowability, in her 
anthropological work is not to say that authenticity was far from her mind. Looking at the letters 
she sends to literary friends and the general motive behind almost all her texts, one cannot help 
but see that deriving an authentic depiction of blackness was perhaps her greatest concern. For 
example, the phrase the “real negro” is generously sprinkled throughout her letters. Writing to 
her benefactor Charlotte Osgood Mason, she even underlines it twice. She states that her 
“dream” is to let “real negro folk music… be heard” (277). To doubly underline “real” is exactly 
what I mean to do to the complexity of her record keeping, as I analyze her humor. Recording 
the real, transcribing the true, can never be as simple for Hurston as offering it up to complete 
knowledge, as making it completely transparent.  
Consider the making of Mules and Men. In 1929 she originally tried to publish a shorter 
book with much of the same material titled Negro Folk-Tales from the Gulf States. It looked very 
similar to the other folklore collections of her time.14 It simply transcribed the tales she heard 
without any narrative order. But she did insist on one key difference, a refusal to provide her 
own interpretations. Around the time she first tried to get it published by Lippincott, she wrote 
Langston Hughes, “I am leaving the story material almost untouched. I have only tampered with 
it where the story teller was not clear. I know it is going to read different, but that is the glory of 
the thing, don’t you think?” (Letters 139). Indeed, it would have gloriously stood out from the 
                                                        
14 As John Trombold notes, the problem Hurston found in the folklore studies of her day was their 
presumption that the value of black culture depended on the sanction of the white chronicler, his or her 
validating “observations” (101). According to Trombold, Hurston wrote against the popular John Miles’s 
Singing Soldiers, which was “concerned with representing the psychology of black soldiers” (100). 
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studies of her day. She wanted to let her subjects speak for themselves, a desire fulfilled by her 
signing the name of the teller beneath each tale. This is primarily what she meant by the “real 
Negro,” the really re-presented. 
This presentation, this attempt to make her subjects live on the page, also involved a 
reach for a certain intimacy. She wrote to Frantz Boas about the precision with which she 
recorded her data and the closeness with which positioned herself:  
I have tried to be as exact as possible. Keep-to the exact dialect as closely as I 
could, having the story teller to tell it to me word for word as I write it. This after 
it has been told to me off hand until I know it myself. But the writing down from 
the lips is to insure the correct dialect and wording so that I shall not let myself 
creep in unconsciously. (Letters 150)  
 
On the one hand, she wants to embody her speakers, imbibe their telling, an intimacy 
necessitated by her imperative to capture the oral in the written. She has them say the same story 
over and over then envisions her pen as an instrument for their mouths (she writes “from the 
lips”). In an allusion to the talking book, her page is their voice, the “sound” that she considers 
remarkably difficult to decode. But as close as she wants to get, touching their mouths, she 
refuses to “creep in unconsciously.” If in one moment she seeks complete access in the next she 
bars it. This interplay between advancement and distance, envelopment and self-limitation, 
reflective of her career, comes to determine her aesthetic choices in the revised and expanded 
Mules and Men. She searched five years for a publisher for Negro Folk-Tales. Finally, Lippincott 
agreed to do it but only if she modified the construction of the book according to their request 
that she add more of her “charm.” It seems that under these auspices Hurston deemed a 
distancing humor all the more urgent. If some take her “charm” as subordination to editorial 
violence, as pandering to “stereotyped notions of black culture,” as “glossed” and “doctored” 
folklore, then that might be because they missed her humor (Kaplan 52). 
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 If there is any moment that Hurston herself responds directly to Lippincott’s request of 
“charm” it is fittingly in the last three paragraphs of the text. For this is the first time she takes on 
the dialect as her own, identifying herself as a trickster.  She tells the story of an animal named 
Sis Cat who “caught herself a rat… to eat” (245). As she is about to begin her meal, the rat tells 
her to wash her face and hands, to at least have decent “manners.” She follows the rat’s 
suggestion, which lets him escape, and when she catches him again, he says the same thing. To 
this she responds, “ ‘Oh, Ah got plenty manners… But Ah eats mah dinner and washes mah face 
and uses mah manners afterwards (246).’ ” Then as a coda reflecting on the formation of the 
narrative, she concludes, “I’m sitting here like Sis Cat, washing my face and usin’ my manners.” 
The story declares her refusal to follow imposed rules of textual construction. What counts as 
decorum for any public is a concern only after she composes her text. With the image of 
consumption and the alignment with a trickster, Hurston portrays her aesthetic as one of a 
distancing trickery, playing with her reader’s ability to claim the figures that people her text. In 
the very last moment she aligns herself with these people and dons a trickster mask. Behind it, 
they are withdrawn from our sight.  
 
High John de Conquer and The Laughing Sublime  
If in Mules and Men, Hurston’s subjects are ultimately concealed, they seem to return ten 
years later as fully disclosed and disconcertingly fixed. Yet Hurston has become more adroit in 
undercutting her publisher’s wishes, in countering the very ways she seems to pander to a 
voyeuristic and simplifying gaze, satisfied only when blacks can be “taken in at a glance.” In 
1943 Hurston published an essay on humor fraught on its face with as many problems of racial 
representation as her 1928 “How It Feels to Be Colored Me.” The essay was titled “High John de 
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Conquer,” a piece she initially wrote as an elucidation and story of the meaning of this figure in 
black life. She was fascinated with him, even suggesting to Alain Locke that they write a 
“comprehensive work” together, “something really scholarly” on this “force” (488, 489). John is 
the source of laughter and song. He symbolizes the agent behind the creation of a survivalist 
humor and sacrosanct music. As told in folk memory, he came to the slave plantations to lead 
these forced laborers to their two primary sources of “pleasure,” reason to laugh and music to 
play. Because this pleasure was prohibited by their slave masters, John warned them to keep it 
secret, lest it be destroyed or irredeemably overturned. If divulged it could fall to the same fate as 
other customs productive of joy, hijacked by a system of stereotyping so that the reengagement 
of these customs incites an element of shame. John came from Africa, as a sort of invisible 
savior and instituted a secretiveness to the expression of black culture.  
 Hurston contradicts all these facets of High John in the introduction and conclusion to the 
essay. Divided into four parts, the first and last are frames in which Hurston interprets the 
meaning of John for her explicitly addressed white readership. The last sentences of the piece 
read, “White America, take a laugh out of our black mouths, and win! We give you High John de 
Conquer.” Telling her readers that this large swathe of black culture is up for the taking 
obviously runs counter to the way she uses humor to protect black life from appropriation. The 
very thing that devours the “probe” (i.e. the feather-bed laughter), the thing that “eats” a 
publisher’s demands (the trickery of Sis Cat), is now sold towards the support of America’s 
involvement in the Second World War. A strategy of defense thus becomes a form of 
propaganda. We know from her letters to Alain Locke that the transmutation of High John, the 
evacuation of his power, was partly solicited by her publisher. In October, after the final edits to 
the essay, she wrote to Locke: “the editor had to have it sugared up to flatter the war effort. That 
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certainly was not my idea… You will see what I mean when you read it” (491). What he 
probably saw, however, was not only the ridiculous statement of “take a laugh” to win the war, 
so ridiculous it trumpets her irony, her refusal to conform, like Sis Cat, to a publisher’s wishes.  
Locke also could not have been blind to her other contradictions, which function as 
deflection. On the one hand she positions John against any notion of assimilation. She even says 
that the reason he has not been more pervasive in African American life, the reason he had to 
“retire with his secret smile into the soil of the South and wait” is that blacks have been more 
concerned with social acceptance than cultural preservation: “he has not walked the winds of 
America for seventy-five years now. His people… have traded him in… for things they could 
use like education and property, and acceptance” (148). Yet this acceptance is what she requests 
from her readers in the essay’s first paragraph. She goes so far as to almost completely erase her 
blackness: “you will take another look at us and say that we are still black and , ethnologically 
speaking, you will be right. But nationally and culturally, we are as white as the next one. We 
have put our labor and our blood into the common cause for a long time” (139). Hurston’s 
biographer Hemenway has attributed this self-demeaning comment to her patriotism burgeoning 
at the end of her life. But there is much more to be concerned with here, and much I think she is 
consciously troubling. First of all, we cannot overlook the fact that she is not grounding herself 
on a cultural plurality or an erasure of culture, but on “white” culture. She implies, indirectly, 
“hitting a straight lick with a crooked stick,” as she was wont to say, that assimilation into white 
culture is the loss of all blackness, which would also spell the loss most certainly of High John, a 
generator of pleasure that “had come from Africa,” she reiterates. The deflective irony of the 
message to “take,” to claim, this cultural seed is that in so doing they would, as the folk 
expression says, “come up cold in hand,” be left with nothing.    
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Where I think she alerts her readers to distrust her recommendation, along 
with her own bent to assimilate is in her pronoun usage, the same technique of destabilizing 
readerly certainty employed in Mules and Men. At the same time she attests to cultural 
equivalence, she reiterates their difference. In noticing our similitude, she tells her audience, 
contradictorily, “You will look at us.” In wresting our pleasure, you will take it out of “our 
mouths.” This leads us to rethink the most exasperating sentence of the whole piece: “Maybe, 
now, we used-to-be black American folk can be of some help to our brothers and sisters who 
have always been white.” As much as Locke supported  the bridging of racial gaps, this sentence 
would have made him bristle. But Hurston is chock full of irony here. How could whites be 
brothers and sisters to a group without parentage, let alone ancestry? How, again to return to the 
pronouns, could she claim a racial difference in a “we” at the same time that she, without 
explanation, annihilates it? Yet the most piercing irony has nothing to do with her, but with her 
white readers, “who have always been white.” The very redundancy questions its truth. The 
point, she hits crookedly, is that these readers have not, of course, always been white.  All this 
irony amounts to the conclusion that the appropriation of High John by a culture that cannot 
accommodate cultural difference is an impossibility.  
Her backhanded pandering, the irony that strikes back at a racist America grows as 
forceful as the words of Big Sweet in the face of her quarter boss. As she touts the value of High 
John, Hurston writes, “[he] will never forsake the weak and the helpless, nor fail to bring hope to 
the hopeless. That is what they believe, and so they do not worry. They go on and laugh and 
sing” (148). Who are these pitiable people? It seems that the “they” are purportedly blacks, 
helpless and hopeless, the very sentiments she launches her writing career contesting. By the 
1940s her antagonism toward this “sobbing” sentimentality had only intensified, something her 
 
    50 
audience would likely have known, for at the beginning of 1943 her reputation as an advocate for 
unbridled black pride had exploded in the newspapers. Douglas Gilbert, a reporter for the New 
York World-Telegram interviewed her for an article about segregation. In defense of black self-
reliance and sufficiency, she told him, “the Jim Crow system works.” Although Gilbert spun the 
story to construe Hurston as a staunch conservative, she stated boldly, “Negroes [are] happy in 
their social gatherings and [have] no more desire to associate with the whites than the whites had 
to associate with them” (476). If this incipient militance, this black nationalism beginning to 
sound its horn was not lost on her racist readers, then too they might have wondered if the 
hopeless and helpless people, those left with nothing if they reject cultural difference, were none 
other than themselves. 
The only way, it seems to me, to spot Hurston’s defenses against and within her apparent 
indulgence of a racist logic, which always essentializes, is to pinpoint her humor. As in Mules, 
where we can no more pin her down than she can pin down her subjects, as in the Gilded-Six 
Bits and her provocative claims in 1928, where she flirts with her reader’s ability to essentialize 
or determine the fate or future of her characters—as in these moments, so too in “High John,” 
aesthetic devices of humor are used to incontestably, unambiguously stretch her characters 
beyond the bounds of reductive reading.  
High John is the image of black humor itself, a metonym for the mechanism of humor. 
He is  “the laugh-provoking Brer Rabbit…playing his tricks and making a way out of no way,” 
in possession of “the wisdom tooth of the East,” “top-superior to the whole mess of sorrow,” and 
able to “beat the unbeatable.” That John is the symbol for humor itself cannot be stressed 
enough, for only his metonymic nature explains why Hurston would use him to introduce her 
most profound aesthetic device for stretching her characters beyond knowability.  
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He is the evocation of what, after Kant, I am calling sublimity. In Critique of Judgment 
Kant makes a nuanced point very important for our purpose in thinking through humor as it 
relates to Hurston’s readers: “True sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging 
subject, and not in the object of nature” (86). He describes the objects that inspire a sense of the 
sublime as things like “mountains ascending to heaven,” a storming sea, or St. Peter’s in Rome. 
These are objects that make the viewer confront the “inadequacy of his imagination” (83). In 
other words, it is not that one cannot objectively see it, capture them within one’s scope, but that 
not even the imagination can reproduce them. Our imagination “waylaid,” like Joe in “The 
Gilded Six-Bits,” we stand in fear before their size. For these are objects of incomparable 
magnitude and insurmountable might, incommensurate to anything else in the world and deeply 
threatening to one’s own strength. As to the latter, which is certainly pertinent to the way John 
“beats the unbeatable,” Kant writes, “the irresistibility of the might of nature forces upon us the 
recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature” (92). Even though it undermines 
our strength and mocks our sight, the object inspires a power that compensates for any sense of 
weakness. “The mind feels itself empowered to pass beyond the narrow confines of sensibility” 
(84). We cannot see, we cannot imagine, but we can think the object, a “capacity of thinking 
transcending every standard of the senses” (80).  Elicited, then, is the feeling of a limited 
imagination and an infinite intellect.  
High John becomes the object of sublimity as he transports the slaves away from their 
grueling conditions.  
So John went off for a minute. After that they all heard a big sing of wings. It was 
John come back, riding on a great black crow. The crow was so big that one wing 
rested on morning, while the other dusted off the evening star… They all mounted 
on, and the bird took out across the deep blue sea. (146) 
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In trying to picture the image of their humor, elaborated as John riding on a black crow whose 
wings extend from the ground into the heavens, we confront something similar to Kant’s 
mountains. Furthermore, the bird is a black crow, a crow being “‘ a large black bird that feeds 
upon the carcass of beasts’” (OED). It necessarily incites fear, hence the people’s sense of 
“adventure,” of risk, of perilous undertaking as they board the crow’s back. No doubt, “the 
slaves were scared to leave” (145). As they confront High John and his crow, they are analogous 
to Kant’s viewers gazing upon a tumultuous sea. They are external, separate from the mightiness 
of the humor that they have not yet possessed. It is when they “mount,” a word meaning grow 
larger, that the slaves interiorize the humor, that they not only witness the object of the sublime 
as the readers do in watching this scene, but become that object.  
This identification with the sublime humor is already signaled, however, in the 
description of the bird as a “black crow.” All crows are black. Thus what seems to be a 
redundancy is actually the racialization of the image, its color being doubly identified with the 
people the humor serves. We might recall a similar image of the sublime from Gilded Six-Bits, 
the moment that Joe’s laughter increased his size so extensively that the narrator compared him 
to a mountain: “Joe stood out like a rough-backed mountain… barring [Slemmons] from sunrise” 
(note that the blackness of the sublime is implied by the contrast with light, the sun) (93). By 
1943 the simile, the mere comparison, has become complete conflation: the allusion to an 
external power is now the identity of the empowered. The sublimity of humor is coextensive 
with the identity of the laugher: in “High John de Conquer” the sublime and the self are 
indistinguishable. It is this identification with High John’s sublimity that allows the slaves to 
“beat it all.” But it also this humor that demands the most from Hurston’s readers. For the 
implication is that only a mind stretched to infinity can capture, conceive—can know her 
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characters. This is, of course, a paradox, but a testament to the psychic space she intended her 
characters to cover. It is a paradox because so long as knowledge ascribes limits to its object, 
knowledge possible only through an infinite gaze is an impossible knowledge. An aesthetic 
device adamantly refusing reductive reading, High John, the quintessential mechanism of black 
laughter, is the return to unknowability through the portrayal of a limitless power.  
 The conclusion to draw from this late essay is that Hurston is as dedicated to describing 
the suffering of black people as she is to describing their joy. A fuller depiction of the human 
comes into being when not only suffering, but joy is cast as ineffable. Paul Gilroy’s conception 
of the “slave sublime” might be defined in his terms as “forms of terror that surpass 
understanding and lead back from contemporary racial violence, through lynching, towards the 
temporal and ontological rupture of the middle passage” (222). The terror, sublime because of its 
temporal disjuncture and affective ineffability, meets in Hurston’s humor a joy of equal 
magnitude irreducible to the tragic. If the human deprived of recognition in either juridical or 
social forms exists in an advantageous and pained interstice, a space between thing and 
personhood, then assuming that this intersticial existence derives from the pain itself is a logical 
leap that both forecloses whatever advantage comes from being in that space.  
Hurston’s measureless depictions of character have been generally called either her 
“cosmic imagery”15 or her “crayon enlargements of life,” terms that she herself uses. Remember 
in “How It Feels to Be Colored” she states “sometimes I am just me… cosmic Zora.” I think 
these terms are inexact and depend on their contexts for their specificity. In other words, they tell 
us little about the nature or purpose behind her figurations. Indeed, they enlarge life, but do so in 
                                                        
15 See John Lowe, Jump at the Sun: Zora Neale Hurston’s Cosmic Comedy (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994).  
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each case towards different ends and with different techniques.16  High John is the very 
mechanism of humor, but when interiorized by the slaves “the sign of this man was a laugh” 
(139). Put differently, his “sign,” the mark of his existence, is in one’s reaction to an event, 
specifically a traumatic event, slavery as a whole and its random acts of violence. High John 
emerges as a reaction, as laughter before a scene of subjection. Because of his emergence in 
reactive laughter, and because his sole purpose is to excite “the irresistible impulse to laugh,” 
because only through laughter is his power fulfilled, because only then is his unbeatable might 
and therapeutic transcendence actually realized, because, in short, only in laughter does his 
sublimity mean anything, I call the enlargement of character that humor enacts in the final 
decades of Hurston’s career, not the sublimity of humor, but more precisely, the laughing 
sublime.  
The development of Hurston’s career is often and rightly seen as a movement towards a 
more direct confrontation with political issues. Indeed, soon after she published “High John” she 
wrote a satire on the American democratic experiment, quipping on Roosevelt’s description of 
the United States as the “Arsenal of Democracy,” which Hurston said he must have 
mispronounced, since we actually “look like [its] Ass-and-All” (“Crazy” 166). It has been 
difficult to identify Hurston’s growing radicalism, one of its more obvious hints occurring in a 
letter she wrote to her friend Claude Barnett, the same year as “High John”: “I no longer even 
                                                        
16 In Their Eyes Were Watching God, for instance, a man named Sop de Bottom explains what his wife 
would do to him if he ever beat her: “Mah woman would spread her lungs all over Palm Beach County… 
She got ninety-nine rows uh jaw teeth and git her good and mad, she’ll wade through solid rock to her hip 
pockets” (219). Kathleen Davies remarks that this alignment of his wife with an unbeatable natural 
phenomenon foreshadows “the avenging hurricane and rabid dog to come.” Although Davies is right, 
there is a difference between the two events: the second is in the mode of realism, the first magical 
realism, for his wife transforms into a creature  incommensurate to anything else in nature. What can 
wade through solid rock? Her form is in this way similar to the black crow’s, something that cannot be 
assimilated into the reader’s experience of the world, something that transcends experience in the sense 
that no reader would have experienced it. 
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value my life if by losing it, I can do something to destroy this Anglo-Saxon monstrosity” (475). 
Marion Kilson sums up her evolution in this way:  
midway in her career… the primary focus of her writing shifted from the fiction 
to essay, in perspective from relativism to critical commitment, and in content 
from an avoidance of racial ambiguities to a confrontation of the complexities of 
race in American society. Hurston’s transformation from ethnographic artist to 
critical ethnographer occurred in the early 1940s. (112)  
 
What has been missing in the critical reception is that running parallel to her increasing 
commitment to politics is the increasing distance she established between her readers and the 
literary figuration of her black subjects. Part of her deepened political commitment was an 
elaboration of her aesthetic politics, which repeatedly informed her readers that the limits of 
black humanity have more to do with them and the way they are read than with blacks 
themselves. Far from the reactionary resistance we saw in Locke and Fauset, characteristic of the 
long tradition of negotiating Sambo, Hurston innovates new moves. Just look at the names of her 
characters. Joe in “Gilded Six-Bits,” Jack in Mules and Men, John in the titular essay above—
these are all names so common they smack of the already read, drawing to mind stereotypes or 
exciting stereotyped thinking. Even here Hurston subverts our expectations, using the appearance 
of simplicity, seemingly simple characterizations, to underscore the irreducibly complex nature 
of black interior life.17 Through her humor, she evacuates the violence of the Sambo myth and 
enables a radical reconstruction of blackness.   
                                                        
17 Regarding the art of naming, Hurston writes to Locke, “Have you thought about the face that in every 
country there is a great John?... There must be some spiritual value assigned to the name John. Note that 
even the fore-runner to the Messiah was John the Baptist… Could not the name be some secret symbol 
that has escaped our modern knowledge?... There is the symbolic naming of a force universal that has 
more to it than appears on the surface” (489). If High John is “the hero who wins by a ruse” part of the 
ruse is in the naming itself.  
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Chapter Two  
 
“To Laugh for My Life”: 
Humor and History in the Works of Ralph Ellison 
 
A strange form of extrasensory perception—or second sight… suggested that 
somehow a Negro (and this meant any Negro) could become with a single hoot-
and-cackle both the source and master of an outrageous and untenable situation.  
 ---Ralph Ellison, “Extravagance of Laughter”  
 
 
Ellison’s Interlocutors  
his is a chapter on humor as the limited transcendence of slavery’s traumatic returns. 
Ellison holds that all American writers worthy of the name confronted the traumas of their 
nation’s past, in one way or another. The nation he contends was founded on a very 
specific conflict: the clash between its ideals and its actions, between its “founding documents” 
and its forms of slavery. In his mind, this clash “erupt[ed]” in the Civil War, “a traumatic 
fraternal conflict” (709), which “continues to influence our thinking” (708). 18  To Ellison, the 
fact that this conflict has yet to be resolved ensures that a breach will remain between America’s 
place in historical time and the place it promised to reach. Ellison relies on humor as the non-
violent forum through which to push his country along. In almost all of Ellison’s essays, 
speeches, interviews, fiction—in almost all his work—humor figures prominently. How, I ask, 
does it help us deal with history without reinforcing racial violence? Why, say, in Invisible Man, 
a book written as an allegory of the nation’s past, would Ellison put its “voice” in what he called 
                                                        
18 All citations from Ellison’s essays, unless otherwise noted, come from The Collected Essays of Ralph 
Ellison, ed. John F. Callahan (New York: Random House, 1994).  
T 
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“taunting laughter”? Why would he make that voice “less angry than ironic?” What is the hold 
that humor has on historical consciousness? How does it lead “us” to a future closer to “our” 
ideals? The answers to these questions come down to the ways that Ellison uses humor as 
perspective and technique, as attitude and form for confronting a painfully racist past.   
If the “who,” “our” past and present selves, is some ideal, as it can easily be read, then it 
is largely asleep.19 Its awakening, as Ellison shows in all his “sites of memory,”20 depend on the 
common project of working-through. When he says that to “forget” is to become “our phony 
selves,” I do not think he means ethically awful towards each other, but socially split apart, 
segregated. This isolation, tantamount to estrangement, is what, in his mind, humor prevents. 21  
He states this most explicitly in a lecture titled “American Humor.” Delivered to a group of 
students at Oklahoma State University, this is a précis of humor’s voyage from colonial America 
                                                        
19 It is equally easy to forget that Ellison’s national self has scarcely been broached. In “The Form of 
Democracy,” Timothy Parrish, for instance, wavers back and forth between Ellison’s American self as an 
ideal emerging and as one emergent: “In America, we—meaning everyone—act on the assumption of a 
universally shared relationship to our nation’s sacred promises. Our triumphs, our failures, even our acts 
of secession, are all committed with this knowledge” (126). Parrish retreats in his second sentence from 
the contention he makes in his first. He does not say committed “to” the knowledge, which would mean 
manifesting it in action, but committed “with.”  He teeters back and forth like this throughout his essay, 
even going so far as to say, “the American, according to Ellison, is almost always aware of ‘who and what 
he is’” (129). I think he easily wheels ambiguous because of where he finds the catalyst for the nation’s 
becoming: in the process of reading, rather than in reading for the process of redress.    
 
 
20 Studying the way Ellison accounts for history through vernacular art, Robert O’Meally takes this term 
from Pierre Nora. But O’Meally extends it to mean an evocation of the past that answers a “quintet” of 
questions: “Who? Did what? Why? How? Where?” (“On Burke” 246). I am using it as O’Meally does.  
  
 
21 The social space that comedy emplots, in contradistinction to tragedy, is widely believed to be 
constitutive of all comic plays. Gail Finney, for instance, calls on the “inherently social nature of 
comedy” to help her understand its unique perspective on the issue of gender (2). Robert Heilman states 
that “the comic mode is social; the comic stage is not the soul, but the world” (14). Ellison would have 
read this view of the comic form through Kenneth Burke, who argues that “tragedy deals with man in 
society; comedy, with social man” (Attitudes 2 36).     
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to the present. There, in his hometown, he summarizes many of the insights he developed over 
the years, insights connected, as the title tells us, to a larger literary genealogy.  His talk shares 
the same name of a book by Constance Rourke, one he studied closely,22 and the same phrase by 
Henry James, one he refers to at the end. Ellison hears in James that “comedy seems to be the 
basic American mode in literature.” To Ellison, James’s insistence on writing a strain of 
comedies simply proves the contention that American identity lies in its humor, that this humor 
is what distinguishes America from other nations.  
James put to fiction what Rouke puts to essays. Although her text is mostly literary 
criticism, it is based on her field work, on collecting around the country the different types of 
jokes by and about what she considers America’s three cultural strands: “Yankees,” “Negroes,” 
and the “Backwoodsmen.” American Humor: A Study of a National Character had such an effect 
on Ellison not least because it placed blacks in the pantheon of American culture. The book also 
demonstrated the way humor could connect, if not congeal, American society. It is in thinking of 
Rourke, then, that he celebrates even the humor that “projected [ethnic] stereotypes.” He 
celebrates this humor because “for all its crudeness” it “allowed the American people to come 
together on some sort of workable basis.” When we think of his ideal American self we must 
first think of humor. A “unity-of-divergencies,” the ideal in a nutshell, requires first a “bas[e]” 
for that unity, and the base is humor.  
Or, rather, it is humor when it functions as historical consciousness. Although he does not 
use those words in his lecture, they are definitely there. They are there in his opening paragraphs. 
He quotes Fats Waller saying, “Life is such that one never knows.” Waller as a pianist and a 
comedian, an artist who blended his jazz sets with slapstick comedy, introduces a concept, one 
                                                        
22 O’Meally points out that he began reading Rourke “closely in the thirties” (The Craft 50).  
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could say the thesis, of Ellison’s talk. Waller’s words say “something about the sudden twist, the 
disjuncture, the pause and then the fall into rational absurdity which is so typical of American 
humor. I like to think that this has something to do with the very circumstances out of which the 
nation was founded.” The formation of America as a nation-state, he says, was founded on a 
confrontation before Columbus even docked:  
Flip Wilson has this story, which you have perhaps heard, about Columbus 
coming close to the American continent, and there is this little Indian girl who 
says: ‘What ‘chall doing over there?’… ‘I’m coming to discover America,’ says 
Columbus. She replies: ‘Well, you can go on back where you come from. We 
don’t want to be discovered.’ (emphasis mine) 
 
If America’s national identity is always already fallen, then humor as its reenactment is meant to 
initiate national transcendence. The slapstick fall we get from the comic acts of Fats Waller, the 
falls from an ideal state we get in every joke, recalls, for Ellison, falls on a national and even 
local scale. Drawing out his allusion to the biblical myth, he considers the absurdity in an act of 
discrimination a bit closer to home:   
You know the kind of absurd thing where you play with a white kid as you grow 
up, and then in a few years he becomes mister and you become boy. Or you get 
the formal imposition of a formal social pattern and pose which blots out the past, 
which severs the old fraternal patterns of conduct as completely as Adam and Eve 
were severed of their innocence.  
 
At the point when Americans start to create humor, they have already fallen. And if they are to 
return—or more precisely, to become—the identity inscribed in their very name, the United 
States, then they have to deal with the conflicts still alive from the day of their birth. Ellison uses 
the comic form to correct and transcend the “formal imposition,” the basic social structure that 
enforces the nation’s divides. By constructing comic plots as well as comic acts he works to 
emplot a more inclusive future. 
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Reflecting on the first Harlem race riot in 1939, he says in the speech, “if you can laugh 
at me you don’t have to kill me.” It might seem accommodationist for Ellison to celebrate the 
symbolic “reduction” of black humanity, even if towards the attempt to ward off physical and 
terminal violence. But this reduction enacts a counter-cohesion in which the jokes target and the 
joker forge an empathic identification. According to Ellison, in laughing at someone else, one 
laughs at himself. Humor “tends to make us identify with the one laughed at despite ourselves. It 
seems that in order to have the insight to isolate the comic defect or the aspect within the other 
person, you have to make the human identification.” It redeems the humanity of all the targets of 
the joke by paradoxically “reducing” it.  Ultimately, what is at stake for Ellison in what he calls 
“ethnic humor,” the humor of stereotyping, is the unity it creates between people against a 
dangerous environment. Reduced is not people but the outside world.  
When we connect his claim that finding humor is finding human ties, when we connect 
this functional component to how he describes humor as working, we find ourselves dealing 
again with historical pain. Ellison argues that the context of the “new world” necessitated the 
humor of the colonists. His logic is that humor works by what he calls “reduction.” For the 
colonists not to feel paralyzed by fear, for them to feel big enough to withstand the bigger threats 
of nature or of the unsuspecting enemy, they had to “reduce” those threats. Ironically, they did so 
by “exaggerations,” which made the possibly murderous “approachable,” “ridiculous,” be it 
person or circumstance. In a word, “the motive” of this type of humor “is to prepare you for the 
worst,” for the traumatic, if not the fatal. Humor is based on things gone awry in a painful way. 
When it projects the future, what could be, it is really recalling the past, what painfully was.  
This is how I am reading Ellison’s concept of preparation. American humor was one way, 
perhaps the best way, “to anticipate the unexpected.” Those uncertain incidents are the things 
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that could “explode in your face.” But it seems to me that if they are always uncertain and at the 
same time being anticipated, then they must also be the return of the past. I am arguing that when 
Ellison talks about the unexpected nature of things, chance contingencies we must prepare for, he 
is thinking specifically of chance events for which we were not. I am saying that “literature,” and 
humor specifically, is not only “equipment for living,” to quote his own quote of Kenneth Burke, 
but a means of redress.  
This leads us to the question, What exactly is this humor made of? What does he mean in 
this Oklahoma speech by the term “humor”? As I have been saying, it is an imitation of past 
events. But it is also a creation of new ones. “American humor helped us… to project the 
emerging American character.” The projection, the “project,” which Henry James continued 
from the folkish “tall tales” that begun it all, is essentially creative. It is creative towards a 
specific end: laughter. “Some agency had to be adopted which would allow us to live with one 
another without destroying one another, and the agency was laughter—was humor” (emphasis 
mine). Humor for Ellison, unlike for Hurston, has a much more familiar instantiation: it is means 
through which laughter is produced. And it is because we are working with a humor that heals, 
or at least mitigates a certain amount of pain, that he pairs it with laughter.  
Of course, the etymology of humor records the healing component in the act of laughing. 
Humor comes from the Latin word for “moisture.” In Old English, it stood for bodily fluid. 
Moisture in the form of tears is the soothing humor brings.  It is a soothing even when the 
characters do not actually cry. Their expression of laughter over something painful implies those 
tears. Although humor, as it is used widely in humor research, could describe a situation as well 
as a response,23 Ellison in this instance ties it strictly to the second. Here humor means the 
                                                        
23 For instance, Mahadev L. Apte, in Humor and Laughter: An Anthropological Approach (Cornell UP, 
1985), subsumes both environmental and intentional humor under the same heading. In fact, for him 
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intentional enactment of cathartic laughter. Smiling is not enough. In all the examples of humor 
in his talk, it is laughter that is intended, consciously produced. Whether he uses the term humor 
or comedy, my point is that they share the same basic meaning: both are forms of “agency.”  
However he arrived at this idea, Kenneth Burke would reaffirm it. In 1945 Ellison wrote 
him a letter of scholarly gratitude. He said, “You gave me the first instrument with which I could 
orient myself—something which neither Marx nor Freud alone could do.”24  Ellison went on to 
say that finishing Invisible Man (1952) is “perhaps… the most effective way of saying thanks.” 
Burke influenced Ellison’s thoughts from the very beginning of his writing career. So it is no 
surprise that Burke’s theory of comedy in his 1937 Attitudes Toward History would recur 
throughout Ellison’s work. In a book about the most perceptive “frames” through which to look 
at the past, Burke considers comedy the most eye-opening. “In the tragic plot the deus ex 
machine is always lurking, to give the event a fatalistic turn” (Attitudes 1 52). “Comedy,” on the 
other hand, “must develop logical forensic causality to its highest point… completing the process 
of internal organization whereby each event is deduced ‘syllogistically’ from the premises of the 
informing situation.” While the comic hero completes the drama, the tragic hero is completed.  
Another way of putting this is that the two frames are different according to degrees of agency: 
comedy allows for more. The comic frame lets people “be observers of themselves, while acting. 
Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would ‘transcend’ 
himself by noting his own foibles” (Attitudes 1 220). Ellison would quote this passage in his 
longest essay on the topic of humor, but the idea of self-observation while one acts would be 
                                                        
humor encompasses much more: (1) the “sources that act as potential stimuli,”  (2) “the cognitive and 
intellectual activity responsible for the perception and evaluation of these sources,” and (3) the 
“behavioral response as expressed through smiling or laughter” (13-14). In Ellison, the first two are one 
and the same.  
24 This letter is part of the Burke collection housed at the Pennsylvania State University Library.  
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dramatized in much of his fiction. If comic characters bolster their own agency, we can infer that 
tragic ones, at least for Burke, do not get such a chance. Foreclosing the possibility of redress, 
the tragic frame “promotes… the attitude of resignation” (46). After all, in tragedy the characters 
spar with “nature” and in comedy with “man.” Out of the ability to see and correct mistakes, to 
make the present good again, comedy differs from tragedy: it enables “response-ability,” as Toni 
Morrison puns (Playing 21). As Freud would reflect over twenty years after his major work on 
jokes, humor is agency of the highest order. The “capacity” to respond to what would otherwise 
be traumatic (162), he is quite right to call it a “liberating” “gift” (166).  
We miss a great deal in Ellison’s politics when we do not account for their Freudian bent. 
Timothy Parrish, for instance, offers what is otherwise an astute reading of how Ellison’s views 
on literary form are central to his vision of democracy. According to Parrish, Ellison portrays his 
vision by staging an interaction between artist and reader, and this interaction is what Ellison 
means by “form.” Quoting Charles Scruggs, Parrish is right to underscore “‘that for Ellison the 
key word is always movement toward a perfection’” (120). But he misses the key component that 
motivates the move.  In the artist-reader interaction, as Parrish interprets it, “each party [comes 
to] understand how the other’s actions partake in the same [democratic] ideal” (130). It seems 
that for Parrish this understanding is less the wish, than the necessary effect of reading. He says 
that the literary form is “bounded, as it were, by our shared commitment to equality” (128, 
emphasis mine). In fact, “the American, according to Ellison, is almost always aware of ‘who 
and what he is,’” even though that awareness is often inadequate (129). Parrish reads Ellison’s 
form as the process of becoming “aware.” Form, as an interaction, is thus the corrective to 
invisibility, to blindness of one’s fellow citizen.   
 
    64 
However, let us consider the sentence Parrish is glossing when he states the American is 
“almost always aware.” The sentence comes from Ellison’s titular essay in his 1986 collection 
Going to the Territory. “[N]o one group has managed to create the definitive American style. 
Hence the importance of the vernacular in the ongoing task of naming, defining and creating a 
consciousness of who and what we have come to be” (616). While Parrish focuses on 
“awareness,” the key term here, which he does not choose to stress, is “consciousness.” Whether 
he knows it or not, it is key for his argument because by its relation to “the unconscious,” a term 
he uses just as much in the essay, it fills in the missing link to Ellison’s notion of readerly 
interaction. The aim of “the popular arts,” and of “comedy” in particular is not only to foster a 
dual recognition. But more, it is to make “conscious” those “unconscious” events “that are 
deemed unspeakable” (611). Form for Ellison is only the space of working together if it is a 
mechanism for working through.  
I want to read what I am calling Ellison’s “comedies”: many of his short stories, his first 
novel, and some of his essays. Most scholars who have dealt with his humor have considered the 
corresponding texts “tragi-comic.”25 But I think the term lacks conceptual precision. Ellison 
himself uses it to talk about Invisible Man. But he is not referring to the novel’s form. In his 
notes outlining the main plot and argument of the book, he characterizes his protagonist: “against 
the tragic-comic attitude adopted by folk Negroes (best expressed in the blues and in our scheme 
by Trueblood) he is strictly, during the first phase of his life, of the Nineteenth century” (344).  
This attitude does not stand in for all the attitudes taken as a whole, which is to say that making 
                                                        
25 Cf. James Albrecht, “Saying Yes and Saying No: Individualist Ethics in Ellison, Burke, and Emerson,” 
PMLA (January 1999), 46-63; Danielle Allen, “Ralph Ellison and the Tragi-Comic of Citizenship,” Ralph 
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the tragic-comic he finds in the blues characterize, too, his literary forms overlooks the text’s 
overall structure, the general arc of the events. More to the point, the works I examine do not 
equally blend tragedy and comedy, a point contrary to what most of the criticism suggests.26 
Standing outside the prevailing view, Robert O’Meally has picked up on Ellison’s comic bent. In 
“Rules of Magic,” he writes, “Invisible Man is more a comic than a tragic hero” (182). He does 
more here than echo Ellison’s claim that he “intended [the novel] to be funny.” O’Meally tilts the 
scales. He calls for a reassessment of our terms.  
In doing so, I would like to summon the aid of Suzanne Langer. In her 1953 seminal 
study, Feeling and Form, which Ellison read closely, she differentiates between comic and tragic 
drama. Although she is thinking mainly of plays, her concept of comedy is wonderfully 
appropriate to Ellison’s texts. Her overarching argument is that both comedy and tragedy exhibit 
a “comic rhythm,” a sense of “vitality.” It is just that in the former this “enjoys a much fuller 
development” (336). When we read Ellison’s own words on comedy and his fictional 
presentations, we will see him approaching Langer’s logic: that comedy is the “development” 
beyond tragedy, its transcendence, not its opposite. But before we get to the details of the 
relationship between the two, let us quote Langer once again: “Destiny in the guise of Fortune is 
the fabric of comedy; it is developed by comic action, which is the upset and recovery of the 
protagonist’s equilibrium, his contest with the world and his triumph by wit, luck, personal 
power” (331). I call his works comedies because they privilege the “triumph” over the tragic, 
however temporary that triumph is. In fact, this very undulation is central in Langer’s mind to the 
distinctiveness of the comic form. Only tragedy envisions “permanent defeat and permanent 
human triumph” (349). As Langer notes, the conventional line between comedy and tragedy is 
                                                        
26 According to Verna Foster, who studies the difference between renaissance and modern tragicomedies, 
the first uses of the term “tragicomedy” denoted an equal balance of the two dramatic forms (17).  
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that everything in one will be fine in the end. All’s well that ends well. That the works I treat end 
on a note of triumph is no doubt a central determiner. But more important to our study on the 
aftermath of trauma, these works engage hardship with an affirmation of life. Not only at the 
end, but throughout, the humor is the “vitality,” the means of survival.   
Considering these works comedies is to reconsider their place in his contemporary 
context. The earliest studies of Ellison’s comedy not only described it as tragi-comic, but also as 
existentialist. Esther Jackson, for instance, likens Invisible Man to Camus’s The Myth of 
Sisyphus. John M. Reilly brings together a collection of existentialist readings, Jackson’s being 
one of them, in his 1970 Twentieth Century Interpretations of Invisible Man. Yet I take Earl 
Rovit’s “Ralph Ellison and the American Comic Tradition” as a case in point, less because it is 
the first of such readings, than because it is paradigmatic. In short, Rovit posits that the comedy 
in Ellison’s novel is the “ironic awareness” of the “fundamental necessity for masks and the 
impossibility of ever discovering an essential face beneath the mask” (35). For Rovit, the 
comedy is this absurdity in searching for a chore personality. Up to this point, his claim is dead 
on. But it is the next step in his logic that Ellson’s text resists: the assertion that lacking “an 
essential face” is cause for “despair.” Anguish, suffering, heartache—these are the names Rovit 
and others attribute to the protagonist’s sense of the absurd.  
Whether the absurd is to adopt a “mask” but to never, in fact, have a face to cover, or 
whether it is to be human yet to have so many overlook that humanity, the absurd, through their 
lens, is something awful. It incites, according to Rovit, “an incontrovertible sense of absolute 
metaphysical isolation.” But the absurd that the protagonist celebrates is deeper and fully 
beautiful. Furthermore, it is not the “sense of isolation,” but the sense of commonality, 
commonality in light of the efforts to divide. Absurd is the diversity of identities that cannot be 
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categorized, logically placed. This is quite different from Rovit’s existentialist stripe. By viewing 
the existentialism as applied, not “appropriated,” to use Ellison’s term, Rovit misses the very 
basis of Ellison’s comedy. Ellison is engaged, but engaged critically with this school of 
philosophy and its literary permutations. He adjusts them to his context. My concern is less that 
the adjustment is overlooked and more that this adjustment inaugurates the novel’s humor, as it 
does in his other works.  
Consider the narrator’s concluding epiphany: “I had no longer to run for or from the 
Jacks and the Emersons and the Bledsoes and Nortons, but only from their confusion, 
impatience, and refusal to recognize the beautiful absurdity of their American identity and mine” 
(559).  The absurdity in the paradox of masking is not, as Rovit contends, meaning empty of 
meaning, but, as Ellison riffs, meaning overflowing. Invisible’s struggle is to find meaning not in 
an existence without “real purpose,” but in one without clear purpose (Jackson 66). Meaning is 
not absent; it is abundant. In fact, his basic attitude as an inquirer is predicated on the assumption 
that meaning is more than present; it is locatable. Arnold Rampersad, major in the long line of 
scholars who read Ellison’s existentialism pessimistically, offers the following view: “Ellison’s 
commitment to a gossamer philosophy of indeterminacy and irresolution… permitted no 
wholesome resolution of [his hero’s] dilemmas” (245-46). Although it is hard to disagree with 
this, it is a leap to move from here, the recognition of a strenuous politics, to here, a serious 
doubt in their promise: true to his philosophy, Ellison “left [Invisible]… in a limbo of uncertainty 
about the future,” for “near the end of his book, Invisible will speak with elation about life’s 
infinite possibilities,” but “by this time the reader is not sure whether this is a considered 
judgment or a manic episode.” Rampersad overstates the case. If there is an absurdity that gives 
cause to despair it is not a double pointlessness, a manic where-am-I-going-and-moreover-what-
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for? It’s the grip of history, a stasis in time as the years pass. Rampersad is right to find an 
“uncertainty about the future.” But in missing Ellison’s critical employment of existentialist 
thought, he draws a dubious conclusion, which tips the scales far more towards tragedy than its 
transcendent other.  
That said, we get closer to the cause of this historical stasis when we turn our eyes to the 
issue of invisibility, of blindness to one’s individual power. But even in that our hero, “less angry 
than ironic” (Ellison),  “more… comic than tragic” (O’Meally), finds cause for freedom. In an 
essay that looks at Louis Armstrong through Ellison’s humor, O’Meally reminds us of the 
possibilities Ellison sees in being misrecognized: “Taken as a clown or fool, Armstrong is 
invisible and thus ironically freer to experiment with his art” (“Checking” 124). If Ellison’s riff 
on existentialism is anywhere it is here: in his insistence on the “freedom within unfreedom,” as 
Invisible puts it. The bigger point of my foray is that the joke in all of Ellison’s comedies is the 
contrast between two absurdities, not merely the struggle to survive in one. This, Ellison calls 
time and again is the basic “contradiction” of American life: the inhumane treatment of 
unbounded humanity.  
From Rampersad’s biography we know Ellison was reading Soren Kierkegaard, oft called 
the father of existentialist philosophy. Perhaps he is thinking the relationship between tragedy 
and comedy partly through him. In his Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard famously claims that 
“the tragic and the comic are the same inasmuch as both are contradiction, but the tragic is 
suffering contradiction, and the comic is painless contradiction” (514). One feels no pain, 
according to Kierkegaard, because one sees “the way out.” For Ellison and his characters, 
however, the comic, far from being painless, is the transcendence, the movement through pain, 
even if more is to come. The way out is the conviction that again they will find a way. Could we 
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not read Kierkegaard as essentially saying the same? Eventually, he collapses his initial binary, 
as is his wont, and in so doing he sums up the meaning of Ellison’s comedy. “Despair,” he says, 
“knows no way out, does not know the contradiction canceled, and therefore ought to interpret 
the contradiction as tragic—which is precisely the way to its healing” (520). To apply this to 
Ellison, one could rewrite it as: the characters commence with the tragic, but end with the comic, 
with finding “the way.” Comedy, in a word, is the healing of despair.  
In closing this discussion on Ellison’s comic form, let us return to Kenneth Burke. Like 
Langer, like Kierkegaard, Burke cannot sustain its opposition to tragedy. The antipodes collapse.  
In “The Dialectic of Tragedy,” a section from A Grammar of Motives, Burke claims, in brief, that 
the hero dies by a sort of suicide, for the foe that takes his life he himself births: “the act, in 
being an assertion, has called forth a counter-assertion in the elements that compose its context” 
(38). As part of context and person, the counter-assertion, then, is both immanent and 
environmental, both out of self and out of scene. Which is to say that when the hero transcends 
the “state that characterized him at that start,” transcends it by seeing his act from the perspective 
of the foe, he transcends both himself and his environment. This is precisely what I mean when I 
use the word transcend: the painful ascension to greater sight. Considering that this double 
transcendence presumes a death or, put differently, “a new birth,” does it not recall what Burke 
says about comedy?  
It appears that tragedy for Burke is the limited form of comedy. The first figures 
transcendence as happening once, only; the second, as happening multiple times. In a claim 
about our “assumption[s],” Burke alludes to how the singularity of the transcendent event pans 
out in the typical tragic plot. “In seeing the self in terms of the situation which the act has 
brought about, the agent transcends the self. And whereas the finality and solemnity of death 
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often leads to the assumption that the tragic vision is possible only at the point of death, we must 
recognize that dialectically one may die many times… and that tragedy is but a special point of 
the dialectical process.” In conventional tragedies, those that satisfy the usual “assumptions,” 
transcendence by death marks the end of the story. In comedy, however, the death is figured as a 
new beginning and the story continues with the promise of better days. It is in this light that I am 
reading Ellison’s texts as comedies, the ephemeral transcendence of tragic events. For Ellison, it 
is the fuller development of the tragic form or, to keep with Burke, “the dialectic of tragedy.” 
 I think this is what Ellison is getting at when he compares the two genres.  Consider his 
explanation for calling Hemingway his forefather. He says he gives him such a status “because 
[like Henry James] all he wrote—and this is very important—was imbued with a spirit beyond 
the tragic with which I could feel at home, for it was very close to the feeling of the blues, which 
are, perhaps, as close as Americans can come to expressing the spirit of tragedy” (“American” 
186). At first glance, it might appear that Ellison’s contradicts himself. He says the “spirit” was 
“beyond” tragedy but at the same time could only get “close.” However, if we read the “come 
close” as a comment on the author’s wish, his want to write tragedy but writing comedy instead, 
there is no contradiction. Comedy imposes a heavier demand on finding a promising politics. As 
he says in the speech that launched us, “American Humor,” the “comic mode is imposed upon 
us,” so long, that is, as the “us” are Americans working through the past. And his closing words? 
“I imagine that [James] wanted to write tragedy, like most of us. But comedy seems to be the 
basic American mode.” Comedy, like the blues, surpasses tragedy, literally goes “beyond,” a 
word from the Old English geond, to pass through. In figuring out the American identity, an 
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arduous trip through the beautifully absurd, American writers may “want” to write tragedy, but 
in the end, return to its “bas[e]”—as well as its working-through.27  
Laughter’s Shared Transcendence  
In Ellison, comedy is a response to a tragic world. Let us begin with his crown 
achievement, Invisible Man. O’Meally defines the bildung of its protagonist as the 
“advancement” of “consciousness.” In light of two moments, one at the beginning, the other at 
the end, moments where laughter takes center stage, I think we could call this “consciousness” 
self-consciousness and call its “advancement” the development of agency (O’Meally, “On 
Burke” 253). Laughter, as not only a reaction to something humorous but the activation of 
something new, plays a huge part in this process of self-growth. In the two scenes I am thinking 
of laughter occurs where you would least expect it. The difference between the two, however, is 
that the laughter is far less active in the first than in the second, less enacting than reacting. The 
narrative begins with Invisible’s trip to “a gathering of the town’s leading white citizens” (17). 
He has just graduated and someone has invited him here to deliver his graduation speech. It won 
him much acclaim from “the white folks.” But before reciting it again, this time in the spotlight 
                                                        
27 I suppose it is important to note that his description of Hemingway is part of a defense. Ellison is 
defending himself against a charge that Invisible Man was a political cop-out, a charge made by Irving 
Howe. For Howe the novel is so rife with ambiguities it upsets any coherent political message. More 
important than that, though, the tone is too conciliatory. In defending himself, Ellison comes to the 
defense of Hemingway, who received similar critiques. Ellison’s point is that Hemingway might have 
seemed to withdraw from American politics, but he in fact got further ensconced. What Ellison is after in 
thinking of the writer’s “want,” and so too of Hemingway’s, is how difficult it is to write comedy. Not 
“black comedy,” he says, for the nihilism in that certainly does become a cop-out. Envisioning an “absurd 
world devoid of intrinsic values,” as literary critic Max Schulz defines it, black comedy for Ellison is 
politically lazy: “Instead of aspiring to project a vision of the complexity and diversity of the total 
experience, the novelist loses faith and falls back upon… a cry of despair” (768). The spirit that Ellison 
finds in the blues, that I find in his comedies, is exactly what Ross Posnock describes in “Ellison’s 
Joking”: “strenuous, risky ways of acting in the world” (2). “A cry of despair,” sure, but more the will to 
get on through.  
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he considers most important, white “praise,” he agrees to join a “battle royal.” His fellow 
classmates will fight each other “as part of the entertainment.”  
The battle ring is wet, full of metallic coins, and, to boot, electrified. Slipping and sliding 
all over the tarmac, all the while with ruddy men laughing on uproariously, Invisible discovers 
“homeopathic laughter,” the name Ellison would give to the type of laughing that helps blacks 
survive (639). He figures out how to diffuse the electric charge: “Ignoring the shock by laughing, 
as I brushed the coins off quickly, I discovered that I could contain the electricity—a 
contradiction, but it works” (27).  On closer inspection, nothing is actually contradictory but the 
idea, or the words he uses to describe it: taming the current even while it passes through him. 
Something similar happens in a passage Burke writes about homeopathy in Attitudes. In a 
homeopathic cure, “one seeks to develop tolerance to possibilities of great misfortune by 
accustoming himself to misfortune in small doses” (56). His examination, however, casts the 
treatment in a surprising light by thinking of it is a way of countering traumatic “danger.” His 
words and his imagery bare such resemblance to the battle scene in Ellison’s novel that we 
would be right to think the scene as instantiating Burke’s footnote:  
The ‘homeopathic’ style is based… on the feeling that danger cannot be handled 
by head-on attack, but must be accommodated. Benjamin Franklin’s lighting rod 
was a ‘homeopathic remedy’ for lighting, as it sought to attenuate  a risk (to 
control by channelization) rather than to abolish it (to control by elimination).  
 
A few paragraphs later he discusses Thomas Mann’s “assertion that one must ‘contain his 
enemies’” (60 emphasis mine). We can see that Invisible’s laughter works as a channel, whereby 
he might “contain” the charge. To the extent that the charge is also the “booming laughter” that 
comes from the audience (emphasis mine), then he is emitting that laughter, as well.  He takes it 
in and turns it out, which works to accommodate rather than abolish the violence. It makes sense, 
then, that Invisible is more “accommodating” at this point in the novel than at any other. In fact, 
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so much so that after the battle has been staged, blood dripping from every orifice on his face, he 
still insists on delivering his speech to the electrocuting crowd. Its title? An ode to “humility” as 
the “essence of progress.”  
Burke’s interpretation of homeopathy is useful, no doubt, but so too is its Aristotelian 
slant. Ellison was deeply wedded to Aristotle’s Poetics. In fact, the “catharsis,” the purging, that 
laughter executes for Ellison would be a commentary on these lecture notes, half of which, we 
know, are lost. We will get to that at end of this chapter. For now, let us simply ask what it 
would mean for Invisible’s laughter to be a homeopathic purging? We can only conjecture what 
Aristotle said about comedy, the second half of his lecture series. We have a tenth-century 
manuscript, the Tractatus Coislinianus (known as the “Tractate”), which some believe to be a 
version or at least an accurate summary of the lost part of the Poetics. It was published in 1839, 
so Ellison might have got his hand on it. Whether he did or not, I quote it because it summarizes 
an interpretation of catharsis that illumines Ellison’s battle scene. Comedy, it says, effects 
“through pleasure and laughter the purgation of like emotions” (Cooper 228). Laughter is outed 
by laughter taken in.28 Or, in the words of Dana Sutton, someone convinced by the tractate’s 
interpretation, laughter is outed by an “emetic pill.” If any illness should be heaved to cure 
Invisible’s soul, it is his deference to white supremacy. Why did he feel that only “these men 
could judge truly [his] ability” but for the reason that he elevates whites above blacks, that he is 
racist against himself (25)? His laughter lessens the shock by purging, in part, his internal racism. 
                                                        
28 Jacob Bernays originated the interpretation that tragic catharsis enacts a purging like the one pictured in 
the Tractatus: pity and fear are purged, he says, by pity and fear. Bernays happened to be Freud’s uncle 
and seems to have influenced Freud’s thinking about the function of humor. Thus Freud’s impact on 
Ellison can be traced back to Bernays (Sutton 45).  
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After all, he aptly calls the electricity “a hot, violent force,” a description abstract enough to 
name his perception of himself and the crowd’s of blacks.29   
Ellison labels this scene an “initiation rite.” The label is ironic. Rites of initiation prepare 
the initiate for the next stage in life, yet the crowd does everything to prevent social change. The 
problem, however, is not just Invisible’s. The whites believe they can evolve while continuing to 
enforce old forms of violence, lines that separate people according to gender, race, and class. But 
as Ellison often notes one group cannot keep another down without staying there with them. 
Because the point of the fight is to see who can pick up the most gold coins, which are scattered 
throughout the rink, the violence of class divisions are stressed at least as much as racial ones. As 
to stereotypes of gender, the person employed to count the rounds is a sparsely dressed blonde 
woman, whom the black men know they are not to look at. Claudia Tate gives a reading of the 
way this woman works against the effort to reify male dominance.30 However, my point is not to 
show the way the oppressed resist a hegemonic rule, but the way hegemonic rule resists its 
oppressors.  Class, gender, and racial violence, all drawn inextricable, negate human evolution. 
The description of the crowd suggests everyone suffers from this ritualized horror. “The men on 
the other side were waiting, red faces swollen as though from apoplexy” (28). An apoplectic state 
is the inability to digest. The movement of their bodily functions, the organic process of constant 
change, the “life-movement,” as Suzanne Langer calls it, cannot accommodate their own 
ideology. To be shocked is to be frozen, and to the extent that Invisible’s laughter allows him to 
move, it regurgitates the sickness that retards human change.  
                                                        
29 The founder of the “Superiority Theory” in humor studies, Thomas Hobbes calls laughter a self-
glorification, a “sudden” sense of eminence against the “defects” of others (Leviathan 43). In Ellison this 
is also the eminence against oneself.  
30 See Claudia Tate, “Notes on the Invisible Women in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man,”  Speaking for You, 
ed. Kimberly Benston (New York: Harcourt, 1987), 163-72. 
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By the end of the novel, Invisible comes to understand these false and internecine 
concepts of the Other as they relate to equally virulent perspectives of history. The pivotal 
moment of this understanding again comes in an occasion of laughter. At this point Invisible has 
been the primary speaker for a group called the “Brotherhood.” Its principal goal is to move the 
country into a state without hierarchal divisions. Therefore, many have taken it to be a thinly 
veiled allegory of the Young Communist League, popular during Ellison’s time.31 Whether this 
was Ellison’s intent is disputable, but he certainly allegorizes a particular view about the way 
history moves.  Invisible’s task in the group has been to galvanize Harlem and make the 
“district” follow the dictates of the Brotherhood. As the novel’s climax, the city is angered by the 
unjust death of a man gunned down by police. When Invisible proposes to his brothers that this 
anger be channeled into organized protest, they tell him to forget about Harlem, as it is too 
“aggressive” now “to be shaped” (472). Anyway, they explain, “such crowds are only our raw 
materials,” a “natural resource”; they are hardly human at all. What they fail to understand is that 
the suffering they incur on others, those who in their mind will “fall outside of history,” must 
also incur themselves.  
The pain they create and intend to leave behind will persist into the future. Invisible 
implores Jack, the group’s leader, and Tobitt, his sidekick, to laugh at the history they will have 
created. Suggestively, in a dream he meets the two men on a bridge. He sees his testicles hanging 
over the banister, dripping blood. They ask him, “why do you laugh” (570)?  He replies:  
“[because] there hang not only my generations wasting upon the water…. There’s 
your universe, and that drip-drop upon the water you hear is all the history you’ve 
made, all you’re going to make. Now laugh, you scientists. Let’s hear you laugh!”  
 
                                                        
31 See Barbara Foley, “The Rhetoric of Anti-Communism in Invisible Man,” in College English 59.5 
(1997), 530-48.  
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The irony is so stark here it is difficult to see what could possibly be funny. In fact, Invisible’s 
demand that they laugh emphasizes the absence of a joke. Knowing that no laughter will come, 
highlighting the fact that no laughter should, Invisible casts the laughter as functional, not 
reflective of a joke. As soon as he stops laughing he seems to sink in a sea of pain: “the pain 
welled up and I could no longer see” (emphasis mine).  Then the bridge “seemed to move” “high 
above” him. Laughter buffers him against pain, like earlier in the novel when he realizes that the 
man he thought was ally, the man who led him to believe in the message of his battle-ring 
speech, Bledsoe, is actually an enemy (“I laughed and felt numb… knowing that soon the pain 
would come” (195)). Freud remarks in “On Humor” that laughter protects one from trauma. As 
for Invisible in this scene, it also permits one to see it. 
It is no surprise that Ellison explored this comic transcendence in stories about children. 
A collection he called the Buster-Riley stories have largely remained in the dark and for this 
reason I want to treat them at length. To examine the function of humor in these shorts would 
probably cast the widest light. Humor is so central that their themes can scarcely be appreciated 
with its analysis. In all these stories the image of wings emerge. Some have noted that wings are 
Ellison’s symbol of transcendence, perhaps the symbol beyond all others,32 yet it is interesting 
that where images of human flight are portrayed, they represent failed attempts. In The Craft of 
Ralph Ellison, O’Meally, for example, states that Ellison’s use of folklore “frees his characters to 
fly toward the moon… or become invisible and sail through the air unseen” (2). We should add 
here what O’Meally later implies: that invisibility is not an “or,” but an “and.” It is always a part 
of successful flight. To fly, in other words, requires invisibility because all attempts at actual 
                                                        
32 Joseph F. Trimmer in “Ralph Ellison’s ‘Flying Home’” examines the intersection between the myth of 
the Phoenix and the use of vernacular. He offers an astute reading of flight as transcendence (33).  
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flight are foiled by oppressive forces. The efforts end in crashes, deaths, or painful collapse.  The 
only flight sustained by Ellison’s characters is imagined or removed from public view.  
Therefore, when the characters achieve flight, then flying becomes a mark of 
transcendence and of its limits, of self-empowerment and unflappable constraint.  
Published in 1943, “That I Had Wings” tells the story of an adolescent Riley playing with his 
friend Buster. They play in the back yard, where Riley’s family keeps a pack of chickens. Gazing 
into the trees, Riley is so fascinated with “a mama robin redbreast… teaching a little robin how 
to fly” that he wants to do the same for his little chicks. I should note that the common theme 
among all the Buster-Riley shorts is a tension between kids and their parental figures. As 
O’Meally puts it, “Buster and Riley are rambunctious, curious boys who explore their world and 
resist their families’ attempts to control them” (The Craft 60). We could describe this resistance 
as the past confining the wings of the present, as the older generation circumscribing the newer. 
In “That I Had Wings” Riley’s attempt to play “mama robin” is also his wish for his own 
maternal figures to help him fly.  
This reading of resistance between the past and the present is encouraged by another facet 
of the story, in addition to the struggle between the generations. The thematic structure of desired 
flight redoubles in the desire to make new music. The boys riff on the old church songs in order 
to make blues songs. The resistance when seen in the light of musical innovation, though, 
represents, also, transcendence of the past. To what extent are Buster and Riley successful? 
When the same thematic twin (revising the old vernacular forms and enacting a sense of flight) 
emerges in other stories, how successful are those protagonists?  
To measure the success of Buster and Riley’s attempt to fly, we must go to the way they 
narrate their attempt, which are comic narratives inside a larger comedy.  We can see from the 
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first blues song that Riley improvises that the source of the comedy is his ludicrous correction of 
historical wrongs. He sings a ditty: “If I was president / Of these United States, I’d eat good 
chocolate candy bars / An’ swing on the White House gates— / Great—God-a-mighty, man— / 
I’d swing on them White House gates” (47). If comedy always involves an incongruity between 
an expectation and the surprise, then incongruous here is not only a child becoming president, 
but a black person doing so. Riley’s subversion of racial divides extends itself in the image of 
swinging gates. Instead of functioning as literal and metaphorical barriers, he turns them into 
facilitators of play. The point of the play is twofold: to emphasize the fact that the historical 
divides are transcended (he makes them “swing,” as in the musical genre) and to diminish their 
dignity as points of prohibition (he makes them play-things).  
Riley’s subversion highlights the farce of racism. It is no accident that the final verb is 
emphatically “swing,” an allusion to the musical form. What Riley is doing to the injustice of the 
past is what swing does to the repetition of a beat, breaks it.33 Ellison claims that at the tipping 
point of the Civil Rights Era, when Rosa Parks refused her seat, segregation had persisted for so 
long it became “an unbearable farce” (626). According to Henri Bergson, any living thing that 
repeats the same behavior eventually becomes a farce of itself. In “On Laughter” Bergson claims 
that we laugh at the mechanization of living beings. We laugh so that they might laugh 
themselves out of objectivity and back into the world of incessant change, which for Bergson 
constitutes one’s sense of vitality. Whichever way we see the political discrimination Riley 
critiques, his song does not turn it into a farce. It emphasizes its already farcical nature. Like 
Parks, however, he would have to bear it some more. No sooner than he utters his subversive 
                                                        
33 Some define swing at the “attack” and “accenting” of “fixed beats” (Encyclopedia Britannica, 19 July 
2011).  
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lyrics does his Aunt Kate chide him: “The Lawd don’t like it an’ the white folks wouldn’t 
neither.”  
For Aunt Kate, the Lord and white folks are synonymous figures, as the recurrent 
alternation between the two suggests. For example, after Kate’s reprimand Riley reflects, “It was 
always God, or the white folks.” Imbued in this reflection is a particular type of pain, one that 
must be deeper or at least different from the ones portrayed. We see the pain of confinement and 
deprecation that Kate instills in Riley as a way of protecting him from racist whites. But we do 
not see what lies deeper or adjacent to it. The reason is that this wound is too present, too close. 
Even the narrator has difficulty getting enough distance to describe its contours. Moving from 
limited to omniscient voice, the narrator tells us: “She always made him feel guilty, as though he 
had done something wrong he could never remember, for which he would never be forgiven.” 
We are inclined to ask what that something is, so enigmatically described? Instead of an answer, 
we get a retreat.  “Like when white folks stared at you on the street. Suddenly Aunt Kate’s face 
changed from dark anger to intense sweetness, making him wary and confused” (48 emphasis 
mine). If Riley cannot remember what he did wrong, it is almost as if the narrator cannot either. 
For right when we expect an unveiling of exactly what he feels, its source and its content, the 
narration slips back into the limited perspective and approaches the pain through a simile, 
obliquely. The subject to the sentence, presumably a reference to the source of the pain, is 
missing altogether (the sentence begins with “Like”), a construction that further eschews the past 
and intimates its entanglement with the present.  
To confront his history, Riley must return to humor. After Kate punishes him for his 
disorderly songs, he thinks,  “Maybe God would punish [me, too]” (50). In the face of that huge 
possibility, “the words kept dancing in his mind. Lots of verses. Amazin’ grace, how sweet the 
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sound. A bullfrog slapped his granma down. He felt the suppressed laughter clicking and rolling 
within him, like big blue marbles.” Ellison’s interlocutor Constance Rourke remarks that a 
bullfrog is another name slaves used for patter-rollers: “the crow was a comic symbol for the 
Negro himself… while the master or the overseer or the patrol… was the bullfrog” (84). Riley’s 
laughter emerges from two sources: the form of his speech, the rhyme that surprises us, and the 
force of his sedition, the subversive recognition that whites are akin to blacks. In other words, the 
patrolman’s suppression of blacks induces equal, if not more harm on his own parental figures. 
After all, Riley’s song reverses the bullfrog’s aim, so that to “down” a stranger is to denigrate his 
own kin (“a bullfrog slapped his grandma down”). Riley’s turn to humor makes the white 
people’s oppression of him their own oppression of themselves. By connecting his world with 
those of whites, he casts redress as necessarily collective.  
The irony in Riley’s depiction of the patrolman is joined with another irony: a pairing of 
a religious message with a secular one, of a spiritual with the blues. His song begins as the first 
and ends as the second.  By making the lines say something about the development of musical 
genres, Ellison is also saying something about the way to confront the past. In “The Little Man at 
Chehaw Station” he explains that musicians develop their styles through  “antagonistic 
cooperation” with other styles (513). In the same way, encounters with the past might just have 
to be antagonistic before they can be cooperative. In fact, when he describes the day that he 
crossed paths with Inman Page unexpectedly, he calls the crossing a “collision” that became a 
harmony, “a shock wave” that brought about a “Wagnerian crescendo.” When we return to 
Riley’s laughter, its “clicking and rolling… like big blue marbles,” we can see a similar 
development. Except instead of music we see two worlds, symbols of Rileys present and Aunt 
Kate’s past. The worlds click before they roll, clash before they ring as if to make a conflict 
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between a then and a now the necessary step towards their cooperation. For Riley the past is as 
much the memories of Aunt Kate as the whites who peopled them. He beckons the past to let 
him fly, which at this point can only be a wish (remember, the story’s title, “That I Had Wings,” 
can easily be stated as a wish).    
All his clamoring for flight culminates in an attempt to give flight to the chickadees in his 
back yard. Either childishly blind or desperately hopeful, he attaches little parachutes to their 
under bellies and has Buster drop them from the side of his roof. Of course the plan goes awry. 
However, he insists on seeing the good in its outcome. I want to show how in this insistence he 
learns to accept the tragic. Before his escapade with Buster, he refuses to accept the tragic 
conditions that he must see in order to transcend them. Buster and Riley talk about what happens 
to their mothers at church when “they feels the spirit,” “the Holy Ghost” (51): “Well, feelin’ 
good or no feelin’ good,” Riley tells Buster, “when I see Ma cryin’ an’ goin’ on like that I feel so 
shame I could hide my face… I don’t like nothin’ yuh have to cry over befo yuh kin feel good” 
(52). Ironically, with the upcoming death of the birds, he will have to understand that sadness 
and joy are verso and recto.  
As the birds fall hard from the roof Buster urgently tells Riley to catch them, but as this 
happens Riley hears Kate yelling. So there he stands immobile: “He was poised, like a needle 
caught between two magnets” (60). Mary Doyle reads Kate mainly as an enabling figure, as 
having “limitations,” but more so the “courage” that Riley needs in order fly (136). In this 
reading, Doyle misses the peculiarity of the “being caught between two magnets”  The metaphor 
underscores the delicacy of his will to act, his will being the “needle.” It also implies that tragedy 
is inevitable. For a moving needle to be stilled between two magnets, each would have to align 
 
    82 
itself at just the right moment in just the right place. With its uncanny precision the alignment 
makes inevitable the fatal error. Aunt Kate, then, is a figure of tragedy that Riley must transcend.  
The story remains a comedy, not in spite of the chicks’ tragic death but because of it. 
Through the death of the baby chickens Riley undergoes a rite of passage: he gains what Ellison 
calls in “Society, Morality, and the Novel,” a “tragic vision.” This is the awareness that the 
fulfillment of one’s dreams lies in the unknown, that to triumph one must dare defeat. It is the 
“realization,” as he says in another essay, “Perspective of Literature,”  “that the treasure of 
possibility is always to be found in the cave of chaos, guarded by the demons of destruction” 
(704). In this essay, when discussing the blind spots in the Declaration of Independence, the 
moment when Jefferson sabotaged his own vision by removing his indictment of slavery, Ellison 
states that the “Founding Fathers” reached the “very peak of social possibility.” But the 
“implications of democratic equality were revealed as tragic…  The final climb would require… 
an acceptance of the tragic nature of their enterprise and the adoption of a tragic attitude” (781). 
By willing to look closely at the tragic situation, Riley makes that final climb, which the 
founding father did not. He thereby achieves a flight of consciousness.  
In the story, the climb is limned as a gradual growth. At first, Riley construes the fall of 
the birds as, ironically, their attainment of flight. “For a little while they were flying,” he thinks. 
At this point the reader remembers the incident Riley had the day before. He fell off the church 
steps and though he cried at the moment he laughs at it in his recollection. Buster tells him, 
“Fool, that wuzn’t funny. Yuh wuz cryin’ up a breeze.” To this Riley rejoins: “I felt pretty 
good… Shucks, I’m talkin’ ‘bout when I was fallin.’ I cried ‘cause I hit my head” (50). His 
laughter celebrates the moment of descent. By the end of the story, after thinking harder on the 
outcome of his play with the birds, he realizes that comedy is not the subversion of the truth, but 
 
    83 
the willingness to confront it. He becomes “suddenly aware of the foul odor of the chicken dung” 
(61). His reply to Buster is echolalic: “‘we almost had ‘em flyin. We almost…’” (62). Here the 
story ends—with Riley’s meditation on the distance between him and the achievement of his 
dream. For Ellison, the “Founding Fathers” turned away from this consciousness, which is the 
consciousness of slavery (Kate’s cautionary chide) and its historical ties to the present (Kate’s 
interruption of Riley’s experiment). The story is comic not least because it ends on the ascent of 
Riley’s sight.   
We see an even broader gain of historical vision in Ellison 1941 short story “Mister 
Toussan.” It begins with Buster improvising on the history of Toussaint Louverture, which he 
learns from his teacher. It is important that the story begins with Buster’s neighbor “Ole Rogan” 
kicking them off his property for picking the same cherries he allows the mockingbirds to eat. It 
is important because the story Buster tells reconceives the nexus of power between them and 
Rogan, and by extension between them and whites. Ellison writes, “People change, but as 
Faulkner has pointed out, ‘was’ is never ‘was’; it is ‘now’ and in the South a concern with 
preserving the wasness of slaveocracy was an obsession that found facile expression in word and 
deed” (643). The two boys sense that Rogan keeping guard of his property is mere metonymy for 
whites keeping guard of the South. To assuage the pain of this felt unfreedom, they imagine 
having “wings” and flying up north or “anywhere else colored is free” (24; 25). While the 
fantasy of flight works as the wish, their humorous story works as its fulfillment.   
Buster does not recite his teacher’s lesson; he stages his own version. He acts as 
Louverture before an imagined crowd of antagonists. Says Buster, “you all peckerwoods better 
be good, ‘cause this is sweet Papa Toussan talking and my nigguhs is crazy ‘bout white meat” 
(28). Observing Buster redeploy the myth of cannibalism as a scare tactic against the French, 
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“Riley bent double with laughter.” They remark that such an angle on the Haitian revolution 
never made it “in the books” (30). But what did is the denigration of Africans, and by extension 
the two boys. As they imagine where they would go if they had wings, they find themselves in 
Africa, at first imitating the capitalist exploiters: “I’d land in Africa and get me some diamonds” 
(25). When Riley warns that the Africans would defend their land and fatally deject him,  Buster 
retorts: “they couldn’t catch me, them suckers is too lazy. The geography books say they ‘bout 
the most lazy folks in the world… just black and lazy.” Part of what makes Riley “double” over 
in rib-scafing guffaw is the dramatization of the unwritten history, its defense against the written 
lies, which Buster had imbibed.  
But there is more than this historical rewriting in the makeup of the humor. Above and 
beyond, there’s an historical return. As Buster continues, he takes Riley to France, to a node of 
European nationalism: “Toussan got real mad and snatched off his hat and started stompin’ up 
and down on it and the tears was tricklin’ down and he said: You all come tellin’ me about 
Napoleon… Toussan said:  Napoleon ain’t nothing but a man!” (29-30). Buster levels out the 
hierarchy of national myth. In so doing, he contests the hegemony and affirms the human ties 
amongst them all. With this, with Toussaint reterritorialized on American grounds, with the play 
set before the backdrop of an African setting (it is in thinking about Africa that Buster 
remembers Haiti), we have the meeting of African, Caribbean, European, and American history. 
Their transcendence, however short-lived, is one of national borders. As nationalistic as Ellison 
seems on first glance, the principles he touts—“equality, justice, liberty”—but rarely names in 
full, are themselves moments when, as Constance Rourke says of Henry James, he “transcend[s] 
the nationalism” he otherwise adopts (Rourke 258). By keeping them vague or at least undefined 
he does the same for America’s national borders. Furthermore, the vagueness beckons his 
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readers to fill in the blank with their own conduct. But as we can see in this story, there is more 
to it. By naming them “founding” principles, by giving them an historical context, he requires us 
to remember if we are to understand. As James Seaton comments, “Ellison’s ‘principle’ is tied, 
for better or worse, to the history of the United States” (26).  
If only the young men could take their transcendence in the realm of symbolic 
reenactment and extend into their relationships with others. Riley and Buster exchange roles so 
that Riley takes the story over and Buster responds. But just as Riley reaches the climax of his 
oration, his mother chides him no less harshly than his Aunt Kate: “I says I want you all to go 
round the backyard and play. You keeping up too much fuss out there. White folks says we tear 
up a neighborhood when we move in it” (31). Riley’s mother becomes the voice of the pater-
roller, a policing figure of the slave plantation. The confrontation jolts him out of his reverie and 
when Buster asks him, “What else did he do, man?” he responds, “Huh? Rogan?” The story loses 
its luster and Riley’s joy becomes “reserved.” “He thought of other things now… dancing as he 
chanted: Iron is iron, / And tin is tin, / And that’s the way / The story ends”  (31-32). He chants 
as if to show that transcendence lies in comic song. Chanting holds a force akin to rhymes: by 
repetition of the same words, the chant transcends their meaning so that the sound is all they 
mean. As elements of earth, tin and iron signify the sense of being earth-bound. And the jingle’s  
tautology signifies an acceptance that things may not change, specifically those things that “ain’t 
got sense,” as Buster says of his neighbor Old Rogan. The humor of it lies in its “economy of 
psychic expenditure,” which Freud considers the cause for laughter in all jokes. Jokes condense 
an idea that would otherwise take many more words to express. They “short circuit” thought, to 
use Freud’s metaphor. However, as we see in the comic chant, they also raise one’s 
 
    86 
consciousness.  Riley’s comedy takes him above, without losing sight of, some tragic 
inequalities.   
If in “That I Had Wings” we get the beginnings of consciousness, in “Flying Home” we 
see its broader development. Published in 1944, the story is about a young naval officer named 
Todd. Because he is black, he is prohibited to fly in the Second World War. Hopeful that he 
eventually will be admitted to active duty, he nonetheless continues to hone his naval skills.  
Like Invisible Man, Todd believes that only whites can judge his ability but by the end considers 
that belief dangerously false. He comes to understand its nefarious nature, but not before he 
laughs “hysterically” at the joke that undergirds it. I would like to look at the hysterical laughter 
in this story as a trope for the similar laughter that emerges in his later fiction: Invisible Man, 
“Out of the Hospital and Under the Bar,” and “It Always Breaks Out.” Hysterical laughter has 
been the critical lacunae in Ellison’s scholarship, which I hope this brief venture will start to 
correct.  
In both “Out of the Hospital” and “It Always Breaks Out” the laughter marks an 
awakening. 34  Published in 1968, the former story begins with the narrator waking up in a 
hospital having received, unbeknownst to him, a surreptitious lobotomy. He persuades a nurse 
passing by his hospital room to help free him, at which point she asks, skeptically, “You suppose 
to be coughing, ain’t you?” (251). He wants to laugh when she asks this: “I was taken with such 
an urgent desire to laugh that in suppressing it, I began coughing again.”  He wants to laugh 
because he sees that even his recovery was part of the doctor’s design. Thus “suppressing” his 
self-control, he accedes to the doctor’s. It is also important that the expression of that laughter is 
                                                        
34 Sometimes the laughter Ellison depicts can be a guard against the recognition of past injustices. For 
instance, in “Cadillac Flambé,” a story Ellison published in 1973, the laughter among the crowd 
witnessing an act of civil rights protest helped the crowd mute it: “a blast of laughter restored us” (262). It 
only serves my point, though, that in none of these cases are we dealing with hysteria.  
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a part of his true healing. In “It Always Breaks Out,” the title a reference to the laughter that 
erupts at the end, the narrator reaches an epiphany as he laughs. The story is about a white 
Southerner named McGowan who deems everything blacks do in public, from tipping their hat 
to refusing to tip their hat, a political gesture against the social order. As McGowan rants almost 
uncontrollably, the narrator comes to a realization. “My laughter—it was really hysteria—was 
painful. For I realized that McGowan was obsessed with history to the point of nightmare” (27). 
Examining “Flying Home” will help us answer a crucial question the narrator’s realization raises, 
a question that thus far has remained unexamined: what does hysteria have to do with the 
confrontation of trauma, events relived obsessively as nightmares? What does the occurrence of 
hysteria say about the relationship between one’s present and one’s past?  
Ellison’s return to the condition of hysteria time and again through the laughter in his 
works is undoubtedly an engagement with Freud. In a 1945 essay titled “Richard Wright’s 
Blues” he interrogates Wright’s simplification of his black characters. Ellison charges that 
Wright occludes their psychic depth. It is interesting that Ellison pulls on Freudian hysteria to fill 
in the analysis that Wright neglects to provide. It is interesting because it suggests the centrality 
of this frame in Ellison’s perspective of blacks. In fact, he uses it even to explain the reason 
Northern blacks act differently from Southern ones. We can hear his debt to Freud in the terms 
he employs: “The human organism responds to environmental stimuli by converting them into 
either physical and/or intellectual energy. And what is called hysteria is suppressed intellectual 
energy expressed physically” (138).  It is, he states with more precision,  “thwarted ideational 
energy… converted into unsatisfactory pantomime” (139).  
Ellison’s characters differ from Freud’s patients in one crucial way. Unlike what we see 
in Freud’s case histories, Ellison’s characters use their moments of hysteria as springboards into 
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“wakefulness,” as he calls it (142). But to be awake is painfully difficult. It means, he writes, “to 
encounter ever more violence and horror than the sensibilities can sustain unless translated into 
some form of social action.” All this is to say that in Ellison’s works, hysteria functions to rouse 
one from sleep and to motivate a shift in one’s social conduct. As we will see, hysteria inspires 
greater historical consciousness and healthier social bonds.  
When we look closer at On Hysteria, Freud’s collaborative study with Joseph Breuer, we 
see more connections to Ellison’s work than his essay on Wright concedes. As Ellison remarks, 
hysteria for Freud is the diffusion of repressions through the channels of the body. Because one 
has no control over the “attack,” one experiences it “spontaneously” (Breuer 16). As in the case 
of Freud’s patients, the characters in Ellison’s fiction are literally “split,” to use Freud’s term, 
into a “double conscience” (229). Ellison depicts this as each character looking at himself 
laughing. We might recall Burke here, who defines the comic perspective as self-observation 
“while acting.” Indeed, Ellison’s portrayals of hysteria join Freud with Burke.  The people Freud 
treats “admit that their conscious ego was quite lucid during the attack and looked on with 
curiosity and surprise at all the mad things they did and said” (228). In short, the conscious 
“stands along side” the unconscious (229), a “splitting of the mind” “present… in every hysteria” 
(12). In all its manifestations—restricted in Ellison to laughter—hysteria is the effect of some 
“laborious suppression.” The reason Ellison employs the term and depicts its reality is not to cast 
his characters as hysterics. His aim, rather, is to encourage the remembrance of a past suppressed 
and the revision of social patterns.   
The first time Ellison portrays his conception of hysterical laughter is in his 1944 short 
story “Flying Home.” The hysteria he limns assures a certain safety. One is safe in the distance 
between oneself and the joke, or more precisely, between oneself and the self that feels the 
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effects of that joke. This laughter allows one to cope with the unexpected (jokes, we know, are 
based on a surprise), by setting one apart from it. As Todd, the protagonist in the story, listens to 
an older man by the name of Jefferson describe how it is to work for Dabney Graves, he notices 
a distance Jefferson enforces: “it was as though he held his words at arm’s length before him to 
avoid their destructive meaning.” Additionally, there is a “thread of detachment in the old man’s 
voice” (168). No doubt, the detachment makes sense, for Jefferson lets Todd know that Graves 
would “just as soon do you a favor and then turn right around and have you strung up.” In other 
words, there’s no logic to the threat of violence; it is not only without predictability and thereby 
all-pervasive, but the very thing that would suggest its unlikelihood, Graves’s “favor,” is also 
what should draw suspicion. The only thing to do is stay “outa his way,” as best one can.  
Let us return to the imagery in Jefferson’s words. He thinks that at any moment he could 
be “strung up,” which is to say, lynched by the same man, the same panoptic force, who shows 
him benevolence. This makes the “thread” in Jefferson’s voice an allusion to the lynching rope. 
It also makes it a sign of Jefferson’s heightened agency, for the thread describes the way he tells 
his comic tale. Connected to the history of lynching and created by Jefferson’s account, the 
thread is both remembrance and revision of a traumatic past.  
What Jefferson revises is his relationship to the trauma. As he tells his story he loosens 
himself from the grip of his horrible memories. The side of Jefferson affected by the meaning of 
his words diminishes in respect to the side that looks on detached. After telling Todd about his 
 
    90 
doubly cumbersome situation, to be entrapped (“I got nowhere to go,” he says) and to be 
constantly threatened, he breaks out laughing. And as he laughs,  
 “Todd tried to see Jefferson, what it was that Jefferson held in his hand. It was a 
little black man, another Jefferson! A little black Jefferson that shook with fits of 
belly laughter while the other Jefferson looked on with detachment.” (169) 
 
Jefferson splits superior over his laughing self. The split, however, marks more than his agency; 
it also marks the adoption of consciousness both by Jefferson and Todd. Both Todd and Jefferson 
watch his other self (“Jefferson looked [at] the thing in his hand”). As real as his agency is, 
however, I want to underscore its limits. I think we see them in the ambiguity between the two 
Jeffersons. The sentence introducing the scene is suggestively odd. “Todd tried to see Jefferson, 
what it was [he] held.” The appositive clause does not so much refocus as redefine its antecedent. 
Was it Jefferson or the little Jefferson who Todd “tried to see”? What Ellison compels us to see 
in all this awkward syntax is the distance Jefferson does not achieve between himself and the 
affect. “To see Jefferson,” or better yet, “to see,” is to see the progress made and the healing yet 
to be done.   
When Todd eventually laughs, he feels an equal, if not a greater pain. Up until this 
moment of hysterical laughter he spends his life avoiding black people like Jefferson, country 
folk who in Todd’s mind were inferior because they knew little of modern science. He 
considered them a hindrance to his progress in flying planes. Besides, he felt a flat out “shame” 
in being identified with  “ignorant black men.”  The irony is that his very avoidance terminates 
his flight. The symbolism of the birds his propellers hit, the “buzzards,” makes the irony pretty 
clear. According to the OED, a buzzard is figuratively speaking “an ignorant person,” or literally 
“an inferior type of hawk.” He crashes his plane, at which point not only can he not fly, but, 
worse, he cannot walk. When Todd hits the ground unable to “curve away” from these hawks, he 
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falls onto the land of Graves who rebukes his humanity, avoiding the hands of folks who 
ultimately save it. After laughing at all this irony, which Jefferson had been trying to share 
through his story, a “new current of communication…flowed” between them. The cause for their 
bond is as much the hysteria as it is the shared sight of a similar joke.  
Todd’s story details his banishment from heaven for flying too skillfully.  According to 
Saint Peter, “that old white man,” he was flying too fast, so fast he could have turned heaven into 
“‘nothin but uproar.’” So “They rushed me straight to them pearly gates and gimme a parachute 
and a map of the state of Alabama” (160). Although Ellison terms such jokes “‘a lie,’” he puts 
the term in quotes to emphasize the joke’s truth. It revises the past, i.e. the balance of power 
between individuals, while accounting for the painful truths. The truth we see in Jefferson’s joke 
is the country’s segregation, plotted and imposed. He comes to laugh at this inequality when 
Graves not only refuses to help him, but wants to put him in a “straightjacket” since “caint… [a] 
nigguh get up that high without his going crazy.” He laughs at this and at his belief that only “his 
white officers” could “real[ly] appreciat[e]” him.  Thence comes “blasts of hot, hysterical 
laughter” (171). Just as Jefferson stood apart from himself, Todd “stand[s] behind it all… 
watching his own hysteria.” Laughing not only at the same thing, “the insane world” of irrational 
racism, but also in the same way, with connected “detachment,” helps Todd see Jefferson as his 
“sole salvation” (172). “It was as though he had been lifted out of his isolation, back into the 
world of men.” Mary Doyle extends this repudiated “isolation” to all Ellison’s characters: 
Ellison’s “protagonists find human connection with the world primarily and inevitably through 
the folk,” she writes (138). Yet we should add, that this connection “through the folk” working 
through trauma. In “Ellison’s Black Eye,” Robert Butler puts it beautifully: “consciousness… 
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purified in the crucible of… pain” (145). In laughing at a past still very much with him, in 
laughing at it together with someone who really sees him, Todd finds fraternal flight.   
Langer remarks that the difference between tragic and comic characters is that the second 
experience no internal conflict. They encounter the world with “perfect reason”; they approach it 
with their minds and an untroubled heart. If we take her division as valid, then “Flying Home” is 
a comedy that transcends the tragic form.  Indeed, Todd finds greater sight only after passing 
through an intense emotional conflict. This is not to say that tragedy is behind him, but his tragic 
blindness is. No longer viewing his people as a hindrance or inferior, he sees buzzards 
differently: “unmoving in space,” transcendent. He watches a buzzard above the trees  “poised” 
and aglow “like a bird of flaming gold” (173). With reason far more rational than the one that 
made him “fall,” reason that would have sent him to an insane asylum, reason, finally, evoked by 




Subversive Second-Sight  
Not until 1985 would Ellison dedicate an entire essay to the insight laughter inspires: that 
to recount the past might just mean “to laugh for my life” (653). “An Extravagance of Laughter” 
takes its central argument from a dictum cited by Charles Baudelaire in “L’Essence du Rire.” 
Ellison translates it elegantly: “The wise man never laughs but that he trembles.” Perhaps we 
should not be surprised that Ellison went to Baudelaire to open his own essay, since, after all, 
Baudelaire’s was also an attempt to come to grips with a moment of eruptive laughter.35   
                                                        
35 This is precisely Kevin Newmark’s argument in “Traumatic Poetry: Charles Baudelaire and the Shock 
of Laughter,” American Imago 48 (1991), 515-38.  
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When Ellison was watching the dramatization of Erskine Caldwell’s Tobacco Road he 
suddenly felt an unexpected meeting of his own history with those of the characters on stage. 
Caldwell’s caricatures represented for Ellison both features of himself, which he scarcely would 
have thought present at the time, and agents of trauma, which he had yet to confront. His essay is 
written as an effort “to clarify the role which that troublesome moment of laughter was to play in 
my emotional and intellectual development” (617). Baudelaire opens with a similar wish: “These 
reflections had become a kind of obsession for me, and I wanted to get them off my chest. 
Nevertheless I have made every effort to impose some order, and thus to make their digestion 
more easy” (147). Was Ellison’s an “obsession” that he wanted to rid, too? Was the 
“development” it catalyzed, first the development it prevented? The laughter for both writers is 
traumatic. So by “digestion” or in Ellison’s vocabulary, “clarif[ication],” they intend to 
assimilate the “shock” (Baudelaire’s word), the “explosion” (Ellison’s), back into their 
consciousness. All trauma, according to Freud initiates a break, and laughter, according to 
Ellison, is often its only redress.  
The difficulty in returning to that eruptive event, perhaps the reason it took Ellison over 
fifty years to do so, is that in returning one must also live the event again, or almost anyway. 
Ellison concedes to Baudelaire’s conception of laughter. Baudelaire defines it as “the expression 
of a double or a contradictory feeling” (156). Indeed, Ellison writes, “I found myself utterly 
unprepared for the Caldwell-inspired wisdom which erupted from that incongruous juxtaposition 
of mirth and quaking.” Baudelaire juxtaposes the mirth of seeing oneself “infinitely” greater than 
“beasts” against the quaking in seeing oneself infinitely less than the gods. Laughter is the 
recognition that man has fallen. Ellison, however, put the theological overtones in the 
background of his text, translating “Le Sage [qui] ne rit qu’en tremblant” as the wiseman who 
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laughs only when trembling. His commentary is less on the secular state of man as on his own 
relation to his history.  
The “fall” that Ellison traces, that he largely reenacts, is thus a fall into the past. The very 
structure of the essay attests to this: it meanders, moving back in time, jumping forward, then 
back, then forward again. I think this movement has a lot to do with the essay that precedes it in 
his collection, both of which suggestively form the spine of Going To the Territory. In that titular 
essay Ellison writes, “perhaps if we learn more about what has happened and why it happened… 
we won’t be so vulnerable to the capriciousness of events as we are today” (616). This message 
of readying oneself for the unexpected recurs throughout Ellison’s essays. In “American Humor” 
he calls it the very function of comedy. Again, it is difficult to understand how such preparation 
could be possible without understanding humor’s relation to history. For one to be able to 
prepare it seems that the future must in some way repeat the past. “Extravagance” helps us see 
that not being “so vulnerable” to future events depends on a future that is at once the past.  
The scene that opens the essay, a trip on a Southern bus, connects his idea of being 
prepared with an implicit idea of being responsible. He writes,  “a ride in such a vehicle became, 
at least for Negroes, as unpredictable as a trip in a spaceship doomed to be caught in the time 
warp of history, that man-made ‘fourth dimension’ which always confounds our American grasp 
of ‘real’ or actual time or duration” (625). Beneath the implicit contrast between an “actual” 
movement of progress and a paradoxical one of stasis lies a complex perspective on 
responsibility. On the one hand the passengers are caught in the “warp,” but on the other, the 
ship is “tripp[ed]” into “doom”: the ship controls its subjects as much as they control it. He 
elaborates this theme of agency and imposition in the next paragraph. There he writes, “for 
blacks and whites alike, Southern buses were places of hallucination.” To hallucinate is to act 
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under another’s will. Ellison suggests that the expression of agency, that one’s control over one’s 
own conduct, is not a simple matter of choice. To achieve such control demands a reconstruction 
of context, particularly institutional change. And this demands a collective effort. In other words, 
it is the space around the “spaceship” that dooms it into stasis.  
It is important to remind ourselves that his commentary on the South from his northern 
“sanctuary” is a way for him to approach his experience in the North. As he remembered the 
South, he “was learning that even here [in the North], where memories of the past were 
deliberately repressed, if not forgotten, the past itself continued to shape perceptions and 
attitudes” (628). Part of the past he discusses was the refusal by Rosa Parks to give up her seat. 
The Southern segregation had become “an unbearable farce,” and Parks’s decision would 
interrupt this faux comedy. The farce resumed, however, and the North, like the South, neglects 
to face it. Blind comedy, one that “deliberately” represses, is the type that Ellison derides. In 
“The Novel as a Function of American Democracy,” he writes, “in this country, there is a 
tradition of forgetfulness, of moving on, of denying the past, of converting the tragic realities of 
ourselves and most often of others…into comedy” (768). Contrary to such comedy, Ellison’s 
humor is often a meta-humor, one that laughs at someone else laughing. He laughs at the 
blindness the person considers insight. Thus when Ellison recalls the day he “joined in” with the 
laughter of a racist “City College student,” whom he ran into in bookstore, his laughter is one of 
consensual dissent.  
The young man refused to believe he knew much about literature, considering Ellison 
intellectually inferior. “How could he know,” Ellison thought,  “that when a child in Oklahoma, I 
had played with members of his far flung tribe” (630), that he was no more disjointed from this 
Southerner than jazz was from spirituals: “while he laughed in major chords I responded darkly 
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in minor-sevenths and flatted-fifths, and I doubted that he was attuned to the deeper source of 
our inharmonic harmony.” His laughter is a two-ness in the DuBoisian vein. It finds the comedy 
beneath the other’s comedy, critical of the other’s while affirmative of theirs.  
As high as his humor raised him, he “couldn’t completely dismiss such experiences with 
laughter” (640). All he could do was “buffer the pain” even when “transcended” (639). He tells 
us of an incident when he was a student at Tuskegee. One of his classmates was stopped by two 
police officers, whereupon they found out that his last name was “Whyte.” In disgust and 
disbelief they made him repeat his surname “again and again” until he came up with one truer to 
their assumptions. Refusing to lie, refusing to relinquish his dignity, Whyte suffered the cost: a 
physical beating to the point of unconsciousness (“the cops knocked him senseless”). This is the 
story that Ellison’s classmates told each other, and while much of it might have been true, some 
of it certainly was not. It was “exaggerated in the telling.” The way they told it made a joke of 
the matter and the exaggeration was critical to the maintenance of their sanity. If they could deal 
with an already exaggerated violence, now exaggerated further, then they could feel emboldened 
to trod the panoptic streets. “Thus was violence transcended” in a limited way “with cruel but 
homeopathic laughter.”  
Cruel, that is, and “grotesque.” The grotesque is not only a form of comedy but an 
“attitude toward history,” as we see in Burke (Attitudes 1 73). Baudelaire also privileges the 
comic form of the grotesque, but for different reasons from Ellison’s. While in Baudelaire it 
names the type of humor that returns man to Nature, in Ellison it names the type of logic the 
reconceives discrimination. The grotesque helps one deal with extremities of violence. Turning 
to the Great Depression, the social conditions that gave rise to the comedy of Tobacco Road, 
Ellison alludes to lynching in his definition of the grotesque: “The greater the stress within 
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society the stronger the comic antidote required. In this instance the stress imposed by the 
extreme dislocations of American society was so strong and chaotic that it called for a comedy of 
the grotesque.” Nothing was rational in the forms of violence exercised under the name of race 
or class. The grotesque was a way of subverting that logic to find its own logic in that 
subversion: “an absolute power based on mere whiteness made for the deification of madness” 
(640). The technique of grotesque humor is to combine two contrarieties, things so far apart that 
connecting them seems mad in itself, seems “an appanage of madmen,” to cite Baudelaire. Yet 
only through madness could such injustice be confronted.  
Ellison ends climactically with an historical study of “laughing barrels.” Returning, alas, 
to his moment of laughter, he imagines what his host might have been thinking: “‘Damn, if I’d 
known this would be his reaction, I would have picked a theater with laughing barrels (653)!’” 
As folk tradition has it, these were dried up whiskey containers placed on the streets to police, 
what Stephen Best and Saidiya Hartman call “black noise”:  
“the kinds of political aspirations that are inaudible and illegible within the 
prevailing formulas of political rationality; these yearnings are illegible because 
they are so widely utopian and derelict to capitalism (for example, ‘forty acres 
and a mule,’ the end of commodity production and restoration of the commons, 
the realization of ‘the sublime ideal of freedom,’ the resuscitation of the socially 
dead). Black noise is always already barred from the court” (9).  
 
When blacks felt a laugh coming on, by law they had to put their heads down in the wooden 
casks so as not to disturb whites walking by. Laughing was “barred” from public space no less 
than “from the court.” But it was “radical” enough to make such barring unsuccessful. The 
problem was that the laughter was contagious, so whites, despite themselves, were compelled to 
join in, which produced a bigger problem: the feeling that “the Negro involved was not only 
laughing at himself laughing, but was also laughing at them laughing at his laughing against their 
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own most determined wills” (657). By enacting a comic-second sight,  the policed became the 
holders of a subversive power:   
Nor did it help that many of the town’s whites suspected that when a Negro had 
his head thrust in a laughing barrel he became endowed with a strange form of 
extrasensory perception—or second sight—which allowed him to respond 
uproariously to their unwilling participation… It suggested that somehow a Negro 
(and this meant any Negro) could become with a single hoot-and-cackle both the 
source and master of an outrageous and untenable situation. (653)  
 
If laughter makes Jim Crow’s proponents transcend their own intents—if it can revive “the 
socially dead” and raise the tragically blind, what can it do for the rest of society?  
I have been arguing that, for Ellison, comedy, as a form, exceeds the reach of tragedy. I 
have sought to explain why he would privilege the comic for the account of something as tragic 
as lynching. Recalling his words in “American Humor,” “such sacrifices,” he says, “are the 
source of emotions that move far beyond the tragic conception of pity and terror and down into 
the abysmal levels of conflict and folly from which arises our famous American humor” (646). 
For him, as for Burke, it is not only that comedy inspires sight, and tragedy, resignation. As I 
have hoped to show in his earliest to his latest works, it is, more importantly, that this sight 
works to redress sites of trauma. Transcendence of the traumatic is limited, no doubt. But even 
with its ephemerality the changes it can prompt in the view of oneself, let alone of society, are 
radical. This makes the remembrance of the past what Ross Posnock makes of Ellison’s politics: 
“strenuous, risky ways of acting in the world.”  
In many ways my study is inspired by the work of Glenda Carpio. In Laughter Fit to Kill: 
Black Humor and the Fictions of Slavery, Carpio launches her thesis off Ellison’s celebration of 
the Burkean phrase “perspective by incongruity.” By this Burke means a sort of 
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defamiliarization, where something is viewed in a context different from its normal setting.36 
Carpio argues that, beyond the humor of relief, “the humor of incongruity allows us to appreciate 
the fact that, far from being only a coping mechanism, or a means of ‘redress,’ African American 
humor has been and continues to be both a bountiful source of creativity and pleasure and an 
energetic mode of social and political critique” (7). It was my aim not only to extend Carpio’s 
analysis to an author in need of it, but also to demonstrate that humor as “only… ‘redress’” is a 
misnomer. Redress cannot succeed without also being a creatively rich “political critique.” By 
seeing Ellison as a writer of comedies for the enactment of such redress, I hope to have initiated 
our own perspective by incongruity.  
                                                        
36 To be precise, Burke defines it as follows: “the metaphorical migration of a term from some restricted 
field of action into the naming of acts in other fields” (Attitudes I 223). 
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Chapter Three 
 
“All Welfare Stories Are Not Grim”  
Charles Wright’s Black Humor and the US Welfare State 
 
 
The Culture of Prosperity  
ittle-known author Charles Wright has certainly gotten his share of depreciation. Born in 
Missouri in 1932, Wright moved to New York in his twenties and there published three 
novels: his first and highly acclaimed The Messenger (1963), his widely derided  The 
Wig: A Mirror Image (1966), and his mostly dismissed Absolutely Nothing to Get Alarmed 
About (1973). Even his good friend37 Langston Hughes said to him, “you [might] write another 
one like The Wig. But don’t. Write another little book like The Messenger” (Absolutely 278).38 
When Wright’s reception has not been dismissive, scholars have treated his work in light of the 
problem of identity and the influence of existentialism.39 While these studies were necessary, no 
one has yet addressed the debates around welfare policies and their underlying ideologies into 
                                                        
37 Wright was the last person to see Hughes at his bedside before he passed away.  
 
38 All references to Wright’s novels come from Absolutely Nothing to Get Alarmed About: The Complete 
Novels of Charles Wright and unless otherwise noted are cited parenthetically by page number.  
 
39 For an extensive existentialist analysis, see W. Lawrence Hogue, The African American Male, Writing, 
and Difference: A Polycentric Approach to African American Literature, Criticism, and History (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2003), 119-46. For exemplary discussions about the problem of 
racial and sexual identity in the novel, see Max Schulz, Black Humor of the Sixties: A Pluralistic 
Definition (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1973), 91-123; William Andrews, Frances Foster, and Trudier 
Harris ed., The Concise Oxford Companion to African American Literature (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); and Frances Foster, “Charles Wright: Black Black Humorist,” CLA Journal 15 
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which The Wig and his later work contravenes. Nor has anyone unearthed and studied the 
satirical articles he wrote for The Village Voice between 1967 and 1973, which largely makeup 
Absolutely Nothing to Get Alarmed About, his third and final novel.40 The neglect has been 
costly, for his columns show a growing concern for international issues of poverty and thus bear 
pressing insight into our contemporary moment. We need to expand Wright’s relevance beyond 
conversations about identity politics and existentialist philosophy and into those about “poverty 
knowledge,” to use Alex O’Connor’s term. Expanded accordingly, Wright becomes significant 
to the transnational turn in the humanities, as well as to the black labor movement and its 
ambivalent relationship with the larger struggle for civil rights. The following analysis of 
Wright’s work during the mid-1960s and early-1970s aims to achieve this expansion. 
Wright’s The Wig has a distinctly modern ring.41  It begins by lampooning the US welfare 
state: “Penniless” and living in squalor, protagonist Lester Jefferson sets out to “make it” in 
President Johnson’s “Great Society,” but turns brashly away from his welfare programs (137). 
Short of joining a welfare roll, Lester is willing to do almost anything to become a contributing 
“part of the national economy,” even if that “part” is a denigrating minstrel role, like “tap-
danc[ing] in front of the Empire State Building.” But welfare is too much. Lester jokes that 
welfare programs rob him of his humanity. “Naturally, I could have got on welfare, but who has 
                                                        
40 I have omitted his first novel The Messenger from this chapter by force of formal constraints. While he 
is concerned with issues of urban poverty, he addresses them without humor.  
 
 
41 Amanda Claybaugh summarizes the ethos of our current “academic culture,” which “automatically 
criticizes the welfare state from two sides at once: from a Foucaultian position that describes institutions 
of welfare as totalizing and coercive and from a leftist position that describes them as compromised and 
inadequate” (162). Evading these issues, Rome Neal, artistic director at the Nuyorican Poet’s Café, 
adapted The Wig for the stage in December of 2003. The “packed house at the cozy café could not stop 
laughing” as “the entire cast gave a flowing, funny performance” (Armstrong 36). This appears to be its 
only stage adaptation.  
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the guts to stand on the stoop, hands in pockets, chewing on a toothpick ten hours a day, 
watching little kids pass by, their big eyes staring up at you like the eyes of extras in some war 
movie? There are some things a man can’t do” (138). Tartly he adds, “my social security card is 
silent on the point of whether or not I’m human.” So instead of waiting for a welfare card (or 
check),  he decides to “walk bare-assed up Mr. Jones’s ladder, and state firmly that I was too 
human” (169, emphasis mine). Wright’s humor registers the frustration of being guaranteed care 
as a citizen and receiving it as the abjected. 
In the backdrop of this satire on welfare’s indignities is president Johnson’s “national war 
on poverty” (Johnson “Total” 181).42 Johnson’s “objective: total victory.” A promise Johnson 
announced two years before Wright completed the novel in 1966, Johnson’s unconditional war is 
figured in the novel as no serious moral war at all, but a “war movie,” a Hollywood spectacle in 
which the poor are asked to play the role of inactive citizens (“hands in pockets, chewing on a 
toothpick”), and the children, which welfare was designed to help first, are asked to star as 
“extras.” The image Wright paints of the waiting welfare recipient does not merely express the 
idea that welfare policies dehumanize their beneficiaries.43 It underscores the dehumanizing class 
                                                        
42 In his 1964 State of the Union Message, Johnson trumpeted, “I have called for a national war on 
poverty. Our objective: total victory” (Johnson “Total” 181). 
 
 
43 To Lester, the leaders of Johnson’s welfare programs do worse than dehumanize; they rejoice when the 
poor disappear. When his friend’s dilapidated apartment building collapses, “the Sanitation Department 
complained like hell when they had to clean up the bodies of three small children, all victims of rickets 
disease. A joyous Welfare Department sent The Duke a twenty-five-year-old quart of scotch and 
officially axed the children from their list” (175). This dehumanization always overlaps with the “culture 
of poverty” theories that shaped welfare policies. For the children do not die beneath the rubble, 
signifying the structural edifice of poverty, but beneath parental neglect, a vitamin D deficiency, the 
problem of not getting enough sun, which implies lack of freedom to enjoy childhood play, a parent’s 
excessive constraints, dark pessimism, etc—all defining aspects of the “culture of poverty.” Taking the 
satire to the absurd, Lester remembers that the Duke told him “with tears in her eyes” that  “the poor 
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stereotypes that underwrote welfare policies, stereotypes Lester tries to negate by donning what 
he calls, “The Wig,” straightened red and blond hair, “a burnished red gold.”  
 The novel follows this 24 year-old protagonist in his many attempts to make this “Wig” 
bring him social prestige and economic security.44  By changing his appearance from black to 
white, he believes he will become invulnerable to racism and class dislocations, in particular the 
dwindling manufacturing industry and the nascent shift towards a service economy. In the course 
of trying to secure a job, Lester Jefferson moves randomly from interaction to interaction. The 
path is so random that novelist Clarence Major remarked, “Charles Wright uses the much 
damned fragmented way of expanding the notion of a story” (34). After discovering The Wig, he 
heads out of his Harlem apartment building, which stands in a zone of concentrated poverty, to 
boast his new hair to his friends. Eventually, he meets his old buddy Jimmie Wishbone and tries 
to use his new look to help him land a music production contract, through which he would be a 
rhythm and blues singer in white face. By the end of the novel, having found lots of luck 
sexually thanks to The Wig but none in the way getting a job, Lester resigns himself to becoming 
a chicken. He is hired by a restaurant, The King of Southern Fried Chicken, to advertise their 
menu by crawling around the streets of Harlem in a chicken costume—bearing beak, feathers, 
and all.  
The full title of the novel is The Wig: A Mirror Image, and based on the narrative 
structure, we can safely think of the chicken as mirror image to the wig.45 Phelonise Willie, the 
                                                        
44 This comic story of transforming oneself in this way rewrites George Schuyler’s satire on a similar 
race-erasing product, Black No More (New York: Macaulay Company, 1931). 
 
 
45 A body divided between man and bird, alludes to a classical discussion about the murky borders of 
human identity. We might remember Aristotle defining a “man” as a “featherless biped,” to which 
Diogenes responded by presenting him with a plucked chicken. See Lynn Festa, “Humanity without 
Feathers,” Humanity 1.1 (October 2010), 3-27.   
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artist who designed the novel’s cover, surely did when she painted a man running, his body 
divided between chicken and bewigged human. Furthermore, these are the only costumes Lester 
adopts, one at the beginning, the other at the end. On their face, however, the wig and the 
chicken are metaphors that stand for two very different stereotypes, the first designating the 
prosperous; the second, the poor. To make them reflect each other, Wright implies that the 
stereotypes of the prosperous presuppose that of the poor, and this implication can be stretched 
out to Johnson’s portrayal of the Great Society. In a 1964 commencement address to the 
University of Michigan, where he first introduced to the term, he proclaimed, “The Great Society 
rests on abundance and liberty for all… a place where every child can find knowledge to enrich 
his mind and to enlarge his talents… a place of leisure… [and] beauty” (Johnson “The Goals” 
16). Described in this way, the Great Society sounds Edenic, offering a life filled with noble 
pursuits. But what makes it problematic are the stereotypes of poverty it presupposes—
“mirror[s]”—and the poor citizens it thereby tries to exclude.  
As if Wright had Johnson’s speech in the forefront of his mind, he describes Lester’s 
discovery of The Wig in shockingly similar terms. He evokes all the stereotypes Johnson applies 
to the rich, wealthy, or financially well-off. Here’s Lester:  
I went to the washbasin, picked up the Giant Economy jar of long-lasting Silky 
Smooth Hair Relaxer, with the Built-in Sweat-proof Base (trademark registered). 
Carefully, I read the directions. The red, white, and gold label guarantees that the 
user can go deep-sea diving, emerge from the water, and shake his head 
triumphantly like any white boy… A wild excitement engulfed me. My mirrored 
image reflected, in an occult fashion, a magnificent future. I hadn’t felt so good 
since discovering last year that I actually disliked watermelon. (139-40)  
 
Nodding to the capitalist “economy” of the Great Society, Lester explains with excitement that 
the Wig provides the appearance of a leisurely life “with the Built-in Sweat-proof Base,” the 
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freedom of adventure and childhood play (“like any white boy”), and physical or moral 
cleanliness, which the poor presumably lack. “I was reborn, purified, anointed, beautified,” 
Lester shouts. Wright is not referencing stereotypes of American prosperity and poverty in 
general, but ones articulated in the first speech President Johnson made on the Great Society and 
in what became known as the “culture of poverty” thesis.  
How does Wright speak back to these stereotypes? He imagines a protagonist who does 
not don the stereotypes of the poor then exaggerate them to display their inherent absurdity. This 
would be easy enough. Instead, Wright’s protagonist dramatizes the stereotypes of the 
prosperous to show how they undercut themselves. He raucously turns them on their head, as it 
were, revealing the ways they not only reflect, but also resist the same cultural ideologies and 
economic structures (like a capitalist “Great Economy”) on which they are based. In other words, 
he depicts the stereotypes of race, masculinity, and the black poor as blatantly reflecting the logic 
of prejudice and the underlying stratifications of class. These reflections also index the weakness 
and limits of hegemonic power and in this way resist it.   If welfare marks one’s belonging to an 
impoverished culture of non-humans, it makes sense that Lester would turn to the opposite, the 
culture of prosperity, as I am calling it, as a way of securing his humanity, of even becoming 
“too human” for welfare. However, my argument in this chapter is that Wright’s biggest joke is 
to make these stereotypes spotlight what they usually hide: how pro-welfare discourses highlight 
their own limits and beckon to be improved.  
By turning these stereotypes inside out, as it were, the novel helps to answer a question 
frequently raised by welfare advocates. Where do welfare’s most powerful symbols lie? If, as 
Irving Howe argued, the US welfare state has failed to “arouse strong loyalties” because it failed 
to forge strong symbols, then one unlikely place to find them, the novel suggests, is in 
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stereotypes (Howe 12). But this is not as unlikely as it sounds. Along with comedians, writers, 
and artists, social scientists have been telling us for years that stereotypes are sly rulers of our 
conscious behavior. One of Freud’s insights in his study of wit is that ethnic and sexual 
stereotypes carry alarming emotional attraction. Deploying them as symbols to critique how 
welfare policies undermined the care they sought to give might not arouse people “to die” for 
welfare rights as they might for the “Stars and Stripes,” but it might, counter-intuitively, 
galvanize concern for the crumbling welfare state (Howe 12). Ultimately, the novel contravenes 
in yet another field of discussion. By conveying stereotypes as powerful, productive symbols it 
bears insight into a question driving a host of recent scholarship in African American and 
Africana Studies: how might the misrecognition of one’s humanity be redeployed towards the 
goal of justice?46   
To answer these questions, the novel turns first to a particularly well-known discussion of 
welfare, Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s The Negro Family: A Case for National Action. In this 1965 
study, the same year Wright began his novel, Moynihan coined what became a very popular 
metaphor for impoverished culture or “the culture of poverty”: “the tangle of pathology.” 
Lester’s Wig stands as counterpoint to this image. And this comes across in the way he initially 
describes it: “I picked up the Giant Economy jar of long-lasting Silky Smooth Hair Relaxer, with 
the built-in Sweat-proof Base” (139).  What is most surprising about this description is the 
obsessive attention he gives to its texture, making no mention of color until much later in the 
novel. He then uses an excess of adjectives redundantly emphasizing the same quality: “silky,” 
                                                        
46 For example, Alexander Weheliye writes, “the problematic of humanity… needs to be highlighted as 
one of black studies’ prime objects of knowledge, since not doing so will sustain the structures, 
discourses, and institutions that detain black life and thought within the strictures of particularity, so as to 
facilitate the conflation of man and the human” (332).  
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“smooth,” “relaxer.” When we consider that he focuses on such a small alteration in hopes of 
bringing such a large outcome, becoming “a part of the national economy” and receiving social 
prestige, The Wig becomes even more suggestive as the counterpoint to “tangle.”  
Of course, Wright is also pointing his finger at the many hair relaxing ads sprawled 
throughout black magazines, like Ebony and Jet, ads for “Perma-Strate,” “Lustrasilk,” “Long-
Aid with K-7,” to name a few. One advertisement for “Long-Aide” in the same issue of Ebony 
where Wright first appeared in a national press (1957) bears striking resemblance to the above 
passage: “Long-Aid gives hair a protective shield against dampness, perspiration… New Miracle 
K-7—specially medicated to kill certain harmful scalp bacteria… keeps hair fresh, clean 
smelling” (20).47  Regrettably, to smell “clean” is to intimate both middle-class hygienic practice 
and moral purity. The commodification of “beauty” and its concomitant stereotypes of race are 
only half the target of the satire, however; given the Great Society context, the other is the 
practice of forcing needed welfare policies through the machinery of racism. Nonetheless, the 
two targets amount to the same thing: representing “the inequality of social classes as 
inequalities of nature,” to use Etienne Balibar’s pithy definition of “class racism” (Balibar 208). 
 So that we do not end up naturalizing this class racism—also so that we may better 
understand the novel—allow me to historicize the class stereotypes Wright redeploys.48 No one 
gave the culture of poverty thesis more popularity than political scientist Michael Harrington, 
                                                        
47 In a review of Lowney Handy’s “Writer’s Colony,” the unnamed writer described Handy’s 
assimilationist agenda: “[she] had attempted to purge Negro students of racial bitterness. She says that 
Richard Wright ‘has been ruined by an obsession with social harm and injustice… and has become a 
pamphlateer’” (“Writer’s Colony” 116). It is not ironic that Handy’s efforts at racial catharsis are featured 
in a magazine with so many anti-black advertisements.  
 
 
48 By abstracting stereotypes from their historical systems, it implies they are natural, inevitable 
formations of the mind, the psychological equivalent to the biological racism they symbolize. 
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whose 1962 The Other America was thought to have directly influenced the anti-poverty policies 
of John F. Kennedy. Building off the work of Oscar Lewis who coined the term “culture of 
poverty,” Harrington wrote, “Poverty in the United States is a culture, an institution, a way of 
life… The family structure of the poor is different from that of the rest of society… There is… a 
language of the poor, a psychology of the poor, a world view of the poor” (22). Even when 
welfare is “designed to help other Americans,” Harrington continued, “the poor are held back by 
their own pessimism” (161). It is no wonder Lester is doggedly optimistic, declaring over and 
over “you are not defeated until you are defeated.”  If the “poor are permanently damaged by 
having been assimilated in infancy and early childhood into a pathological culture” then the 
prosperous are capable of endless self-improvement (Banfield 237). Indeed, Lester believes “I 
had no limitations.” Likewise, if the poor are “radically present-oriented,” the prosperous focus 
mainly on the future (Banfield 236).  
Although Oscar Lewis stressed a structural diagnosis to the poverty problem, Harrington 
placed capitalism beneath the long shadow of an impoverished culture, an ironic revision of 
Lewis since both were card-carrying socialists.49 But it was easy to miss Lewis’s more radical 
suggestion to redistribute resources and fundamentally change the system, for in his 1959 Five 
Families he wrote, the poor “show little drive to improve their standards of living and do not 
place high value on education, clothing, or cleanliness for themselves or their children” (15). As 
might already be obvious, in some ways these arguments are funny in themselves, for they 
reiterate a tautology: “the pathological behavior of poor people causes their poverty, which is the 
source of their pathological behavior” (Katz 41-42). This is a tautology Lester acts out as the 
                                                        
49 Socialism would cure their problems, Lewis claimed: “I am inclined to believe that the culture of 
poverty does not exist in socialist countries (qtd. in Katz 19).  
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pathological component in the culture of prosperity: “I’m slightly schizophrenic,” he says, again 
turning Johnson’s Great Society on its head.  
Wright was sure to position these comic asides and the novel itself in the traditions of 
both American and surrealist black humor, coupling the two when he called his novel a “bête-
noire” (Absolutely Nothing 372). It is no accident that he used this mode, which I consider a kind 
of satire,50 as a platform to query the contradictions of class stereotypes, the fact that they reveal 
what they are designed to obscure, their cultural assumptions and the economic structures that 
reproduce poverty. Sure, all comic modes (be it burlesque, trickery, dramatic comedy, parody, 
slapstick, etc.) differ from realism in that they foreground social and structural contradictions. 
But black humor registers the contradictory nature of things much more intensely by 
“deflect[ing] humor toward anguish” (Hassan 640). The contradictions, in other words, are much 
harder to solve. As one scholar remarked on Andre Breton’s description of surrealist humor 
noire, it conveys “the anxiety and even the abjection one feels amid the myriad of mass produced 
artifacts in late-industrial society, but it neither represses nor sublimates that emotion according 
to some other ideal. Instead, it displaces the emotion into a laughter that verges right back into 
the centerless midst of things” (Weisenburger 101). Laughter here does not resolve 
contradictions, it indulges them.  
                                                        
50 While considering black humor a kind of satire conflicts with common definitions of the satirical, I 
follow Weisenburger’s distinction between “generative” and “degenerative” satire, which has the added 
merit of historicizing historical forms. Unlike the degenerative mode under which black humor falls, the 
generative, standard model holds that the “purpose of satire is to construct consensus, and to deploy irony 
in the work stabilizing various cultural hierarchies. Particularly with the rise of modern capitalism, 
satirists have been expected to sustain the dominance of ideal over merely commodified being; they have 
been understood, in other words, as writers working to sustain the dream of ‘original’ signifieds standing 
in clear relation to signifiers, thus to retell the fable of a utopian, transcendental goal for capitalist 
production” (1-2).  
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If realism as Fredric Jameson notes operates by a “strategy of containment” (Jameson 
193), if, as Amy Kaplan elaborates, it seeks to project “a harmonic vision of community that can 
paradoxically put an end to social change” (Kaplan 12), then black humor novels lay bare these 
social conflicts to motivate political action.51In an interview Wright disclosed, “ ‘I initially 
started this realistic novel about a group of black guys wearing black leather jackets and meeting 
on Sunday afternoons in a basement plotting a revolution in the early 1960s’ ” (Meeks 28). As 
his interviewer paraphrased, “Nobody in the publishing industry wanted to represent this type of 
book by a black writer during the height of the Civil Rights Movement… the only solution to get 
his message across was to use black humor.” Ironically enough, the black humor probably 
brought out the revolutionary message—the urgency to act—better than the censored realism 
could have.  
 
 
Second-Sight and the Underside of Class Stereotypes  
 The Wig gives Lester the power of sight.52 “Completely accept[ing] the Horatio Alger 
Legend,” as Frances Foster notes, he is relentlessly optimistic, the very opposite of the dependent 
and morally absolved welfare recipient (51).53  “A true believer in the Great Society,” he vows to 
never give up: “I’d turn the other cheek, cheat, steal, take the fifth amendment, walk bare-assed 
                                                        
51 To be sure, Kaplan’s argument is that beneath appearances, “realism does not totally repudiate 
revolutionary change by ‘seeking to fold everything… back into the status of nature’” (10). Such resolute 
attitudes toward the realist mode “tend to overlook the profound social disturbances that inform realist 
narratives” (7).  
 
 
52 In the “Author’s Note,” Wright states, “And the story itself is set in an America of tomorrow.”  
 
 
53 Christopher Lasch takes a representative stance on the theme of responsibility, which commonly 
polarizes welfare debates: “Welfare liberalism absolves individuals of moral responsibility and treats 
them as victims of social circumstance” (369).  
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up Mr. Jones’s ladder, and state firmly that I was too human” (169). True to the form of the 
culture of prosperity, his optimism is not only an attitude to the present, but one towards the 
future. He believes in the favorable outcome of Johnson’s promises so deeply that he soon casts 
himself as a prophet. The feeling of “I had to make it” becomes the conviction that he will: 
“Coming up, I’d decided not to comment on The Wig, realizing rhetoric would not be effective. 
The Wig would speak for itself, a prophet’s message” (145).  
Immediately, The Wig starts to resemble Du Bois’s “veil,” that component of double-
consciousness that for all its limitations allows the subaltern to discern the future. In addition to 
representing the “façade of race” (Shaw 18) and “institutional racism” (Marable 48),  the “veil,” 
as Robert Gooding-Williams points out, echoes “the discourse of nineteenth-century animal 
magnetism (mesmerism)” (78). He continues, “according to the folklore… a child born with a 
caul (a veil-like membrane that sometimes covers the head at birth) will enjoy a second-sight (for 
he is ‘double-sighted’),” able to “see ghosts as well as the future.” Both veils and wigs rest on 
one’s head, endowing the wearer with a prophetic “second sight.” When Lester acts out the 
“second-sight” of The Wig, of those purportedly born in a culture of prosperity, his second-sight 
is the ability to discern the false, ghostly present (all things that suggest he won’t “make it”) from 
his certain, positive future. Satirized, then, is this vision of “a world that looks on [the poor] in 
amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois Souls 8).  
It is probably safe to assume that almost every African American writer responding to an 
African American literary tradition knew of Du Boisian double-consciousness, the condition of 
possibility for all second-sight.  But without treading too far into the swamp of authorial intent, 
Wright’s choice of The Wig as the framing metaphor appears to be a conscious response to Du 
Bois. Surprisingly, no one writing on the novel has pointed out the oddity of Lester calling his 
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hair The Wig, odd even considering its place in the black vernacular idiom.54 He, after all, does 
not wear a wig, but douses his head in “relaxer.” In this respect, The Wig is a misnomer. On the 
other hand, he capitalizes it, highlighting its figurative nature. As a metaphor for his new hair, it 
signifies a racial marker, but, on the other hand, as a false metaphor it suggests the falsehood of 
that marker. This is exactly the conceptual ambiguity of Du Bois’s veil and the condition of 
possibility for transcending it, “float[ing] above” it, as he says (Souls 8). The veil, after all, is 
both a barrier and a blessing.  
In adopting the stereotypical role of the prosperous American and expressing second-
sight, Lester dramatizes a contradiction at the center of pro-welfare debates: the equal emphasis 
on self-reliance and communal support. Social scientist Gaston Rimlinger observes the problem 
this contradiction poses for the lasting success of any welfare program: “in the United States the 
commitment to individualism—to individual achievement and self-help—was much stronger 
than… in England… The survival of the liberal tradition, therefore, was… stronger and the 
resistance to social protection more tenacious” (qtd. in Quadagno 5). Lester demonstrates some 
of the consequences of insisting on self-sufficiency, consequences for developing family ties, 
empathy towards strangers, platonic and erotic bonds—for all affective affiliations. The irony, 
Lester’s circumstances imply, is that it is the ideology espoused by those accusing the poor of 
self-isolation and family breakdown that produces these effects.  
Daniel Patrick Moynihan was merely echoing a long line of welfare advocates, when he 
contended that “The steady expansion of this welfare program, as of political assistance 
                                                        
54 In the “Author’s Note,” Wright states, “The word ‘wig’ as it is used in this story is negro slang for 
‘hair.’” Clarence Major elaborates in his Dictionary of Afro-American Slang: ‘wig’ means “a man’s or 
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programs in general, can be taken as a measure of the steady disintegration of the Negro family 
structure over the past generation in the United States” (14). The solution to the issue of isolation 
was to develop venues through which poor blacks could assimilate and “participate” with the 
“greater majority of the population,” hence the insistence on what was known as “maximum 
feasible participation” (which usually meant encouraging a certain percentage of the poor to sit 
on welfare program boards or funding communal artistic initiatives like Amiri Baraka’s street 
drama). Participation in any collective activity or institutional program is denied to all Lester’s 
friends, but rather than thinking of this denial as coming from an external agent (thus making 
them victims), Lester’s adoption of The Wig urges us to interpret him allegorizing an ethic of 
self-help. Moving not from victim to perpetrator but occupying the space in between, the  
message shifts from a list of grievances to a catalogue of internal contradictions. In other words, 
instead of taking the satire as detailing the multiple afflictions endured by the colored poor, 
which is how the novel has always been read, I take it as conveying the multiple ways a 
dominant middle-class afflicts itself.  
 This self-affliction appears to be what the novel is getting at when he responds to his 
neighbor’s plea for help. In one of the most raucously absurd sections of the novel, Nonie Swift 
calls Lester over to her apartment in order for him to remove the rats threatening to kill her. He 
subsequently adopts the role of the absent father putting the house in order, but in this role leaves 
a greater disorder in his stead. A clear rewrite of the rat-chase in Native Son, the chapter begins, 
“One magnificent rat, premium blue-gray, and at least twenty-five inches long, walked boldly 
into the center of Nonie Swift’s cluttered living room, its near-metallic claws making a kind of 
snare drum beat on the parquet floor” (213). Lester then proceeds to chase the “Rasputins” as 
they form a “V-formation” in counter-attack (216). That Lester names them after a figure 
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symbolizing an “insidious or corrupting influence… over a ruler [or] government,” counters their 
symbolism in Native Son of Bigger’s privation and disempowerment with the opposite 
implication: Lester’s support of state and patriarchal power. 
 In fact, Lester rejects Nonie’s label of the rats as “white folks” out to get her. “‘You 
killed the white bastard with your hands,’” she says, to which Lester retorts, “‘He’s a dead gray 
son of a bitch,’” the emphasis Lester’s (214). Lester stands not for the underclass and stigmatized 
peering through a knothole in the fence, but for America’s national mythology: “Images of 
heroes marched through my Wigged head. I would hold the line. I would prove that America was 
still a land of heroes” (215). Ironically, the heroism is only accidentally tied to helping his 
neighbor. After Lester skins the rats as animal “fur” (217)—indeed, the scene is absurd—Nonie 
begs Lester for the rat-skins, hoping to relieve her privations. “‘At least you could give me some 
for broth… Don’t be so mean and selfish. I’m only a poor widow and soon there’ll be another 
mouth to feed’” (218). In the end, he leaves the house in disarray and rebukes her plea: “I looked 
up at Nonie and laughed.”  
The notions of masculinity that produce his apathy towards his neighbor again implicate 
Moynihan’s destructive recommendations for communal support. When Lester first enters her 
apartment, Nonie tells him, “I started to call the ASPCA,” the American Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (213). Wright comically selects an organization based on anti-
cruelty. As the nation’s oldest animal welfare organization whose founding objective was to 
provide care and whose name in Manhattan was associated mainly with shelter homes (during 
the time Wright wrote the novel it operated New York City’s municipal animal shelter system), 
the ASPCA  is a veiled reference to the welfare state. Lester enters Nonie’s apartment as a 
substitute for a welfare social worker, symbolizing more broadly the welfare state by proxy. 
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“‘Please be careful,’” she tells him, which is also to say ‘full of care.’ His reply quickly 
implicates the patrifocal lens of welfare policies: “‘I’ll handle this mother,’ I said.”  
To run across the notion that black mothers are the culprit of their own poverty is to 
immediately think of Moynihan. To engage him further, when Lester summarizes the hunt at the 
end, he draws to mind Moynihan’s implicit militaristic agenda against the black woman: “Rat 
killing was a manly sport and there was always the warmth of good sportsmanship after the 
game” (218). Listen to the sport-like qualities Moynihan gives to military service as the panacea 
for a matriarchal family structure, and by extension, for poverty: “There is another special 
quality about military service for Negro men: it is an utterly masculine world. Given the strains 
of the disorganized and matrifocal family life in which so many negro youth come of age, the 
Armed Forces are a dramatic and desperately needed change: a world away from women, a 
world run by strong men of unquestioned authority, where discipline, if harsh, is nonetheless 
orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if limited, are granted on the basis of performance” 
(42). Lester’s internalization of this logic answers in no uncertain terms a question that bugs him 
soon after he adopts The Wig: “Dear Dead Mother and Mother. Why do I have visions of 
guillotining you” (151)?  
By the novel’s end, Lester’s believes he has found the cure for his self-afflictive 
masculinity: castration. Having found little success through The Wig and a great deal of anguish, 
he walks to his friend Mr. Fishback’s morgue. Fishback has him strip his pants, tells him to get 
an erection, and pushes an “invisible button in the mirrored wall” (254). “Out popped a red-hot 
slender steel rod,” which Fishback “jabbed…. into the head of my penis… counted to ten and 
jerked it out” (254). Lester Jefferson, the willing victim of this torture, then says, “smiling,” 
“‘I’m beginning to feel better already’” (254). The novel’s most damning message about the 
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masculinity that inheres in the stereotype of prosperity, as conceived by Moynihan, is that it is 
tantamount to or symptomatic of a fear of impotence.  
No doubt this message also extends to the history of the US welfare state from its 
beginnings. Since the nineteenth century, American (and English) anti-poverty policy inscribed 
joblessness as a mark of impotence. In an 1821 report on the poor laws of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Josiah Quincy observed that the laws separated the poor into “two classes”: “the 
impotent poor, in which denomination are included all, who are wholly incapable of work, 
through old age, infancy, [etc.]…. And the able poor… capable of work” (Rothman Almshouse 
Experience 4). Having tried from its inception to discriminate between the deserving and 
undeserving, poor laws “translated overtime into the restriction of aid to the impotent and the 
exclusion of the able-bodied” (Katz 12). Lester sets out to find a job in avoidance of welfare’s 
dehumanization, but by assuming the perspective of its leading advocates, he ironically ends up 
surrendering to that demise. Lester illumines the fact that welfare policies not only reaffirmed 
but produced national masculinities, and by facing the mirror he asks all those who believe in the 
right of welfare to account for one’s own role in its sobering sides and to take ameliorative 
action, even if the right “button” (“invisible” Lester calls it) is terribly hard to find.55 
 
 
Readerly Second-Sight and the Production of Empathy  
 
Tirelessly  unsympathetic, Lester is a frustrating character. Are we not  frustrated with his 
reply of “laughter” to his neighbor’s plea for help, with his selfishness, and worst of all with his 
                                                        
55 Bruce Robbins advances a similar claim regarding the overlap between welfare and the university 
(welfare defined loosely as a system of care): “Ambivalence about the welfare state takes the form of 
ambivalence about the new sexual equalities and freedoms, expressing itself in a familiar blend of satire 
and disavowed vicarious enjoyment” (Upward Mobility 217). 
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unbridled adoption of a patriarchal masculinity? This is a frustration reviewers and critics have 
consistently mentioned—with Lester and the havoc his self-centeredness wreaks on the prose, 
not a shred of concern for his readers.56 Peter Teachout enunciated what many would reiterate 
when he said, “The imagery is piled, the comic dilemmas are rigged, the jokes are heavy; there is 
too much nervous kidding, there is no poetry in the slang; the narrative voice shifts from tone to 
tone; from mock melodramatic (‘smiling ecstatically, tears gushing from my…’)… to 
sentimental (‘corny human stuff like that’). The novel barely holds together” (466). Teachout is 
right.  
However, these apparent weaknesses are the most radical features of its form. Unlike all 
his other works, the novel agitates. It upsets the pleasure one expects to receive from reading a 
book labeled as satire, but this very agitation and uneasy pleasure constitute an elaborate 
                                                        
56 One Kirkus Reviews writer says of the novel, “Very funny and tremendously effective once or twice, 
but the rest is chaos” (1242). And David Galloway in his long-form book review “Visions of Life in 
Recent Fiction,” miffed, “Wright clearly asks more mileage from his grotesque image than it can produce. 
The Wig too often falters in just this fashion, and the novelist’s good intentions go astray—even in the 
central but unhappily not centralizing image of ‘the wig’ itself; from a novelist of lesser talent The Wig 
might have seemed a ‘promising’ novel, but from the author of The Messenger it seems a distinctly 
second-rate achievement” (854). A more tempered complaint came from Robert Lee: “The Wig risks a 
fair degree of plain pop-art silliness but its idioms and Wright’s eye for America’s attraction to easy 
panaceas and commercial ‘uplift’ is never without its shrewdness” (241). More recently, Frank Campenni 
wrote an encyclopedia entry for Contemporary Novelists, opening with the deprecation, “The literary 
output of Charles Wright has been slight in volume and promising, but not always effective, in practice” 
(1072).  
 At the other end, Ishmael Reed and Clarence Major are two lone voices who have given The Wig 
unrestrained praise. Reed, for instance, introduced the second edition of its publication with a somewhat 
valid critique of its reception and a statement of gratitude similar to Major’s: “Charles Wright’s novel 
marked a change in African American fiction; it had neither the lofty and Biblical heft of James 
Baldwin’s works, nor the opaque elusiveness and obeisance to New York Intellectual fashion found in 
Ellison’s Invisible Man… All of us who wanted to ‘experiment’… used it as a model. And though some 
would call me the literary son of Ralph Ellison, in the 1960s I was the younger brother of Charles Wright. 
The fact that this novel was ignored tells a lot about how African-American fiction has been kept in its 
place” (ix). After paying similar respect to Wright, Major reiterates Reed’s formulation of the state of the 
field: “Black American fictionists have been primarily concerned with subjects involving the racial plight 
of Black people; with naturalistic or realistic and deterministic forms, in terms of literary technique” (33).    
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machinery provoking us to act. Amongst the many things Lester suffers from is a dearth of 
empathy and this manifests in his address to us, provoking us to be much more empathetic 
through the very empathy the text refuses to avail. I am using empathy to mean not only “sharing 
the feelings of another person” (Jahoda 152), but also as it first emerged in the field of aesthetic 
theory. Building on its Greek etymology, “feeling into” (from the German Einfuhlung), empathy 
was defined by aesthetic theorist Edward Titchener in 1910 as the “the process of humanizing 
objects, or reading or feeling ourselves into them” (417). The Wig denies us access to its 
“objects,” its symbols and characters, and so denies us the aesthetic pleasure of empathy.   
Defining empathy this way explains why the frustration Lester evokes with his apathetic 
attitude occurs in the mode of black humor. Most scholars who have written on this humor 
cannot avoid remarking on its frustrating management of empathic bonds. Hamlin Hill states, “it 
refuses to draw back from the catastrophe which endangers the protagonist, but cheerily 
annihilates him. The black humorist does not seek sympathy or  alliance of his audience, but 
deliberately insults and alienates it” (344). Unsurprisingly, then, Eberhard Kreutzer complains, 
“the intended tragicomedy cannot convince us because the comedy boils down to cheap jokes 
and the tragedy never makes itself felt for the sheer inadequacy of expression” (160). Kreutzer’s 
issue is not the particular emotion the novel made him feel but how little it made him feel at all. 
My interlocutors hardly representing proof of the case, I wonder how might the sentences work 
to inspire empathy, inspired necessarily through their ‘inadequate’ language? What kind of 
empathic bonds does this linguistic inadequacy help excite?  If stereotypes create apathy in 
Lester, then how does his deployment of those stereotypes create the reverse in us?  
As Kreutzer was getting at, one thing common to all the breakdowns of empathy is a 
concurring breakdown of language. No one in Lester’s world, including himself, cares for 
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anyone else, but apathy comes curiously along with silence or out of the inability to 
communicate. No other encounter expresses this more explicitly than Lester’s observation of a 
welfare mother murdering her son. As she yells at her him because he “doesn’t want to go to a 
segregated school,” a police officer offers her assistance, asking, “‘Wanna use my nightstick?’” 
(243)57 She then gives him a beating, a punishment she tells Lester that “the NAACP and the 
Mayor and the Holy Peace-Making Brotherhood advised” (243). While the satire is about the 
ineffectuality of non-violent protest, the accomodationist ethics of the NAACP, and the rise of 
police brutality after desegregation, it is also about what happens to empathy when language 
fails:  
Silently, I watched the mother slam the nightstick against the boy’s head. The 
boy’s mouth opened and he fell to the sidewalk. Blood flowed from his nostrils 
and lips. ‘Mama,’ he sighed, and closed his eyes…. The mother knelt down and 
shook the boy and then stood up. ‘He’s dead,’ she commented in a clear voice. ‘I 
could never talk to him.’  
‘It’s not your fault,’ the policeman said. ‘Kids are getting out of hand 
these days.’ (244)  
 
As the final, thus the bigger, explanation for her homicide, she says they never communicated. 
The statement hangs there in the context seemingly out of place and Lester gives it more 
meaning when he puts his own silence in relief: after yelling “this isn’t fair!” he is scolded for 
“trying to obstruct justice,” so  “silently” he stood there then “tottered off.” The implication is 
that people lose their humanity when their vocabulary of justice is unintelligible to the arbiters. 
Simply put, when a system by reason of its own language cannot understand the language of 
                                                        
57 Wright again indexes Moynihan’s argument that black women castrate their sons in a number of ways 
without a father present. In Moynihan’s words, they “reinforce” the “disparity between educational 
attainment between nonwhite men and women in the labor force” and  reproduce “their consistently poor 
performance on mental tests,” hence the mother’s dictate that her son attend a “segregated school.”  The 
black woman comes to stand for the perpetuation of poverty itself. 
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others it also cannot redress certain types of wrong. The solution is not to make others 
intelligible but to make oneself capable of hearing their voices.  
Wright stages the necessity of this self-adjustment through the odd language of The Wig, 
which is to say, the language of class stereotypes. As he walks towards the apartment of his 
friend to show off his new, hopefully more attractive hair, he thinks, “I’d decided not to 
comment on The Wig, realizing rhetoric would not be effective. The Wig would speak for itself” 
(145). He hopes The Wig will bring him closer to this friend Sandra Hanover, to others, to 
strangers, and ultimately to the centers of capital. For it to “speak for itself” is to bring him social 
and economic belonging. So he is chagrinned when he remains invisible (he simply “hoped 
someone would say, ‘Good morning. What lovely weather we’re having.’ ‘Yes. Isn’t?’ I’d 
reply… Corny human stuff like that’ (246)). Given Lester’s economic and social estrangement, 
The Wig, of course, does not speak effectively, here with his friend from whom he feels even 
more estranged after he leaves nor anywhere else in the novel. What does all this imply? His 
loneliness says as much about the failure of stereotypes to communicate their intended message 
as it does about the failure of one’s attempt to receive it. In other words, if he had used “rhetoric” 
he at least would have been speaking in a language his friend was more likely to understand. The 
point is not to state the obvious, that believing stereotypes reflect who we are is self-alienating, 
as is any attempt to transpose a “social relation between men” as one “between things” (Marx 
165). Rather, the point is to discern what Lester cannot: how to speak effectively, empathically.  
This production of empathic speech is exactly what the humor solicits when we laugh (if 
we laugh) at Lester’s linguistic failure. Funny is his belief that communication through a 
stereotype will create empathic bonds. The laughter does not stop at marking the absurdity, but if 
Henri Bergson’s theory of laughter holds any validity, our laughter is “corrective” and begs him 
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to change (21). As Bergson writes, laughter is a “social gesture” (88), a “utilitarian aim at 
general improvement” towards sociability (20), an effort “to repress any separatist tendency” 
(170)—by finally converting “rigidity,” which characterizes Lester’s recurring coldness, into 
“plasticity,” which characterizes empathic identification (171). To pull further on Bergson, what 
better expresses the process of receiving and giving empathy than “readapt[ing] the individual to 
the whole” and ourselves to others?58 Lester’s comic belief in the communicative power of 
stereotypes is a mechanism to solicit our empathy. Assuming we understand the culture of 
prosperity, we see from his own cultural vantage-point what he ironically cannot—the ability 
that defines second-sight. We thus enact a comic second-sight that encourages the making of 
empathic bonds.59   
 If the novel defines a stereotype as a sign that fails to “speak for itself,” by which it 
means fails to speak in a language that promotes empathy, then we could call stereotypic 
Wright’s principles of composition. The crudeness of his sentences draws attention to itself, 
turning the focus away from the suffering it describes towards the insufficiency of the 
description. When Lester finally meets his friend Sandra Hanover, he notes her pained silence 
but hears her shoes: “her eyes were closed and her Texas-cowboy sadist’s boots morse-coded a 
lament” (145). Unlike in The Messenger, Absolutely Nothing to Get Alarmed About, and his 
                                                        
58 Most have read Bergson’s argument as implying laughter is conformist and thus a refusal of difference. 
First, as The Wig suggests, not all conformity is bad as not all separatism is good. Two, for Bergson, what 
laughter asks the comic person to conform to is a state of unending difference and change. Hence, he 
conceives “automatism” as funny (Bergson 143-44).   
 
 
59 As Robert Gooding-Williams notes, for Du Bois second-sight was always hinged to empathy. Second-
sight enables the ascent ‘above the veil’ and Du Bois “conceptualizes this sublime life wed with Truth as 
one of reciprocity: of human beings mutually according each other appropriate attention, concern, and 
respect” (75).  
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newspaper articles, Wright relies on excessive adjectives (here compound and cumulative), an 
excess that promotes a more empathic way of seeing others. The adjectives in the phrase “her 
Texas-cowboy sadist’s boots” are frustrating because they defer their subject. The subject is 
hidden beneath its physical descriptors, a stylistic choice that indicts the exaltation of appearance 
over essence, markers of gender, class, and race over the human that exceeds them.  
The Wig is no less existentialist here, as it would be if it divided existence from essence, 
or performance from performer. Nor is it rehashing the dictum that we should refrain from 
judging others based on their appearance. The judgment it objects to through its own linguistic 
“inadequacy” is one that frames that appearance within a stereotype, like “Texas-cowboy.” 
Elsewhere, even non-physical things receive stereotypical and superfluous physical descriptors,  
as in Lester’s “butter-scotch color dreams.” Yet nowhere are the excessive adjectives more 
pointed than when they are attached to the dead whom the state is supposed to protect. Lester 
recalls, “Outside, in the quiet street, I saw a crowd gathering and went over. A Negro Civil 
Service worker—he looked to be about forty-five—had dropped dead. His skin had turned purple 
blue-black” (168). The scene impacts Lester more than any other has: “I shuddered and then 
began running, running home… knowing if I didn’t swing a secure gig, twenty years from now, 
I’d be flat on my own back, my chafed lips open as if to receive a slice of honeydew melon. 
Purple blue-black and dead.” Because Lester associates the man’s Civil Service job with his 
death, he equates his state of unemployment, in which he has no medical or financial protections, 
to employment by the state. He then identifies this vulnerability as “skin” turned “purple blue-
black,” a color we have to work hard to imagine. What, after all, does such a color, such a 
racialization look like? We as readers are asked to figure that out and the task is annoying, 
annoying since confusing and seemingly insignificant compared to the greater significance of his 
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death. What some describe as “inflated pop style at its worst” is a technique that makes us reflect 
on the how we color others, excessively, inappropriately—apathetically (Kreutzer 160). 
This brings us to the issue of blame which lies behind all the scenes of cruelty. Who is 
culpable for the injustice? In the episode where the welfare woman killed her child, the state 
emerges in the form of the policeman, who comically blames the innocent child for his own 
murder. “ ‘It’s not your fault,’ ” he says to his mom, “ ‘kids are getting out of hand these days’ ”  
(244). The humor, the obviously erroneous blame, only amplifies the question of culpability. 
Wright could have recapitulated a common charge against social welfare policies that the 
“therapeutic approach to social action” relieves “ghetto residents of the responsibility for their 
own fates and their own futures” (Gifford 67). To these critics, the officer’s statement “ ‘It’s not 
your fault’ ” summarizes where welfare goes wrong. But by faulting the listeners (the cop and 
the mother), for not understanding and finding empathy for another’s voice, especially when that 
voice feels abrasive (she “ ‘could never talk to him’ ” and Lester’s charge “ ‘This isn’t fair!’ ” 
was met with the officer’s reprimand), the novel compels us to share the blame.  In so doing, it 
recommends a universal responsibility, not through the coldness associated with bureaucratic  
procedure, but the difficult empathy missing from the novel.  
I have been suggesting that the empathy the characters do not express towards each other 
is solicited in the reader, and this solicitation has everything to do with ineffective 
communication. Whether or not each reader’s response can be empirically supported is beside 
the point. The solicitation of empathy seems to be part of the novel’s design. This might be why 
Wright turned to black humor to write about “a revolution” and to “get his message across,” as 
he explained to Kenneth Meeks (Meeks 28). Part of readerly second-sight is that the reader 
watches him or herself read, and this self-consciousness is principally what realist texts seek to 
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avoid. Realism “is primarily related to the culture of surveillance, in which the realist participates 
in the panoptic forces which both control and produce the real world by seeing it without being 
seen in turn” (Kaplan 7). The panoptic structures in The Wig, its “inadequacy of expression,” its 
stereotypic speech, forces the reader to observe him or herself reading by refusing easy entry and 
cathartic laughter. Through the reader’s comic second-sight, the novel conjoins the politics of 
pleasure with the production of empathy, and this in itself is a revolutionary, pro-welfare act.60  
 
 
The Village Voice Years: Wright, the Cosmopolitan and Trickster Ethnographer  
 
In 1967, one year after publishing The Wig, Wright started writing for the Village Voice, 
an organ for pro-welfare advocacy and anti-poverty policies.61 Despite the paper’s alignment 
                                                        
60 The Wig rather explicitly connects this frustration of pleasure with the enablement of revolutionary 
action, the fundamental (syntactic) restructuring of a capitalist society. When Sandra Hanover states her 
attraction for Lester due to his new hair (“Naked, you’d look like a Greek statue”), he “bolted out the door 
and down to my second-floor sanctum. Pleasure, I reflected, was not necessarily progress, and I had a 
campaign to map out” (149). In fact, comfortable, easy pleasure emerges again and again as a problem for 
racial equality and socialist justice. Raising the most concern about the fulfillment of comic pleasure, one 
of Lester’s friends says outright, “I worked for the government, man. I kept one hundred million colored 
people contented for years. And in turn, I made the white people happy. Safe” (155). Moreover, there are 
people in the novel who pander to stereotypes of racialized others described as “Good Humor men 
equipped with transistor laughing machines” (182). “Good humor,” which makes laughter so easy it is 
done for you by “transistor… machines,” serves to quell disruptive anger towards the contradiction of 
believing in justice but practicing the opposite.  
 
 
61 There are too many articles in The Voice on welfare to give a representative sampling here but is 
exemplary for its identification of the most promising federal welfare policies ever proposed. On October 
28th, 1971, Steve Van Evera wrote a story on the only minimum basic income standard a president 
presented to Congress. In “Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan: Buying Black Power for the Rural South,” 
Evera wrote, “viewed from the perspective of the Northern poor, the proposed Nixon Family Assistance 
Plan is a pretty worthless concoction. It would probably result in lower welfare payments in a number of 
Northern states, and would reduce the freedom of the poor across the North. It is, therefore, easy to 
understand why Northern liberals and blacks have been so cool toward the proposed bill; most of the 
strong left-liberals  and all the 12 black Congressmen voted against the bill when it finally passed the 
House for the second time this summer and they did so because it promised to do little or nothing for the 
poor or their own constituencies… But the FAP, if passed would be the greatest boost to black power in 
the rural South since the Voting Rights Act of 1965” (40).  
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with his own politics, Wright stood out. With his occasional column (erroneously thought to 
have been bi-weekly),62  he, along with composer Carman Moore, were the only blacks to write 
regularly for the Voice throughout Wright’s tenure.63  Kevin McAuliffe, who wrote the only 
historical study of the paper, notes that “for all its public hand-wringing over White Guilt and 
Black Power, [it] never had a black editor or a black staff writer” (219). Wright wrote comic 
articles about the experience of being severely poor in Manhattan and, after 1972, in Mexico and 
Morocco, an experience that therefore cut across national and racial lines. Usually the events he 
covered were in themselves insignificant (a random burglary or mugging, for instance) and often 
long-past, sometimes by months. Thus in a newspaper that primarily covered current events, 
written mainly by whites, his articles stood out two-fold.  
Certainly, it was a “writer’s paper” not a journalist’s. To quote co-founder Dan Wolf, it 
was “‘originally conceived as a living, breathing attempt to demolish the notion that one needs to 
be a professional to accomplish something in a field as purportedly technical as journalism’” 
(McAuliffe 13). But when one compares Wright’s pieces to those of his colleagues, one notices 
they were even less “technical,” and as fellow contributor Jerome Klinkowitz suggested—
disorienting.  Considering their belatedness, their distinct style, and the paper’s racial 
constituency, one has to wonder what made his work attractive to the all-white staff?  
                                                        
62  African American literary anthologist Bernard Bell records, as other scholars have, that Wright wrote a 
bi-weekly column called “Wright’s World.” Only in 1971 did that name become attached to the column, 
which before 1973 never appeared every two weeks for more than a month. In fact, sometimes months 
would pass before he wrote anything for the Voice. He contributed to the confusion when the biographical 
narrator said in one chapter from Absolutely, “Now I was managing to write for The Village Voice every 
other week” (283).  
 
 
63 As an indication of its popularity, in 1976 it was sold to Ruport Murdoch for roughly $30 million 
(McAuliffe 457).  
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Wright compiled and edited the columns he wrote between 1967 and 1972, 
supplementing them with other material, and published the collection a year later as his third 
novel, Absolutely Nothing to Get Alarmed About. Colleague Jerome Klinkowitiz reviewed it, 
providing a window into how the Voice perceived Wright’s function there:  
The years 1967-1972, recorded here not in fiction but as his personal journal…. 
These were five years of assassinations, riots, war, decay, and finally malaise, and 
if the true sense of it were expressed in a national style, Wright was living at the 
center: New York City, the Bowery, the Chinese Garden. Long departed from the 
East Village, he headed south on the leading edge of the blight. Poverty 
boondoggles, panhandling hippies, venereal disease: Wright was at the source... 
The author’s mirror is distortive, in a sense, for it sends back pictures that aren’t 
exactly there. But what is out there is mad, chaotic, incapable of being 
understood, while Wright’s translation clarifies as only the magic of an apt 
comparison can, and by using our wider window of imaginative vision we get at 
least a sense of what’s truly happening before our eyes.  (41)  
 
Klinkowitz then emphasizes, almost erotically:  “throughout this book we get the sense that 
Charles Wright is the only person who sees what’s happening, who looks past the sham reality of 
our lives toward what is really going on.” Seeing the “real,” giving a “translation,” merging 
“fiction” with a “personal journal,” “send[ing] back pictures”—Wright’s role for the Voice 
smacks of ethnography, similar to the kind Zora Neale Hurston was asked to do. Klinkowitz 
suggests that what made Wright’s coverage particularly attractive was that he could translate the 
experience of poverty as a participant observer. He was not only black but, with his job as a 
dishwasher and his residence at the Salvation Army’s Bowery Hotel, poor.64 I call his 
                                                        
64 Wright lived other places, but wherever he went he always worked in menial labor. I have not been able 
to find his means of employment at the time of his death. Such details of his life are likely to come from 
his editor Jan Holdenfield. Watching Wright spiral into alcoholism and depression, Holdenfield offered 
him a spare room in his Brooklyn apartment. He lived there for nearly twenty years, between the ages of 
forty-four and sixty-three (“Charles Wright” World Authors, 1970-1975). On October 1st, 2008, Wright 
died in his East Village apartment at the age of seventy-six.  
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ethnography  disorienting because what else must it feel like to see the same thing as “not there” 
and there simultaneously?  
It is not surprising that Wright’s seeming revelation of what poverty is really like would 
be attractive to readers. It is surprising, though, that his disorienting style would be felt as 
pleasurable. In praise Klinkowitz points out the articles are “distortive,” “send[ing] back picture 
that aren’t exactly there.” Without delving into a psychoanalytic inquiry, which as Homi Bhbaha 
and Edward Said show easily leads to an examination of how the poor were fetishized, I simply 
want to mark that the distortions were pleasurable to some readers, a pleasure Wright necessarily 
exploited. My task for the remainder of this chapter is to understand how Wright went about his 
distortions and to what end.  
Klinkowitz summarizes the thematic focus of Wright’s articles better toward the end of 
the review: “Wright examines the reality of our culture and carefully sorts out the unreal, be it 
the engineered irrelevancy of an Anti-Poverty Program or the inappropriate panhandling by a 
white hippie.” Given Wright’s concern in these pieces for the rights of the poor and the 
exploitive acts of the better-off, how do his distortions speak back to those acts and work toward 
those rights? More specifically, how does he resist his role of cultural translator by turning the 
“mirror” away from his subjects and toward his readers, showing them what is “incapable of 
being understood” and perhaps why? Klinkowtiz begins speaking paradoxically when he reflects 
on what he and presumably others could not understand about “Wright’s World,” the name 
eventually given to his columns.65 He says the chaos was “incapable of being understood” but 
                                                        
65 His columns were not printed under this name until the first issue of 1971 with the article, “Wright’s 
World: Blair Sabol Would Have Understood” (18). Even then he did not publish under this heading 
consistently. It appears that only when he did publish bi-weekly, which happened rarely before 1972, 
were his articles titled “Wright’s World.” 
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then claims that “Wright’s translation clarifies,” as if by “magic.” Wright’s black humor relied 
on, and exploited this paradox, the sense that you can see what you also believe you cannot. 
 I ask then, how did Wright’s humor reflect the problems not only of poverty, but of 
certain ways of seeing it, of interpreting and redressing it?66 This is to say, how did he exploit the 
expectation that he would detail the differences between the poor and his middle-class readers, 
an expectation aroused by the title “Wright’s World”? And finally, how did he question the 
ethnological assumption that his racial identity and class status—that personal experience 
authenticates the knowledge and representation of others?67  
As I have been arguing, Wright’s principal technique for troubling the reader’s access to 
the experience of poverty is to play with stereotypes. Different in these articles is that like 
Hurston he employs the technique of what I called deflection, inviting a stereotypical reading 
only to then undermine it. Let us look at one article, paradigmatic of those preceding it, that falls 
roughly in the middle of his Village Voice years, July 17th 1969. Its title hints at the humor that 
                                                        
66 Questioned here are, indeed, the cultural assumptions that underlie poverty knowledge, but also the 
methods of acquiring that knowledge. For one, that method reinforces the distance between knower and 
the known poor, as the very title of Wright’s column underscores, “Wright’s World.” Second, the rout to 
knowledge is contradictory. It deploys an observer as proxy both for the middle-class and the poor. Third, 
it claims to be authoritative through the inherently biased medium of experience and racial identity. In 
other words, if Wright were not black and poor, the legitimacy of his knowledge would require more 
proof. I am speculating that he got away with so much non-factual and fantastical reporting because 
identity was and still is considered an authoritative platform for knowledge. Wright exploits this 
assumption, questioning identity and thereby experience as the preeminent authorizers of knowledge. By 
interrogating all these methods of knowledge formation, he shows how easily they undermine the fight for 
justice they were harnessed to support.  
 
 
67 In Mohawk Interuptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States, Audra Simpson discusses the 
problems of these techniques of knowing—the differentiation, authentication, and adjudication of cultural 
forms—which have come to characterize traditional ethnography. She unveils an alternative practice of 
ethnographic study that she names “ethnographic refusal,” refusing recognition from the state or centers 
of dominant knowledge (95-114). Wright does not so much “refuse” and suggest ways that the lines of 
difference are always already crossed.  
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pervades almost all his pieces: “Burglary in Mongrelsville: The Dog Collecting Boy and the 
Cardiac Man.” Comparing a burglary to dog collecting is a low burlesque, to say the least, and 
casting someone’s nervousness as a problem with his heart not with the scene of the crime 
carries the burlesque further. As we will see, a more direct but unfunny subtitle would have been 
“The Welfare Child and the Witness.” Already the humor raises some pressing questions: did the 
boy conduct the burglary and the man witness it, as is implied? Did the boy steal dogs and if not, 
that is, if he did burglarize someone’s property, a serious offense, why paint him in harmless, 
even innocent terms, as a dog collector? These questions ultimately get at Wright’s ambivalent 
attitude to welfare policies.  
The reader quickly finds out (the piece is only two pages) that the boy robbed the Lower 
East Side apartment of Wright’s friend, that an old man who lived “directly across the street” 
witnessed the robbery, and that a court case ensued. The boy is thirteen years old, black, and by 
his devious behavior “a chubby Tom Sawyer type.” He does collect dogs and sometimes steals 
them, but that fact is extraneous. As to the crime, he stole about a thousand dollars worth of 
appliances, an important fact given parenthetically: “(estimate of ‘goodies’ $800-$1000)” (50).68 
Also, he probably performed the robbery out of sheer desperation, for he seems to be a welfare 
child living “beyond” the New York State poverty line. This suggestion of his welfare status is 
also given parenthetically, couched in the middle of a paragraph about the man who “watched 
                                                        
68 Beneath these repeated descriptions of the character’s physical weight and the financial account of the 
“goodies” is a satire on the indiscriminate poverty index of the Office of Economic Opportunity.  
Drawing on Mollie Orshansky’s research (the “Orshansky Index”), the OEO defined poverty by how 
much food one was able to afford. It pegged the poverty line at three times the cost of the Department of 
Agriculture’s low-cost budget for food, since Orshansky determined that it was to food poor families gave 
one-third of their income (Katz 117).  
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our Tom.” It is suppressed even further by its abruptness, its ambiguous connection to the 
sentence before it:  
The cardiac man did not have a phone but they vowed to tell the people in the 
fifth floor front about the ‘heavy black case’ [a brand new tape recorder]. The 
Welfare Bonanza was nine days off and it was a rather gritty time for the poor, 
especially for people who lived beyond the monetary welfare standard, especially 
for party people. But the couple across the street saw chubby Tom’s mother dash 
out and return with “heavy goods” from the Pioneer market.  
 
Wright, as I indicated, has told us that the boy stole a tape recorder, which could not have been 
all that heavy. Thus the man’s sight is questionable, raising additional doubts about the heaviness 
of the “goods” he saw the boy’s mother “dash” away with. Wright is mocking the man’s 
perspective, indexing his projection of stereotypes—Uncle Toms and will become known as 
welfare queens—onto the black poor. The implication of this misreading extends to welfare 
policies: while welfare may allow one to walk away from the market with “‘heavy goods’” that 
fatten one up (Tom and later his father are both characterized as “chubby” (51)), it stigmatizes its 
recipients, reinforcing divisions between the poor and the prosperous. 
As we can begin to see, Wright centralizes the issues that are most extraneous to the case 
and, in this way,  imitates the epistemology of stereotyping. On one level he suggests that 
interpreting a situation through class and racial stereotypes yields consequences we already 
know: it forces us to look away from reality. On a deeper, more interesting level he shows that 
stereotyping underlies criminal investigations regarding the poor, and he does so by first staging 
the piece as a detective story. This emplotment creates suspense and consequently provokes 
readers to redress the problem, for it makes us anticipate the possible solution to all the problems 
of guilt, innocence, and retribution that propel the detective genre.  
Each paragraph is presented as one more step toward finding out what happened and 
whether the boy, “our Tom” can be proven to be the perpetrator and held accountable. The 
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second paragraph immediately presents Wright as the detective taking us along his journey to 
discovery. The paragraph begins with the cold empiricism of the shortened phrase, “The Facts: 
At 10 a. m. on March 21, 1969, a budding thief climbed up the fire escape of a building…” (50). 
Yet the facts are slim, as a policeman later confesses. He said to Wright, “rather sadly: ‘There 
isn’t much proof to go on’” (51). Wright replied, “‘If you don’t catch the boy with the goods 
what other proof could you possibly have? Except a man and a woman who saw the boy and are 
willing to testify!’” There is no rejoinder to this, so when we arrive at the court case to which the 
boy does not show up, this scene with its missing culprit figuratively places on trial two things: 
Wright’s conviction, as well as the officer’s, that he knows who committed the crime (“our 
Tom”), and the stereotyping he performs. It is not people but stereotypes that courts unwittingly 
put on trial when they criminalize the poor.   
Staging this as a detective story that ends with a deferred trial is significant also for its 
effect on the reader. To find out what happened and who is responsible forces us to examine how 
we make that determination. After all, to the extent the story piques our curiosity, we assume the 
role Wright relinquishes as detective, assume it even to the extent we try to understand the title. 
The randomness of the dog theme involves us further. Wright tangentially describes the dogs that 
populate the East Village, so tangentially that the description compels us to think about the 
assumptions that would make it seem connected: “This is a City of Dogs. Mongrelsville. Sanitary 
minded people let unleashed dogs roam at will and defecate grandly. These people probably 
wash their hands before returning to the bathroom” (50). What assumptions, what underlying 
logic connects the problem of dogs to that of delinquency and urban crime? Are we to draw an 
analogy between the “unleashed” “mongrels,” a racialized term, and the subhuman treatment of 
the poor? The search for the answer is staged in the last two paragraphs: 
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 We had another drink [Wright and his friend] and listened to Richard 
Harris sing: ‘Didn’t We.’ Then I remembered a UPI report: ‘HOVE, England—
the City Council has voted to build 14 more public toilets for dogs, following 
experimental use of six fenced compounds equipped with dummy light posts.  
Case dismissed.69 (51)  
 
Many readers would have known the lyrics of Harris’s popular hit, in which he sang, “This time 
we almost made the pieces fit… This time we almost made some sense of it.” That approximate 
“sense” we as readers might have made is the recognition that poverty has been addressed as a 
problem of social disorder, signified by poor “sanitation,” a solution to poverty that can only 
“almost” make sense.70  
 Employing a humor to underscore what does not make sense about poverty knowledge, a 
humor that also beckons the reader to help find better, if provisional solutions, typified Wright’s 
journalism. If we step back and look at how his perspective developed between 1967 and 1973, 
we will notice that his politics became increasingly international. He had always examined the 
relationship of African Americans to other races, principally Latino, but his move to Morocco 
and then to Mexico stretched his cross-racial perspective over national lines. This expansion in 
scope is far more difficult to discern from just reading the novel the columns compose. Although 
the amendments to the articles are important, gone are the dates, the comic titles, and the 
surrounding perspectives in the newspaper that influenced how he was read. With no clear logic 
                                                        
69 Wright changed this piece for the novel only by adding to the end: “Dogs. Dog lovers” (296), an 
addition that syntactically positions the two subjects from the subtitle in parallel relationship, the “boy” 
standing for “Dogs,” the man “Dog lovers.”  
 
 
70 Quadagno remarks, “When the policy agenda turned from the expansion of the welfare state to the 
repression of disorder, this grand opportunity to protect the family, especially, families headed by women, 
was lost…. The equal opportunity welfare state was replaced by a welfare state that encouraged racial 
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in the novel itself for how he chose to order and cut up his articles, one hardly wonders why 
Absolutely Nothing sold so poorly.71 To compare the novel with his work in the Voice tells a 
clearer story, one that supports his continued investment in stereotypes and deepening concern 
for welfare rights.  
But most importantly, the comparison upends the historical marginality attached to his 
name. First, the paper showcased his role in a larger conversation. Many of his colleagues were 
also deeply concerned with welfare and poverty issues. This is not shocking when one considers 
New York’s growing welfare rolls. For example, by 1970, 12.4 million people were on welfare 
nationally, a sharp rise from 8.4 million in 1967. One fourth of that total increase occurred in 
“just two states, New York and California” (Quadagno 121).  Second, by 1969, about the middle 
of his Voice career, the circulation of the paper had risen to 138,000 and continued to grow 
(McAuliffe 235). In other words, Wright amassed a readership that makes him a notable voice 
for the black labor movement, the transitioning Civil Rights Movement,72  and the bourgeoning 
                                                        
71 A. Robert Lee claimed that the sexual escapades bookend the novel and give it some coherence, but 
even that is dissolved in its overall fragmentary nature: “for all the copious detail Wright gives his novel, 
it rarely fails to hold its overall shape. Even the sex romp which  rounds out the novel… fits into the 
larger pattern” (Lee 242). 
 
 
72 In “Death Turns America On,” a 1968 eulogy to Martin Luther King, he reads the civil rights 
movement through his concerns with growing urban poverty. This Village Voice piece also feature 
Wright’s wry style of black humor. He excoriates the looting King’s assassination incited then draws a 
picture of poor youth huddled around a street fire, an image that recalls King short-lived Poor People’s 
Campaign:  
 
[H]is death cements the fact that the majority of Americans… are jive ass 
mothergrabbers. On the eve of national mourning, it was a typical Harlem Saturday night, 
except that Florsheim’s Eighth Avenue store was shoeless and broken glass looked like 
pieces of abstract plastic…  A great number of police roamed, joked—a scene straight 
out of my fantasy of a novel, ‘The Wig’ number 2777…. On 125th street, in bars, blacks 
talked about King. Only teenage boys glowed with the intensity of a smouldering fire, 
embryo knowledge of the world, and their own helplessness, nevertheless they produced 
a small bright fire. The hotel Theresa facade was clean at last. Blumenstein’s looked the 
same. Harlem breathed the peaceful air of slaves. (5)  
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movement toward Black Power.73 Because of his place in the paper and social history, we should 
view Wright as not only bridging, but expanding the nation’s broadest anti-racism and anti-
poverty debates.  
 In a key article published at the end of 1970, “Welfare: Easy Living & Christmas Tree 
Lights,” Wright finds cross-racial class solidarity and employs a trickster ethnography different 
from what we saw in the “Dog Collecting Boy and the Cardiac Man.” Rather than compelling 
the reader to take over the search for justice, following a more ethical and accurate path to 
knowledge, here he exploits the reader’s empathy for him and the story’s characters, all past or 
current welfare recipients of various races. Wright begins addressing the reader directly, marking 
the difference, which he soon obscures, between them and welfare “survivors”:  
By the time you read this, the celebrating will have cooled. The friendly 
neighborhood grocer will be paid, the common-law husband will have met his 
pusher, and the children will be stuffed with sweets. Perhaps there will be a visit 
to Busche’s, the famed credit jewelers, or a sharp new leather coat. The old-age 
pensioners and the ‘mentally disturbed and misfits’ will pat their bar tabs and get 
jackrolled. However, all welfare stories are not grim. There are the old, the lame, 
and the helpless poor. This is their way of life. But for others it is a new lease on 
living, almost as easy as breathing. Now all that remains are the twelve days of 
survival, the next check. I want to tell you about some of these men and women. 
(17)  
 
At first stereotypical class differences abound: children born out of wedlock, fed unhealthily, and  
money splurged, not saved or invested. Yet whatever the reader’s social class, he or she is 
invited to empathize with this celebration of finally receiving a welfare check. Furthermore, the 
                                                        
 
Imagined here is a slavery to consumerism, one that pleasurably forgets about the poverty in cities like 
Harlem, particularly as it effects “helpless” youth producing “a small bright fire” “on 125th street.” 
 
 
73 For his views on the Black Panther Party, see The Complete Novels of Charles Wright, p. 285; and for 
his perspective on the broader black power movement, see The Complete Novels, p. 362.    
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people are both “friendly” and close to home (of the “neighborhood”). If readers have made an 
empathic identification at this point, they would be right to wonder who Wright is mocking when 
quotes someone characterizing the poor as “‘mentally disturbed and misfits,’” pathological.  
Followers of his column might have assumed the but of the joke to be Sargent Shriver, 
head of the Office of Economic Opportunity. For in an epigraph at the top of one piece, 
antepenultimate to “Welfare: Easy Living,” he quotes Shriver pathologizing poor youth: 
“‘Young people today are being subjected to the most profound temptations and stresses’” 
(“Saturday Night” 15).  Wright then points out the irony of criminalizing drug addiction amongst 
poor people of color but allowing it amongst middle-class whites. Still, the target of ridicule 
there, like here, is also the reader. If readers have empathized with these people as described in 
the preceding sentences, then they have also taken the class markers as true. Since he does not 
ground the quote in any single speaker or author, he suggests the idea is familiar enough to be 
automatically associated with culture of poverty arguments, which use for evidence those very 
class markers Wright casually displays.  
 The second question then becomes, what does he mean by “However, all welfare stories 
are not grim”? What is the “however” negating? Is it the narration of the story or its facts, like 
people paying off their debts only to get robbed, “jackrolled”? The following sentence implies 
the facts are negated, for the facts are still “grim” as he looks toward the “old,” “lame,” and 
“helpless poor.” But the sentence following these implies the problem is with the narration. Both 
the facts and the narration, then, are suspect, or to put it differently, the validity of each is 
mutually-dependent. Therefore, when he closes the paragraph with the seemingly 
straightforward, “I want to tell you about some of these men and woman,” he is talking about the 
reader and the reader’s assumptions that form “these men and women.” Depicting facts and 
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narration as inextricable, he implies not only that readers actually see stereotypes masquerading 
as people, but also see themselves masquerading as others. The empathic identification they 
might have made is only half-true; for the people that populate the “stories” are at once different 
and indistinguishable from the story’s makers. Through the humor of a dark irony, Wright wants 
to tell us about ourselves, others, and the dangers of empathizing a little too quickly.   
 With greater ambivalence, Wright continues to invite us to identify with him and his 
characters. He appears at one moment racially egalitarian, then discriminatory in the next, 
parading culture of poverty views. Conveying his ambivalent ties to the poor (at once of them 
and above them), he describes his friend Jojo, who significantly is “blond”: “after cashing the 
[welfare] check, Jojo… invited me for beers, hard boiled eggs. Later we switched to wine and 
watched the sports shoot pool. Life can be good for survivors.” Was “wine” Wright’s idea, 
confirming his similarity to his middle class readers, having already authenticated his 
ethnographic observations? Wherever we place him, he then starts stereotyping a welfare mother, 
but not without a bid to the reader’s trust: “Please accept my word: Helena will ball…. Welfare 
money, booze, and beer…Nellie has seven illegitimate children. Often they are hungry, thanks to 
their mother’s careless life-style.” In comparison to Jojo, who  “paid off a $7 loan,”  and the 
other welfare recipients he portrayed, Helena, or in his term of endearment Nellie, is the 
exception.  
This is especially clear in the following paragraph where Wright again solicits our 
empathy in a brief confessional interlude. Pulling us to extend whatever empathy we give to him 
toward his fellow poor, he writes: “Although my childhood was quietly religious and happy, I, 
too, was briefly a child of welfare… Even today I can taste the delight of Sunday supper: day-old 
bread in a bowl of milk sprinkled with cinnamon and sugar.” The “delight” is as ironic as the 
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beauty he remembers about his “beautiful Christmas tree,” “leafless” with “branches tied to it.” 
If his position has been indeterminate, by the end his voice becomes more clearly satirical: “We 
have to pay taxes and take care of these lazy, good-for-nothing bums… We will give them 
enough so they’ll be content and will cause no trouble. Welfare is their addiction.” Is it Helena’s, 
too, in this ironic sense, or truly hers? Are the stereotypes he corrals to color the “helpless poor” 
at the beginning theirs or his projections? Wright’s concluding satire does more to confuse these 
questions than answer them. This confusion lends credence to what critical race theorists 
sometimes call “the empathic fallacy”: “the idea that one can use words to undo the meaning that 
others attach to these very same words,” “that a better, fairer script can readily substitute for the 
older, prejudiced one”—the belief in the power of empathy to change people’s minds (Delgado 
22). With empathy now in such short supply, Wright’s humor is sobering but hopeful. In other 
words, this very troubling of empathic identification may clear the way for a more ethical 
empathy.  
His subtle brand of indirection was appropriate considering the political orientation of his 
audience. He could have blatantly satirized the culture of poverty thesis throughout the piece, as 
he did in the end, and positioned himself as outsider in firm alliance with his readership, all 
chuckling around their fire of self-righteousness. But by abruptly switching in and out of 
contrary point of views, an act that reflects and begins to explain the scrambled makeup of his 
novel, he speaks to the likely liberalism of his readers. Liberalism is defined not only by an 
insistence on eradicating barriers so that all might equally ascend, but also by an unfortunate 
epistemology: racist disavowal, which I believe to be the psychic substructure to color blindness, 
more popularly associated with liberalism. To disavow one’s racism is to maintain a racist belief 
but hold it as an exception to the broader structure of one’s beliefs, as Wright does to Nellie. If 
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we’re looking from below, we might say that it is to assimilate the lessons of racial equality into 
a preexisting racist belief structure. Psychoanalyst Derrick Hook puts it nicely, “I believe x, I just 
choose, every once in a while, to believe not x anyway” (715). If even acknowledged as racist, 
the racist belief is seen as minor, not seen and addressed in its actual egregiousness. Empathy 
alone is not enough, so long as it can still be given to those one considers exceptions to the rule, 
like Wright’s Nellie. It is this contradictory mode of knowledge formation that makes racism so 
difficult to eradicate and Wright’s trickster ethnography terribly necessary.  
 Toward the middle of 1971, Wright began setting these local scenes of poverty and 
welfare in an international context.  Take, for example, “Hassan of Morocco: A King’s 
Courage,” which does not appear in the novel.  Wright describes his intimacy with the poor and 
makes some choice comparisons for his readers in the US, first in realist prose:  
In the late bougainvillea scented summer of 1964, King Hassan II arrived in 
Tangier for his annual visit, and I waited for him on the Avenue Espana, facing 
the sea. Moroccan friends, members of the foreign colony, drank early morning 
coffee, mint tea. Talked about the king and the problems of the country. We 
foreigners felt very much at home in Morocco. In other words, the veil of Western 
frustration was lifted. But we were aware of poverty. Many of our Moroccan 
friends were poor. There was almost no industry in Tangier as opposed to Rabat 
and Casablanca.  
 
The first thing that stands out is that all this occurred seven years ago, a point Wright wants to 
make sure we get when he says later, “Remember: the year was 1964” and describes the 
occurrence as “That seven-year-old memory.” The relevance for the present day, he explains, is 
the recent “attempted assassination and coup in Morocco,” but indeed it is more than that. It is 
relevant also “because of my love for the Moroccan people.” In fact, the recent security breaches, 
which he links to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, are subordinated to this cosmopolitan 
“love.” He does not mention Dr. King, but of course alludes to him through Hassan (“The King 
was late,” “Would the King arrive?”), an occlusion that suggests the people forgotten in 
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America’s national memory and systems of care (or “love”): the blacks within its borders and the 
people of color beyond it.  
These implications bring a series of questions to bear on his “veil of Western frustration,” 
a veil that either allowed him or did not allow him to see the poor. Their awareness of poverty, in 
other words, could have been achieved despite the lifting of the veil or because of it (the “but we 
were aware of poverty” can go both ways). Is the “veil,” then, an ethnocentric perspective or in 
the Du Boisian terms it recalls a double-consciousness? Does it give him and his fellow-
foreigners second-sight, the ability to see what his readers usually do not, the dearth of jobs and 
the unequal distribution of industries in cities like Tangier, that is to say, cities not like 
Casablanca, Rabat, or New York? If so, how might this second-sight of an international labor 
market be transferred to his readers? Considering Wright assumes they will take interest in his 
love only by evoking their love for Kennedy, are they blind by will or ability?  
The last question is for his readers to decide, but the others gather answers when his 
mode switches to satire. He seemingly takes back the position of authority he worked so hard to 
build:  
I’d be a fool to comment on past and present politics. After all, I am a black 
American. I still do not understand America. America is another country. 
Foreign? My God, yes. Three years ago in the Bronx, teenagers complained 
because a black friend drank from a public water fountain. One wants to live in a 
country where one feels free to drink water. It is as simple as that. In Morocco I 
am a Moroccan. In Morocco I am aware of Moroccan problems.  
 
Awareness stands as counterpoint to understanding, which he must still work to achieve. It is not 
that he cannot see with his American veil, but that it requires him to look deeper and wider to 
understand the bigger problems beneath and beyond state law. Stating he cannot understand 
Morocco then claiming his sense of home and awareness there is more than tongue and cheek. It 
is also more than an assertion of how absurd racism is, especially when compared to the equal 
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treatment he receives when technically a foreigner. Rather, this self-contradiction suggests what 
makes the veil frustrating and the good that frustration can do: to don the veil is not to see 
another’s perspective, but to be left with the frustration of partial sight. And that frustration 
pushes him to resolve it, as the reader is pushed to resolve Wright’s contradictions.  
Complete resolution may always be delayed, but if the following paragraph is any 
indication, the bigger issue behind stereotypes of blackness and foreignness for that matter is the 
international influence of US capitalism:  
As I was taking a tourist, a black American tourist to my terraced apartment, the 
police stopped us. They were very polite, just as the customs inspector at Tangier 
air port had been a year before. But one brilliant summer’s day, I watched 
hundreds of Moroccans literally fight for flour and grain that had arrived from 
America.  
 
Referring to America’s international aid initially seems out of place, but when we consider it 
helps to create schisms within an underserved social class even as it purports to help, the scene 
begins to make sense. The police are similar in function to the customs inspectors. The first 
polices domestic space the second a national one, both supposedly protecting their insiders, 
natives, from foreigners like Wright. Why does he contrast the scene of class in-fighting to 
scenes of their “polite[ness]” and executions of their jobs? Because they are not safeguarding 
Moroccans from the real threat to national and domestic security, the suggestively unmentioned 
agent behind the “fight” for “grain”: America’s international system of care.  
The stereotype of delinquency is its sublimated image, which is why he describes the 
fighters, but not the inciter, why he makes a confusing comparison of two named agents, the 
police and the inspector, with “hundreds” of hungry, fighting Moroccans. Implicating American 
capitalism by force of logic not name, begs the question of its collusion with an international 
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welfare policy,74 as well as its collusion with stereotypes of the poor. Yet likening it to agents of 
protection qualifies the critique. Wright is not saying it was a bad thing that food was delivered. 
The culprits are the unequal processes of exchange that help propel this delivery, and they need 
to be policed. The “veil of American frustration” is reproduced on the level of the sentence. 
Placed here it compels us as readers not only to find its underlying logic, the deeper levels of 
systemic causality, but the “love” we need to fight it.   
 Toward the end of 1971 and throughout 1972, Wright intensified his international 
perspective. His comic second-sight grew more blatant and biting. He lambasted the colonization 
of Mexico, celebrating its anniversary of independence as the historic moment when “no one was 
starving” anymore (“Wright’s World: Mucho and Upward with El Presidente” (1972) 17). In 
“Mexico in White, Red, and Black,” he called for cross-racial class solidarity over national 
borders. He figured the funniness with which class asserts itself in Mexico as a rallying cry to 
everyone: “Here, only class remains” and it is “the small box with the automatic jack-in-the-box 
lid where a nightmare clown resides, a cuckoo bird with a hyena’s wine” (6). Its unsuspecting 
influence is funny in a disorienting, grotesque way, and for that reason a way that cannot be 
ignored. In a later article on El Grito (Mexican independence day), he renders the process of 
stereotyping the poor as drug addicts a displacement of personal responsibility. One neglects 
one’s responsibility to account for one’s role in the oppression of the far-away because, as 
Wright satirizes, the account can only ironically serve one’s ego. Wright says that to assist “a 
                                                        
74 Political historian Henry Pachter defines welfare as it relates to foreign policy: “The welfare state may 
achieve techniques of industry-wide planning, price-fixing and over-all control of development, but 
though it will not nationalize the coal industry in France and England, erect a TVA in the United States 
and build a government steel mill in India, it stops short of expropriation. On the contrary, its proclaimed 
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teenage addict” homeless in the streets, “I gave him a dime to buy a soda and he smiled” 
(“Wright’s World: The Holiday Boy” 34). Wright then mocks the sense of rectitude and 
selflessness such acts often bring:  
Remember: there were no marching bands, no unfurling noisemakers, confetti, or 
crowds. Just the two of us in the brilliance of a Sunday afternoon, two human 
beings who had transcended language barriers, diverging mental patterns. I will 
end this column just as my encounter with the boy ended. Still smiling, he raised 
his right hand, made the peace sign, and said in English, “Victory.”   
 
I hardly need to clarify the multiple targets of his satire as I did in his previous columns. The 
easy knowability of the racialized poor, the differences in aptitude coded as barriers in language, 
solicitous care felt as the warmth of self-righteousness (he is literally glowing in his “Sunday” 
charity), his quick declamation of moral superiority—all are fairly obvious points of attack. Even 
the allusion to Johnson’s abandoned “war on poverty” is dead-center before our eyes. During 
these years he sometimes focused solely on national issues, but his tone was angrier and 
eventually directed almost exclusively at American ties with Mexico. In 1972 you could read 
him satirizing the “slavery” of prostitution,75 the fact that “segregation is flowering 
                                                        
75 In “Wright’s World:  Prostitutes, Pimps, and the Psychological Rap,” from January 27th, 1972, he 
writes, “in a symbolistic and realistic sense slavery hasn’t been abolished in the United States” (13). Then 
performing the ballistic logic of slavery’s real presence, he states characteristically, “The majority of 
women who become prostitutes do so of their own free will.” The problem, his pun makes plain, is as 
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magnificently,”76 and the “millions in city poverty funds lost by fraud and inefficiency,”77 but by 
1973 his scope was firmly international.78   
What remained consistent was his concern for the poor and welfare rights. I would like to 
close this chapter with an article that conjoins these concerns with a critique on the international 
division of labor, “Wright’s World: Bless the Sardines and Ice Cold Vodka.” Published in 
November of 1971, it portrays Wright half way through as poor, able only to afford sardines for 
dinner, then for the remainder casts him as ironically contemptuous of poor people. This turn 
from satire against exploited labor to satire against the laborers pivots on a distilled image of 
                                                        
76 In “Wright’s World: Currents of White Supremacy,” from February 24th, 1972, he begins abruptly: 
“FLASH! A Chicago poll reports that segregation is flowering magnificently in America” (22). 
Presumably the humor is that we do not need a “flash” to see that. The verb-choice is deliberate, for 
“flash” refers to a more specific issue in the piece: Hollywood’s reproduction of segregation and white 
supremacy.   
 
 
77 This quote is a line from Absolutely Nothing, not from an article in the Voice. I consider it one of his 
later writings because of the ways he positions it as a summary of the novel. First, he places it toward the 
end in the fourth to last chapter. Second, he implies that it summarizes all the newspaper reports he had 
been reading that morning, reports that, by extension, correspond to his own. “At home,” he says, “I 
usually avoid china and glassware. A paper container of iced tea, laced with brandy, a thin Post, a bar-
mitzvah cigar. And The New York Times.  
MILLIONS IN POVERTY FUNDS LOST BY 
FRAUD AND INEFFICIENCY 
Knocking ash off my cigar, I sighed and crossed my legs. Serious too,” he adds with self-mockery (342).  
 
 
78 Of the four columns he wrote in 1973, only the last turned to a New York local issue, “Wright’s World: 
Death of a Garden—or Confucius Plaza Rises!” Suggestively, however, he reports on the “bulldozing,” 
the plundering of the Chinese Garden, in Chinatown. “Watching them bulldoze” it down is uncomfortably 
similar to watching state-supported companies plunder foreign enterprise. He draws the comparison 
overtly, remembering a sentence from an earlier article, in which he anticipated the wreckage: “hadn’t I, 
almost three years ago, written in these pages, ‘I stood up, looked north, through the pollution screen 
toward the Empire State Building, then South toward the old buildings of Chinatown, sitting on a real-
estate dish of excellent sweet pork????’” (57). His excess of question marks are either complaints that 
people did not also stand up and act, or they are exhortations to keep reading his insightful columns. 
Whatever they are, he quickly restrains his tone and relies on the power of sheer exposition: “July, 1973. 
The two blocks (sliced by Chrystie Street), Bayard and Division Street, were demolished and looked like 
fields freshly plowed for planting.”  
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culture of poverty stereotypes: “cheap people” (15). Well before we arrive at this image, he 
wonders what makes the sardines such a “recession bargain.” The first pack is a “product from 
Poland.” Opening it and reflecting on its cost he thinks, “But do we have a trade agreement with 
Poland?” He soon turns to a different pack, “another import: smoked sardines from Norway,” 
and there his attention remains for awhile. He marks they are four cents cheaper and grows 
curious about the means and processes of production that can guarantee such a difference, let 
alone such a low price.  
Mon Dieu! The tin is smaller than the average bar of soup. But what do you 
expect for 25 cents? The smoked Norwegian sardines are a perfect complement 
for vodka. But I’m thinking about cheap tin and it depresses me. I’m thinking 
about the cost of labor, the men and women who fished the sardines out of the 
sea, the people who packed them, the profits the Norwegian business man and the 
American importer and the Chinese owners of the store where I bought them and 
how kind and smiling they are as if I were a new billionaire…  
 
He thinks of a division of labor in and beyond national borders. The remarkable thing about this 
division is that the levels conflate in his mind, the business man and store owner set in parallel 
relationship to the fisherman and sardine packers. All seem to be sadly exploited, though his 
comma between the two groups marks a distinction of degree. The exploitation of one is 
connected to that of the other, intimating a justifiable solidarity across class lines. Nor do 
national borders make much of a difference to the flows of capital between the core and 
peripheral centers. After all, the exploited labor and more profitable product come from Norway, 
which besides being a symbol for the welfare state is also a major actor in the world market.  
Prior to this reflection on the cost of his survival, he had “a crazy idea that Norway is like 
California’s Orange County.” Having thought about an asymmetrical labor division within a 
core-like nation-state, a division that conceals a common suffering, one wonders if that “idea” 
still sounds “crazy.”  
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 Suddenly his tone shifts to satire, as if angered by his own thoughts. “I think progress is 
simply grand…. I believe in free enterprise and hate indifference, cheap, cheap products, cheap 
people.” Indifference is an odd word here, for how is his “hate” for it equivalent to the hate he 
holds for “cheap people”? And how does he hate “indifference” if he believes in “free 
enterprise”? Is this not a contradictions in terms? Is this contradiction another manifestation of 
his contrary and shifting points of view, at once staunchly capitalist and welfare defending? 
Beside the term “free enterprise,” indifference rings of ‘interference,’ well-meaning and 
reprehensible. As to the bad side, Wright hints at monopolistic “interference” against the myth of 
a free market, to draw from Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Systems Analysis (25). These are 
protectionist measures, like the “patronage of strong states” (“do we have a trade agreement with 
Poland?” Wright wonders) (Wallerstein 28). This sort of interference indexes the irony of a 
capitalist crying out against government interventions; for a “totally free market,”  as Wallerstein 
remarks, “would make impossible the endless accumulation of capital” (25). As to the good side, 
however, I draw from the insights of political historian Henry Pachter. Sketching the 
international borders of the US welfare state and qualifying its democratic leanings, he claims 
that in such a  state:  
the basic relationship of buyer and seller, employer and employee, owner and 
nonowner are no different from those prevailing under pure capitalism, but they 
are supplemented by state interference in two important areas: where classical 
capitalism is indifferent to distribution of income, the welfare state at least tries to 
make income differential less steep. (qtd. in Howe 3) 
 
Interference, in this light, is the enforcement of welfare rights and indifference is what gets in the 
way. All this is to say, Wright’s satire is multi-directional:79 by confessing his hatred for 
“indifference” and his love for “free-enterprise,” he at once attacks himself for colluding with the 
                                                        
79 Bruce Robbins coined the term “multi-directional blaming,” by which he means something similar to 
my use of the word: the act of targeting the system through the less evasive self (Perpetual War 11). 
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exploitation of wage-workers and the capitalist system for foreclosing the reach and quality of 
care. The two types of interference alluded to in “indifference” suggest a necessary intermingling 
of the right-minded and deplorable in welfare policies, or as Bruce Robbins puts it, it suggests 
the “amalgam of solicitude and cruelty” that constitutes welfare “‘caring’” (Upward Mobility 
231). Wright’s contradiction and his attempt to resolve it in the remainder of the article 
demonstrate his efforts to improve welfare ideology and its implementation. 
As I have begun to show, Wright’s double-sided humor manifests itself in puns: 
“indifference” for interference as well as in-difference, that is, for universalism and 
discrimination; “cheap people” for cheapened people as well as people who are cheap, for the 
labor and the laborers (15). Wright’s choice to double his aim is to implicate himself and the 
readers who are like him in local and global capitalist exploitation, both equally difficult to see. 
Thus he ends the article with a standard image of culpability while he remembers working as a 
sous-chef catering a party: As “dishwashers,” “cooks,” and “bus boys frantically” prepared the 
meal, he yells to them,  “‘The parsley hasn’t been washed,’… looking at my wet, dirty hands. 
‘The parsley hasn’t been washed,’ I protested in a loud voice” (emphasis mine).  To varying 
degrees, all are implicated in the problems of exploitative labor, something the humor in his final 
line makes clear: “they were putting the finishing touch on a $25,000 wedding party.”  
Discerning one’s own responsibility in corruptive power, whether in domestic or 
international welfare policies, is in my mind most importantly what Wright’s humor initiates. 
Yet the discernment is far from facile and clear cut. If everyone is culpable, it is easy to pretend 
no one is. The fault of all is the fault of none. Remember he repeats that the parsley is dirty, not 
merely his hands. Like his pun on “indifference,” such “protest”—a choice word—points to the 
inevitable dirtiness of practical solutions to political problems and the moral squabbles we must 
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agree to engage in order to live. One is morally sullied by the very process of surviving, eating, 
be it sardines or a costly meal. But if we follow Wright in “Bless the Sardines,” this fact does not 
lead us to resignation. He observes his hands then the final product as if to suggest we each play 
a particular role in the unequal distribution of care. The point he makes with his growing anger 
as the US welfare state is chipped away is not necessarily to do the right thing, but to do 
something.  
At a time when welfare is attacked from all sides, for either being over-reaching or not 
reaching far enough, perhaps doing something requires a strategy so anti-commonsense as 
investing in stereotypes. The comic deployment of stereotypes in The Wig, Absolutely Nothing, 
and Wright’s Village Voice columns compels a reinterpretation of the US welfare state, one that 
suggests it is worth improving—and defending. Wright deconstructs the stereotypes of class 
inhered in the “culture of poverty” thesis and implicit in its opposite, using them to transgress the 
lines of abjection they try to protect: social, economic, and national divides. He thereby 
encourages a universal expansion of care that cannot be achieved without his reader’s 
commitment.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Uneasy Laughter and the Limits of the Human: 
Suzan-Lori Parks’s Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World  
 
What one desires… is the unfinished victory of things who can’t be bought and 
sold especially when they are bought and sold.  
---Fred Moten, “The Case of Blackness” 
 
Defining the Human and Its Comic Form 
hen I first viewed the 1990 BACA production of The Death of the Last Black Man in 
the Whole Entire World, I found the characters disturbing.80 I did not know whether to 
laugh outright when I first encountered the play’s title, and when watching the actors 
perform the most heinous racial stereotypes my uncertainty only grew. The characters were not 
only named after the stereotypes of docile servitude, but they embodied them, all with the specter 
of plantation of slavery looming in background. The main character Black Man with Watermelon 
had returned from the dead, having been killed by a lynch mob and, among other things, the 
other characters set out to mourn him. Like others I asked, was this minstrelsy in a hyperbolic 
form or something else? And whatever it was, was it right to laugh,  to get even a modicum of 
pleasure from something that looked like a minstrel stage? Either way, it was disturbing to be 
brought to laughter, as I and the audience repeatedly were, and then be forced to question the 
ethics of that automatic response. As Bertolt Brecht would put it, enjoyment itself became an 
object of inquiry (Brecht 36).  
                                                        
80 My interpretation of the BACA production is based on a recording held at the New York Public Library 
for the Performing Arts, Performing Arts and Research Collection, viewed on July 5th, 2013.  
W 
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Black Man sat in a chair with a watermelon in his lap for almost the entire play. It was 
obvious that Parks was not indulging in stereotypic identification. In fact, the stereotype of 
characterizing black people as watermelon eaters, a stereotype that also reduces blacks to edible 
objects, is cast as oppressive: because of the watermelon’s weight, black man cannot move. 
Indeed, if the play can be considered to have a central crisis it is black man’s inability to “move 
his hands” (101).81 Yet the relationship between the actor and the stereotype he or she embodied, 
that is, between the person and the objectification, was less obvious in the other characters. For 
instance, Black Woman with Fried Drumstick never reflected on her stereotype as black man did. 
And the other characters had an even closer relationship to their stereotypes. Their names were 
the stereotypes themselves, yielding no preposition (like “with”) to mark a space between the 
objectification and the person underneath. Yes and Greens Black-Eyed Peas Cornbread, Lots of 
Grease and Lots of Pork, Ham, Prunes and Prisms—almost all the other characters differed from 
Black Man in their uncomfortable investment of the stereotype itself. How was the audience to 
make sense of this? Should we have been reading a space between object and human even when 
the two seemed indistinguishable, if not identical? And if there was no space, then did an ethical 
viewing of the play demand that we “be critically aware of the dangers of replicating those 
dominant voices,” as one scholar instructs (Marneweck 56)?  
 Rather than interpreting Parks’s deployment of stereotypes as a process of discrediting 
them, I would like to argue that they are subversive in a different sense: they stretch the limits of 
the human. Certainly, putting stereotypes in relief and parodying them “interrogate[s] the ironies 
of racist and sexist mentalities,” as Aja Marneweck writes of the way Parks parodies stereotypes 
in Venus, her most contentious play (58). From one angle, one might say, the staged black body 
                                                        
81 Unless otherwise noted, all references to Parks’s plays and essays are to the collection The America 
Play and Other Works (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1995).  
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“plays into the stereotypes of its representation, but in such a satirical way that it exposes the 
untruths of those representations and begins to afford the emergence of the individual and the 
transgressive voice of difference” (55). From the angle I will view The Death, however, the 
transgression is not in discrediting stereotypes as untrue, but in using them, against common-
sense, to expand the category of the human. The characters’ bodies are not limited but stretched 
to the objects they endure.  
 Where Parks differs from the other authors of this dissertation is in her exposition of the 
human body. An emphasis on the body in performance is a distinguishing feature of all 
dramaturgical forms. And Parks comically exploits the fact that plays pair well with disclosing a 
logic of stereotypes since stereotypes are always about embodiment. They are about a certain 
way of seeing not the human in general, but the human body. For example, Black Man has a 
Brechtian moment in which he wonders why the watermelon is attached to him as if it is an 
extension of his anatomy. He can “tell whats mines by whats gots  my looks” (hence his foot 
proves to be his), but the “Melon… don’t look like me” (106-07). To his question “Melon 
mines?” Black Woman responds “gobble it up and it will be.” It is this interaction that intimates 
better than any other the fact that the edibility of stereotypes have everything to do with the 
body, that in titillating—perversely, no doubt—one’s hunger, they implicate the body and one 
source of its survival, food. In other words, the fantasy in stereotyping discourse is that once 
consumed stereotypes extend the limits of the body, a fantasy Black Man initially questions but 
eventually accepts as a way of extending his own limits. For by the end of the play he comes to 
understand the “melon” as his own possession.  
The play’s message, as Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston note in another context, is 
that “humanity (and the human body) is a catachresis,” “a term unable either to ground itself 
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adequately in a referent or to assert a common logic to unite its various referents” (14). It is no 
accident that the play is filled with catachreses, which are, as usual, pretty funny. The rupture 
that the category of the human effects on all normative logic is figured on the level of the 
sentence: the solecisms, misnomers, and misspellings are all attempts to construct the discursive 
context from which a freer human might emerge. The particular normative logic Parks addresses 
is one of racist domination and racial essentialism; the fruitful rupture of this logic, then, is what 
Sylvia Wynter describes as a “certain ideal of humanism—a dissonant, non-identitarian, but 
nonetheless a comprehensive and planetary humanism” (Scott 121). Why non-identitarian? 
Because Parks is not trying to capture black dialect, “standard English,” or any recognizably 
spoken tongue. Her concern is the orthography and speech of unshackled human beings and the 
event (the play itself) of its birth. She explains in an introduction to the book of plays in which 
The Death appears that “I’m working theatre like an incubator to create ‘new’ historical events… 
Theatre is an incubator for the creation of historical events—and, as in the case of artificial 
insemination, the baby is no less human” (5).  
 Since the advent of deconstruction, humanism has gotten a bad rap, but the ethical value 
of Parks’s work is its recovery of humanism under the very signs for which it has been critiqued: 
a Eurocentric axiology presupposed in racial stereotypes. In David Scott’s analysis of Sylvia 
Wynter’s rehabilitation of “emancipationist humanism,” Scott puts this axiology in justifiably 
damning terms: “Europe’s idea of itself as the embodiment of humanity’s ideal” (120). Parks’s 
response to this abjection of non-humans is to reembody the human, not to dissolve it into a 
microphysics of power. Such a dissolution makes resistance impossible since gone are social 
wholes, individual subjects, and identifiable agents. To be dissolved in this way is what Foucault 
famously termed the “death of man,” a term sounded in the play’s title and used to by Foucault 
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to describe the fact “that man is in the process of perishing as the being of language continues to 
shine ever-brighter on our horizon” (Foucault 385). “Ought we not to admit,” Foucault asks, 
“that since language is here once more, man will return to that serence non-existence in which he 
was formerly maintained by the imperious unity of Discourse” (386). Perhaps we ought, but only 
to the degree, the play’s title suggests, that we forget about race, gender, and other social 
categories that produce and mark bodies indissoluble in language.  
 I am spending so much time emphasizing the importance of the body for Parks so we do 
not misunderstand the humanism she constructs and the resistance it enables. Some have 
considered her comic language too fragmented and abstruse to hold much power against 
hegemonic discourse, the same suspicions raised by Foucault’s antihumanism and his corollary 
account of power (Caribbean culture scholar Aaron Kamigisha calls Foucault’s human subject 
“hopeless” (132)). Mel Gussow, in his review of The Death, suggestively titled “Dangers of 
Becoming a Lost Culture,” claims the plays is “as recondite as it is elliptical,” and Patti Hartigan 
lamented that “the vivid dreams behind Parks’s rigorously condensed method clot the 
perspective. Her work can be obtuse… [drawing] connections that are, at best, allusive” (42). 
When we look on the level of the sentence at these allusive connections and the work’s overall 
resistance to comprehension, does a different humanism not come into view, one with material 
bodies that however marked and made by language also exceeds it?   
The unfamiliar words and syntactic constructions do something very concrete. The comic 
speech and its inscription re-embody the human. Parks states this as her aim. “Language is a 
physical act,” she writes (11). “It’s something which involves your entire body—not just your 
head… Each word is configured to give the actor a clue to their physical life.” She explains the 
effect language has on the body through something as subtle as an article: “Look at the 
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difference between ‘the’ and ‘thuh.’ The ‘uh’ requires the actor to employ a different physical, 
emotional, vocal attack” (12).  The humor in these words takes this embodiment further. She 
says, “Think about laughter and what happens to your body—it’s almost the same thing that 
happens when you throw up” (15). She brings to mind what Rupert Glasgow calls laughter’s 
“physiological state”: “the body, as it were, turns the tables on the human subject and bestower 
of meaning who is supposed to control it: instead of being the master of my body, my body 
becomes the master of me” (14). Parks’s catachreses represent the human, but also enact the 
body’s self-possession. Considering the play’s backdrop of plantation slavery, the soil on which 
black stereotypes were born, how could she not include an embodied self-possession in her 
reinvention of the human?     
 Although I gave a plot summary above, Gussow and Hartigan are right to point out how 
difficult the plot is to understand. Black Man has returned home from death, home where Black 
Woman, his wife, has been waiting. How he died is unclear. It seems to be any number of things: 
mauled by dogs, lynched by a gang, or electrocuted by capital punishment. The multiple acts by 
which he could have been killed represent the historical risks to African American life since 
Reconstruction, when vigilante racial violence escalated exponentially. The play is mainly a 
conversation between Black Man and Black Woman about whether or not he has really returned 
(again implicating the body) and whether or not he will stay. By the end he asks to be buried, a 
request to which Black Woman consents, and this exchange supports the commonly held idea 
that the play is about the process of mourning. For example, Glenda Carpio remarks that the play 
is about “remembering and honoring the dead” (206). But what then do we make of the chorus, 
which troubles this reading? The chorus talks not only about how and with what consequences 
Black Man died, but also about the falsity of Columbus’s claim to have found the New World, 
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about the family line to which Black Man belongs, and about how his story will be recorded and 
preserved (the need to “write down” that the black man died and to “hide it under uh rock” 
(115)). From the chorus, then, one could just as easily say that the plot is not about mourning but 
more broadly about accounting for blackness in the modern world, accounting for historical 
trauma and correcting the historical record. I hope I am sufficiently showing how many ways one 
can read the most basic part of any story, the plot, and how stubbornly resistant it is to summary.  
 Yet because in my mind the play acts out what happens when hierarchies between the 
human and non-human collapse, this plot confusion makes sense. The decentered plot acts out 
the decentered human. To pull again on Halberstam and Livingston’s insights, the plot of The 
Death dramatizes a way of seeing in which “the human [no longer] functions to domesticate and 
heirarchize difference within the human (whether according to race, class, gender) and to 
absolutize difference between the human and the nonhuman” (10). Livingston and Halberstam 
accidentally reify the official category of the human by positioning the “posthuman” against it. I 
see no reason to append the prefix “post” to the humanity Parks envisions despite its 
differentiation from Enlightenment humanism and its powerful ability to signify both the before 
and the after, both the necessary preconditions to exclusionary categories, as well as their effects. 
By questioning the human body as she troubles the body of the plot, Parks makes plain the fact 
that the “human being is first of all embodied being,” a definition for the human I will use 
throughout this chapter (Hayles 283).  
In conflating the plot of the story with its meaning, in construing physical acts as 
symbolic acts, Parks brings to mind that the body is always socially constructed (while also 
material). Therefore, to expand the body’s borders is to open up society. Judith Butler puts this 
implication as follows: “What constitutes the limits of the body is never merely material… the 
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surface, the skin is systematically signified by taboos and anticipated transgressions: indeed, the 
boundaries of the body become… the limits of the social per se” (Gender Trouble 131). 
Expanding the human means expanding the body, which in turn effects an expansion of the 
conditions of social belonging. Because the taboo defines those conditions, as Butler notes, 
stereotypes are a logical place to look to understand and expand the grounds of humanity.  
  It is this humanizing emplotment of stereotypes that forces us to rethink not only Parks’s 
aesthetic project, but those of her contemporaries. In just a brief glance at black authored 
theatrical productions since 1970, one cannot help but notice a resurgence of minstrel 
stereotypes.  Playwrights (as well as novelists) have been playing with the very representations 
of blackness that the civil rights and black power movements sought to bury for good and for 
good reason. In theater we might recall: Ntozake Shange’s Spell #7 (1979),  a play that asked 
whether blacks dancing and laughing on stage could ever be read outside the specter of 
minstrelsy; The Wooster Group’s extremely controversial production Route 1 & 9 (1981), which 
restaged Pigmeat Markam routines with such accuracy that The New York Council for the Arts 
called it a “harsh and caricatured portrayal of a racial minority.” These decades also saw George 
C. Wolfe’s Aunt Ethel in The Colored Museum (1986), a play that juxtaposed stereotypes against 
scenes from Atlantic slavery.  Playwright Kim Euell considers The Colored Museum a 
forerunner to plays of the late 1980s and early 1990s that conjure up minstrel stereotypes in order 
to exorcise their power (“Signifyin(g) Ritual” 668). We might also remember Robert 
Alexander’s revision of Uncle Tom and Topsy in I Ain’t Yo Uncle (1996), Matt Robinson’s 
resurrection of the “laziest man in the world,” his one-act play The Confessions of Stepin Fetchit 
(1993); the raucously named The Little Tommy Parker Celebrated Colored Minstrel Show by 
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Carlyle Brown, Re/membering Aunt Jemima: A Menstrual Show by Breena Clarke and Glenda 
Dickerson—the list goes on and on.   
Shawn Marie-Garrett dubs this “new art of stereotype,” “the return of the repressed” (41). 
According to her, its newness lies in two things: the employment of stereotypes to make political 
statements about historical wrongs and the lack of distance between the representation of racism 
and the criticism of it (the ambiguous authorial voice).82 Whether or not this way of investing in 
stereotypes is all that new, it is certainly more prolific than before. My point in recalling these 
productions is to ask whether Parks is up to something different or something similar. If the 
latter, we would have to reinterpret the way race has been staged in the latter half of the 
twentieth-century. 
 In repurposing stereotypes towards an exposition of the human, Parks not only 
contributes to a new wave of theatre productions, but she also speaks to an issue at the heart of 
African American and African studies. In the words of Alexander Weheliye, this is a question of 
“what different modalities of the human come to light if we do not take the liberal humanist 
figure of ‘man’ as the master-subject but focus on how humanity has been imagined and lived by 
those subjects excluded from this domain” (321). In “After Man,” Weheliye goes on to boldly 
assert that “the greatest contribution of black studies—and minority discourse more generally—
to critical thinking is the transformation of the human into a heuristic model and not an 
ontological fait accompli” (322). Parks enacts this “transformation” by doing more than 
demonstrating the way the abject marks the limit points of the dominant category of the human. 
The central insight of deconstruction that the excluded is preconditions who gets to belong can 
                                                        
82 Garrett writes, “Many professional critics and scholars disturbed by this new art of stereotype criticize 
the artists for not establishing distance between themselves and their material, for underestimating the 
destructive power of these images, for failing to put them in context or view them critically and 
unambiguously” (32). 
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be supported by Parks’s abject characters, as it can by all states of abjection. The exception is 
always the rule. But Parks specifies the issue Weheliye flags by forcing us to ask: how does the 
fact that anti-black violence is not exceptional but mundane determine the theatrical techniques 
and dramatic form through which Parks stretches the human? Put differently, in what ways do 
the poetics of the play reflect the quotidian nature of anti-black violence? And, finally, how does 
the human need to be rethought in order to account for the mundanity of black death? What is the 
dramatic form fit for this human?   
 Parks employs a highly intense brand of theatre of the absurd, which is largely what 
makes her audiences so uncomfortable. Absurdist theatre is surprising and expected. It is  
surprising given that the most ethical form in which to portray the language signs used to justify 
racial violence seems at first to be realism, satire, or at least, as Shawn-Marie Garrett and others 
have charged, a form that leaves no ambiguity between the representation of racism and the 
criticism of it. She discovered when she staged Venus that her absurdist theatre can be so 
uncomfortable, it push her audience to the exits, as I have discussed elsewhere.83 When one 
considers the nature of absurdist theater and Parks’s Brechtian inflection of the form, the choice 
becomes a little less disturbing and little more expected. The Death employs almost all the major 
conventions that Martin Esslin, who coined the term Theatre of the Absurd, considers 
constitutive. Before I describe what those features are, allow me to ground us in a passage that 
exemplifies them, one that received barrels of laughs.  
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON: Now kin I move my hands?  
QUEEN-THEN-PHAROAH HATSHEPSUT: My black man my subject man my 
man uh all mens my my my no no not yes no not yes thuh hands. Let Queen-then-
Pharaoh Hatshepsut tell you when. She is I am. An I am she passing by with her 
                                                        
83 See Irvin Hunt, “‘There Wont Be Inny Show Tonite’: Humoring the Returns of Scopic Violence in 
Suzan-Lori Parks’s Venus,” History and Humor: British and American Perspectives, ed. by Barbara 
Korte and Doris Lechner (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013), 171-92. 
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train. Pulling it behind her on uh plastic chain. Ooooh who! Oooooh who! Where 
you gonna go now, now that you done dieded?  
ALL: Ha ha ha.  
PRUNES AND PRISMS: Say ‘prunes and prisms’ 40 times each day and youll 
cure your big lips. Prunes and prisms prunes and prisms prunes and prisms: 19.  
We might notice in the passage what Esslin describes as “verbal nonsense” (associative logic and 
non-syllogistic reasoning) (328). Without any apparent logic, the verb “dieded” deviates from 
recognizable speech. The echolalia of Prunes is recognizable but also lacks logic, especially 
when one tries to make sense of the allusion to James Joyce. Esslin also ascribes to the essential 
nature of absurdist theatre the denial of “clear-cut solution[s]” (a refusal to resolve the crises of 
the narrative) (415). This refusal of resolution is present, for example, in the double past-tense of 
“dieded.” Only after closer examination might we discern that its inflection indicates an 
unspecified multiplicity of deaths, as if to imply the dying will continue or, more optimistically, 
the dying itself has died.  
The two other defining features of absurdist theatre deserve a little more explanation. The 
first is an emphasis on “psychological reality” over some objective appearance of the outside 
world (414). I should note that the psychic real is different from psychological depth. It is like an 
Adrienne Kennedy surrealist dreamscape but without the horror or ominous undertones.84 
Indeed, in the performance I saw, the actors enunciated statements about tragedy with great 
exuberance, even joviality—a tone suggested in the oddly written, which is to say deliberate 
laughter. Perhaps because of her insight into the psychology of healing she diverges from what 
Esslin conceives as the overall motivation and payoff of absurdist theater: therapy.  “[T]he 
recognition,” Esslin writes, “that the fact that the modern world has lost its unifying principle is 
the source of its bewildering and soul-destroying quality… has a therapeutic effect… the 
                                                        
84 Parks considers Adrienne Kennedy her forerunner. Kennedy’s Funnyhouse of a Negro compelled 
Parks, as she claims, to “take weird rifts and shifts of character” (Wetmore 8). 
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unease… dissolved and discharged through liberating laughter” (414). However, in The Death 
the “unifying principle” is not depicted as lost, but yet to be born, and the laughter on the stage is 
not in itself “liberating” for the characters or the audience. Nor does it discharge, but elicits an 
“unease.”  
So how does Parks’s instantiation of the absurd help her limn not merely a broader 
picture of the human, but one that enfolds and redresses the quotidian experience of racism? 
How do the aesthetic techniques of absurdist theatre serve the project of reconfiguring the human 
while accounting for racial violence? Let us return to Weheliye, who claims that the experience 
of exclusion is often the only means through which to receive political recognition. “Suffering,” 
he writes, “becomes the defining feature of those subjects excluded from the law, national 
community, the human, etc. due to the political violence inflicted upon them, while 
paradoxically also granting them access to the spheres of inclusion and equality in various 
manifestations of human rights discourse” (325). As that which provides belonging to a protected 
human community only after it excludes, suffering, Weheliye continues, “functions as a 
particular quality of (black) humanity,” or, as Wright might say, the human poor. Decoupling 
this suffering from blackness was, I believe, an integral goal of Hurston’s work and troubling the 
idea that it can define blackness without equally defining whiteness was one imperative behind 
Ellison’s Invisible Man. Parks’s approach to the pain of black humanity is to transmute it into an 
uneasy pleasure, a pleasure that is necessarily absurd and, because of the frequency of violence 
(the experience of being “dieded”), absurdly necessary. In other words, in Parks’s Death the 
pervasiveness of racial stereotyping, which always intersects with class and gender, requires an 
unease to be part of the production of pleasure. This uneasy laughter, distills into affect the 
comic features of absurdist theatre and their expansion of the human.  
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A Stereotype Is a Funny Thing  
No other dramatic form seems more appropriate than theatre of the absurd for Parks’s 
reconfiguration of stereotypes: she transforms them from the effective instruments of violence 
we know them as into positive, life-affirming Heideggerian things. Given his contrary political 
concerns and historical context, it might seem like a stretch to turn to Heidegger to elucidate 
Parks, but his insights on the difference between instruments and things map remarkably well on 
Parks’s investment in stereotypes. For Heidegger an instrument is an object that serve us, 
whereas a thing is autonomous, “something that is self-supporting, or independent” (164).  
Building on Heidegger’s essay “The Thing,” theorist Bill Brown remarks, “we begin to confront 
the thingness of objects when they stop working for us” (4).  Indeed, Heidegger defines a thing 
as  “an object in itself without reference to the human act of representing it” (174). A thing, says 
Heidegger, is “an object that is no object for us, because it is supposed to stand, stay put, without 
a possible before” (174-75). In the context of the play where the central crisis is self-
dispossession—Black Man’s body being fixed under the control of racist violence—the thing is a 
useful concept since it is that which cannot be possessed.   
Still, using Heidegger as a lens goads some critical questions. Why would Parks at this 
point in her career be interested in separating stereotypes according to what I am calling à la 
Heidegger a distinction between instruments and things? Can we say that this is a distinction she 
sets out to dramatize in her other works? Since Parks is a playwright principally concerned with 
revisionist historiography—with turning to “theatre [as]… the perfect place to ‘make’ history… 
because so much of African-American history has been unrecorded, disremembered, washed 
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out”—what are the historical grounds of this distinction, the historical events or the vision of 
African American history that inspired it (Parks 4)? What is its purchase?  
 The play is set in “the present,” but Black Man is characterized as a leader of the Civil 
Rights Movement. A news broadcaster reporting on his death says, “Gamble Major, the 
absolutely last living Negro man in the whole entire world is dead. Gamble Major born a slave 
rose to become a spearhead in the Civil Rights Movement. He was 38 years old. The Civil Rights 
Movement. He was 38 years old” (110). The most immediate allusion of Major’s age is to Martin 
Luther King and Malcolm X, both assassinated at the age of thirty-nine. There is also the more 
ambiguous allusion to the age of the Civil Rights Movement itself. Whatever the specific 
significance of the exact year Parks might be thinking of (thirty-eight years from when she last 
staged the play in 1992, as mentioned on the title page, is momentously 1954), she brings to 
mind the dying freedom struggles of the civil rights and black power movements, or what Nelson 
George and others have called the “post-soul” era. The word “soul” signals for George a high 
optimism about the promise of equality and a collective celebration of black heritage.85 That this 
ethos has past is nothing to clap our hands about.  
In her full-length study of “post soul America,” Bambi Haggins defines this post-Civil 
Rights period by a “cynical hopefulness” (5). Such cynicism has been widely noted. Novelist 
Trey Ellis declared that a New Black Aesthetic has emerged and “members of this generation are 
not shocked by the persistence of racism as were those of the Harlem Renaissance” (239-40). 
Neither are they “preoccupied with it as were those of the Black Arts Movement.” For writers 
like himself, he continues, “racism is a hard and little-changing constant that neither surprises 
                                                        
85 In Post-Soul Nation, George writes, “as the sixties progressed, soul signaled not simply a style of pop 
music but the entire heritage and culture of blacks… We became ‘soul sistas’ and ‘soul brothers’ who 
dined on ‘soul, food,’ exchanged ‘soul shakes,’ celebrated with ‘soul claps’ as ‘soul children marching for 
‘soul power’ while listening to ‘soul brother number one,’ James Brown” (vii-viii). 
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nor enrages.” After hearing Saidiya Hartman’s accurate description of these decades, we might 
find the pervasive mood of pessimism and defeat hardly surprising. “The narrative of liberation,” 
she writes, “had ceased to be a blueprint for the future, the decisive break the revolutionaries had 
hoped to institute between the past and the present failed. The old forms of tyranny, which they 
had endeavored to defeat, were resuscitated and the despots live long and vigorous lives” (Lose 
Your Mother 39-40). Parks certainly details the persistence of racism and the broken promises of 
Civil Rights legislation. In fact, we might safely say that her principal concern throughout the 
eighties and nineties is that racism is “little-changing.” As Black Woman With Fried Drumstick 
Puts It, “Yesterday today next summer tomorrow just uh moment ughoh in 1317 dieded thuh last 
black man in thuh whole entire world” (102). Parks refashions the common sense around 
stereotypes as if to suggest that the backlash against Civil Rights victories requires a new 
approach to stereotyping discourse.  
Efforts by the NAACP, actors, and civil rights activists, successfully worked to banish 
the most recognizable stereotypical images of African Americans from Broadway and 
Hollywood. In his study of the evolution of Sambo, Joseph Boskin observes that by the 1960s, 
“black had finally shoved and laughed [the Sambos and Mammies] off the stages, the screens, 
the comic strips, the cartoons, the front lawns, the children’s stories, the knickknacks, the 
advertisements, the radio, and television programs” (224). The resurgence of these stereotypes in 
the subsequent decades does not suggest the strategies of censorship were ineffective—that 
better strategies are in need—but that censoring might be futile. These images remain in the 
American subconscious so much so that “the idea of cleansing the American psyche of its racial 
fetishes… might fuel the power of the fetish all the more by making it taboo and therefore 
seductive” (Carpio 22). Parks’s absurdist humor registers the frustration over the systematic 
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dismantling of freedom movement victories, like desegregation and voting rights laws. Her 
reconfiguration of stereotypes as things not only joins the effort to diminish their destructive 
power, but it also affirms black humanity at a time when it lies most in the balance.  
In some of Black Man’s first lines, he defamiliarizes stereotypes as if he simply cannot 
understand them as the instruments of violence they usually are. To be sure, the stereotype is 
already defamiliarized since figured as an actual watermelon fixed in his lap, but his questions 
carry the defamiliarization beyond where the physical representation can go. Staring at the 
watermelon sitting in his lap, he says,  
Saint Mines. Saint mines. Iduhnt it. Nope: iduhnt. Saint mines. Iduhnt. Nope: 
iduhnt. Saint mines cause everythin I calls mines got uh print uh me someway on 
it in it dont got uh print uh me someway on it so saint mines. Duhduhnt so saint: 
huh…. Who give birth tuh this I wonder. Who gived birth tuh this. I wonder. 
(105)  
 
He addresses the stereotype as a biological being from a human progenitor. The “melon” looks to 
him like an implant on his body, which differs from his other body parts:  
I kin tell whats mines by whats gots my looks…. Look down at my foot and 
wonder if its mine. Foot mine? I kin ask it and foot answer back with uh ‘yes 
Sir’—not like you and me say ‘yes Sir’ but uh ‘yes Sir’ peculiar to thuh foot. Foot 
mine? I kin ask it and through uh look that looks like my looks thuh foot gives me 
back uh ‘yes Sir.’… Move on tuh thuh uther foot. Foot mine? And uh nother ‘yes 
Sir’ so feets mine is understood…. Melon mines?—Dont look like me. (107) 
 
He does not refer to the watermelon in its most obvious factuality: as food. Quite naturally, this 
is how Black Woman sees it when she dismisses the crisis of possession with the comic 
rejoinder: “Gobble it up and it will be.” She will eventually understand why he takes this 
complicated rout to self-possession, understand, that is, what compels him to an act of “self-
alienation” (Brecht 93), to use Brecht’s word, where he “observes his arms and legs, adducing 
them, testing them and perhaps finally approving them” (92). Black Man cannot possess the 
object that currently oppresses him because he cannot yet turn it into a thing, an object that, like 
 
    164 
his feat and forearms, speaks for itself. To put the matter concretely, the issue of turning an 
objectifying language-sign into a humanizing one is the issue of thingification.   
Things, as Heidegger claims and Black Man dramatizes, inspire an awareness that we 
exist. They highlight both the conditions of our existence and that we exist at all, which is very 
different from how instruments operate. An instrument, say a toothbrush, differs from, in 
Heidegger’s example, “a jug” in that the first disappears in our use of it, drawing no attention to 
its specific qualities, which are interchangeable and general (it can be interchanged with other 
toothbrushes and is therefore general, not specific, in nature). The more the instrument 
disappears the more it is useful. For, naturally, if instruments drew attention to themselves, they 
would get in the way of their easy utility. Being completely useful and thus wholly invisible is 
the point (“The Thing”  166). Heidegger says of these instruments that “Everywhere everything 
is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand,  indeed to stand there just so that it may be on 
call for a further ordering” (The Question 16-17). Stereotypes serve this same function, 
instrumentalized to order the world. The danger that instruments pose for Heidegger is not 
merely that they disappear in our use of them, but that so do we. Philosopher James Edwards 
therefore claims that according to Heidegger “the most successful technology… obliterates even 
us as a condition of what gets done. The doing is all” (Edwards “The Thinging of the Thing”). 
Unlike things, instruments conceal themselves and obliterate self-awareness. In the context of 
objectification, the instrumentality of stereotypes is to obliterate self-awareness since one is 
presumably no longer aware that one is also a human being. Racist stereotyping reflects the 
blindness of the stereotypist to his own humanity, not to another’s. If he were self-aware, if he 
understood his human makeup, he would see others as coextensively human.   
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Things, on the other hand, make us and, I am claiming, our humanity visible. This 
visibility is my reading of the “unconcealedness” in the following translation where Heidegger 
compares instruments (or objects) to things: “Instead of ‘object’—as that which stands before, 
over against, opposite us—we use the more precise expression ‘what stands forth.’ In the full 
nature of what stands forth, a twofold standing prevails. First, standing forth has the sense of 
stemming from somewhere, whether this be a process of self-making or of being made by 
another. Secondly, standing forth has the sense of the made thing’s standing forth into the 
unconcealedness of what is already present” (166). Things show us who we are. They produce 
the self-awareness that Black Man exhibits when with the watermelon in his lap he says without 
moving, “The Black Man moves his hands.” He, along with the audience, observes the makeup 
of his body, which is to say his embodied being, as he begins the process of self-repossession. It 
is not only the watermelon that he turns into a thing, but his own body parts, which refuse to 
follow the dictates of his speech. His body, like the watermelon, are not instruments to his words, 
but self-awareness-raising things.  
Making us visible to ourselves is only half the reason Heidegger champions things, 
however. What of the idea that things give the “sense of stemming from somewhere,” the sense 
of conditionality? That things emphasize their historical conditions seems to be his ultimate 
point: “Thinking in this way, we are called by the thing as the thing. In the strict sense of the 
German word bedingt, we are the be-thinged ones, the conditioned ones. We have left behind the 
presumption of all unconditionedness” (179). Heidegger’s concern is technology’s growing 
mediation between people and their world; Parks’s, on the other hand, is historiography’s 
mediation between what happened and what’s recorded. To transplant into Parks’s imaginary the 
idea that things elucidate the historical conditions of our becoming is to see that by changing 
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stereotypes from instruments into things Parks is signaling alternative historical conditions. 
Stereotypes traditionally support the conditions of slavery and its reincarnations. As things they 
point to conditions of survival, the fact that even amidst a pervasive oppression blacks 
maintained their grounds for pleasure, love, and an irrepressible humanity.  
In her analysis of The Death, Soyica Colbert implies a similar point about the psychic 
resources of survival. Writing on how the play portrays the “The Future of the Human,” she 
claims that Parks “reimagine[s] the  relationship between people and their bodily objects” (192). 
Parks “challenge[s] the relegation of black people to things and black bodies to objects… to 
rupture history’s teleology” (195). Colbert asserts that this challenge produces an “atemporal 
black humanity” where blacks cannot die by operating outside the temporal frame of their 
oppressor’s. Her explanation for how the collapsing of “subject/object binary” ruptures certain 
conceptions of time, like Newton’s “sequential ordering,” is complex, but it brings her to a point 
I have been elaborating: the dispossessed find a way to repossesses their bodies, to affirm 
themselves beyond the bounds of exclusionary categories of the human. I am taking Colbert’s 
brilliant reading further by attending to Parks’s humor, which is not decorative but integral to her 
process of humanizing her characters. For Colbert it merely expresses, as Suzan Langer might 
say, the spirit of vitality, the “mirthful[ness],” yielded in the reconfiguration of oppressive 
objects (Colbert 208).  What happens to Parks’s portrait of the human, how must we understand 
it differently, when we take her humor as central? Why is the humor necessary for the 
reinterpretation of objects as things?  
Colbert misses what I think the audience found funny in one of the most comic scenes, 
and in the process she overlooks what this scene has to do with recuperating the human. I have in 
mind the moments Black Woman With Fried Drumstick throws eggs into a bowl and says 
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periodically, “Funny how they break when I dropped em. Thought they was past that. Huh. 3 
broke in uh row. Guess mmm on uh roll uh some sort, huh” (117). Colbert reads this as Black 
Woman maintaining “a critical distance from [her husband’s] suffering” (206): “Instead of 
engaging with the violent performance of suffering in front of her, Black Woman tries to explain 
away the inconsistencies that she finds in each egg that she drops.” To the extent that Colbert is 
even implicitly addressing the laughter the action evoked, she reduces the humor to comic relief. 
On the contrary, what is funny is the lack of awareness of Black Woman’s actions, an awareness 
that Colbert’s reading presumes. Black Woman is not making a joke and this is precisely what is 
funny: her obliviousness to her own humor. Doubly funny, then, is that she is surprised when the 
eggs crack after dropping them. The “inconsistency” is between her ridiculous expectation that 
they will remain whole and the fact that they break when they fall. Because of her failure to 
decode signs that the larger viewing community perceives—hence the laughter—Jonathan Culler 
might call the characters incompetent readers. But it is their incompetence that is both funny and 
productive. 
  My point is that comic in the play are readings that draw out the thingliness of objects 
by the way the characters interpret them. By apparently misreading the stereotypes, the 
characters repossess their bodies. Freud further clarifies the humor of this incompetent reading. 
“A joke is made,” he claims, “the comic is found” (225). A joke is a deliberate act, intended to 
overcome a social inhibition, the comic an act of naivety, wherein an inhibition is “not present.” 
A certain ignorance, which Freud sees as childlike, attends all comic behavior. It is “the comic,” 
not “a joke,” that the audience laughed at when Black Woman with Fried Drumstick threw eggs 
into a bowl. According to Freud, this is funny because “we suppose that [the comic person] has 
tried in good faith to draw a serious conclusion on the basis of his uncorrected ignorance” (227). 
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Logically, there is nothing surprising about eggs breaking when dropped. But to Black Woman, 
as to Black Man, lines between cause and effect are obscure, the normal utility of objects are 
illegible, and the correlation between words and the things they represent is broken. The laughter 
not only points to the reconstruction of the human, but it compels the audience to reflect on their 
common sense.  
Resisting all common sense, Black Man makes the thingliness of the object an extension 
of his humanity, negating the dispossession of his body. In the section of the play titled the 
Lonesome 3some, he throws the watermelon off his lap and watches it reproduce by itself, 
turning it into a thing “without a possible before.” 
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON: Must uh rained! Gaw. Our crops have 
prospered…  
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: Funny.  
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON:… Lookie look-see gaw: where there 
were riv-lets now there are some. Gaw. Cement tuh mudment accomplished with 
uh gaw uh flick of my wrist…. Our one melon has given intuh 3. Callin what it 
gived birth callin it gaw. 3 August hams out uh my hands surroundin me an is all 
of um mines? GAW. Uh huhn. Gaw Gaw. (117)  
 
Black Man throws the melon to the floor and the unleashing of its interior substance yields 
“some where there were riv-lets.” In the 1990 BACA production, the watermelon does not 
actually break. Instead spotlights reveal two more whole watermelon in the garden in front of 
Black Man and Black Woman. He therefore figuratively breaks open the stereotype and finds 
from it missing a ‘you,’ a referent. After all, the play is again on pronouns, the absence of a “u” 
in the word marking the corollary absence of a human referent. Black Man reads the stereotype 
as not reaching out to a “you,” but as being a thing in itself. If the humor in the play has been 
read as excavating the unspeakable terror of slavery—the slave sublime—and its ineluctable hold 
on the present (Carpio 191-92; Elam 456), then my reading locates the space of Black Man’s 
escape.  
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Black Man applies the same comic reading to another vehicle of violence, the rope used 
to lynch him and the tree branch on which it was hung. Curiously, he insists on keeping it around 
his neck as not a marker of death but of his refusal to die.  
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: 9. Chuh. Funny. Funny. 
Somethin still holdin on. Let me loosen your collar for you you comed home after 
uh hard days work. Your suit: tied. Day work was runnin from them we know aint 
chase-ted you. You comed back home after uh hard days work such uh hard days 
work that now you cant breathe you. Now.  
BLACK  MAN WITH WATERMELON:  Dont take it off just loosen it. Dont 
move thuh tree branch let thuh tree branch be.  
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: Your days work aint like any 
others day work: you bring your tree branch home. Let me loosen thuh tie let me 
loosen the neck-lace let me loosen up the noose that stringed him up let me leave 
thuh tree branch be. Let me rub your wrists.  
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON: Gaw. Gaw.  
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: Some things still hold. Wrung 
thuh necks of them hens and they still give eggs. Huh: like you. Sill sproutin… 
(118)  
 
In the same way the noose moves on its own—doing precisely what the object is not supposed to 
do—he runs without being chased. He, like the rope, always escapes possession. But more, these 
things function as sites of memory he refuses to repress. The work he imposes on himself is to 
“bring the tree branch home,” incorporate it into a space shared by someone who has not lived 
the trauma but must witness it to truly see him. After all, it is only after Black Woman consents 
to accept “the tree branch”—and, by extension, the trauma itself—as part of Black Man, only 
after she seeks not to remove but “loosen” it, that she can offer him recognition: “them hens… 
still give eggs… like you.”  And what she recognizes is not only his subjectivity, but his undying 
humanity, his new (“sproutin”) life.  
When we laugh, if we laugh, at these comic scenes it is by a second-sight through which 
we view the illogic of the character’s cognition from the vantage point of our common sense. 
After all, second-sight is the ability to see from one’s own cultural perspective the blind-spots of 
 
    170 
another’s. How does our uneasy laughter compel us to reinterpret the objectification of 
stereotyping along with them? Recall that Bergson contends that laughter is “corrective,” that it 
seeks to bring the comic person back into the fold of the larger society, which in this case is the 
play’s audience.  How does our uneasy laughter bring us into the fold of the outsiders, the 
characters of the play? How does it work not to assimilate them into our cognitive processes but 
us into theirs? The laughter is uneasy not only because of the ethical squabbles it forces us to 
confront, the politics of pleasure we must critique even as we indulge. It is uneasy, moreover, 
because it tries to change our cognitive methods of processing the world.   
This change is elicited by the character’s modeling and commenting on the laughter they 
excite in the audience. Most peculiar about the laughter we hear on stage is its deliberateness. 
Laughter is an automatic activity. Telling someone to laugh, as, for example, Invisible Man does 
to Bledsoe and Jack in the novel’s final scene, is a sure way of stymieing if not ruining the 
possibility of that laughter. The characters in The Death do not command we laugh, but the 
conscious effort exerted over their own laughter parodies ours. In the opening scene of the play, 
the “Overture,” the characters model the laughter that they simultaneously produce. Black Man 
says, “ha ha ha. The black man laughs out loud” (103). Foreshadowing the collective laughter 
that concludes the play, everyone together oddly sounds out: “Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. 
Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. Ha. HHHHHHHHHHHHHHH” (104). Whether reading on the 
page or hearing it in the audience, this laughter mocks our own. Glenda Carpio describes it 
fruitfully through a quote of Samuel Beckett: “ ‘laugh laughing at the laugh’ ” (210). The target 
of this laughter is as much the people and forces who conducted the violence (Black Man says 
“Thuh dogs give me uhway by uh laugh aimed at my scent” (114)), as it is the audience. Carpio 
remarks, “The impulse to laugh makes one complicit with those who, witnessing the lynching, 
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can summon a laugh as they point to Black Man, a realization of which further deepens the 
compassion that one finally feels for him” (220). However much compassion the cautionary 
laugh elicits, Carpio does not mention or do much with the more obvious point: that our 
“realization” is also that the characters refuse to join our laughter.  
They refuse and by their mockery make a point of this refusal. It is one thing to say that 
someone neglects to laugh at their own behavior by continuing to conduct oneself comically. It is 
quite another thing to say they refuse to do so. What makes their laughter influence our 
perspective is its insistence not to assimilate into our cultural logic, that is, not to consent to the 
common-sense view of stereotypes. They not only perform their own interpretation but insist on 
it, and this insistence queries the line between affirming perspective of the dominant and 
adopting the one of the marginalized. My argument toes this line, however necessarily, when I 
state that Parks stretches the limits of the human. It is only by first subscribing to the logic of an 
exclusionary definition of the human that I can say the characters turn to things in order to 
stretch it. By pointing their finger at our laughter, they draw attention to the way we might be 
taking foot in the vantage-point of the dominant and plotting the human on its coordinates. This 
may be a necessary emplotment, an unavoidable reification of the exclusionary logic we want to 
undo. Is it the necessity of repeating the violence we hope to end that they sound out in their 
speciously cathartic “HHHHHHHHHHHHHHH”?  Is the partiality, if not failure (Carpio calls 
their laughter “mirthless” (210)), of the emotional catharsis they enunciate a response to the 
seeming impossibility of erasing violent enclosures? What we recognize in the characters is not 
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When Discrediting Stereotypes Robs One’s Humanity 
Parks had some  practical concerns and ethical reasons for configuring stereotypes as 
things. A comparison of The Death to her other plays could not make this clearer. The 
investment in stereotypes we see in the The Death is of a very different sort from the one we 
encounter, for example, in Parks’s first production, her 1989 Imperceptible Mutabilities in the 
Third Kingdom. At first glance, however, the plays seem like they are up to the same thing, 
making the audience reflect on how they process and respond to stereotypes. Imperceptible is 
divided into four “parts,” each of which is introduced by Brechtian projections, a “slide show” of 
a Sambo-like “images,” as the stage directions indicate (25).86 At the play’s premier the stage 
was darkened, a “near black-out” as one reviewer describes it, preventing the audience from 
seeing the actors that stood below the screen (Garrett 2). When the lights were turned up, 
however, it was obvious that those pictures did not resemble the characters, which signaled the 
breach between their embodiment on stage and within a photograph. When asked about the 
purpose of these slides, Parks said, “You have these fixed pictures projected up there and down 
below there’s a little person mutating like hell on stage. I’m obsessed with the gap between those 
two things… preconceived images of African Americans and real people” (46). The first of these 
pictures was of a “serene women,” the next a “melancholy woman,” “then the first woman again, 
laughing,” (2). The fact that none of the images recalled familiar racial stereotypes—it might 
even be stereotyping to read them as such—underscores that the play is about the process of 
                                                        
86 Brecht writes of Die Mutter what can be said of Imperceptible and The Death: “the stage not only used 
allusions to show actual rooms but also texts and pictures to show the great movement of ideas in which 
the events were taking place. The projections are in no way pure mechanical aids in the sense of being 
extras, they are no pons asinorum; they do not set out to help the spectator but to block him; they prevent 
his complete empathy, interrupt his being automatically carried away. They turn the impact into an 
indirect one” (Brecht 58). 
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stereotyping, not the stereotypes themselves. It is about “the gap,” as Parks says, between 
preconceptions and real bodies—not stereotypes but thinking stereotypes. 
The guiding intent of each and every character in Imperceptible is to discredit these 
stereotypes. Thus a slave woman highlights the inherent absurdity of the Sambo myth, when she 
tells her master that she will greet the new slaves with a smile: “Howmy gonna greet em… Greet 
em with uh smile!” (43). And another character, Mr. Smith, spends his entire life trying to 
assimilate into middle class society by negating the Sambo stereotype only to be physically and 
symbolically paralyzed in the process. He takes a picture of himself smiling to revise the Sambo 
myth. His smile is not aroused by the benign conditions of slavery or the cognitive inability to 
perceive its terror, but by his work ethic, his demonstrated fitness for civic belonging. Ironically, 
it is his effort to belong that defeat him. Unlike Black Man in The Death, who partly heals 
himself, Mr. Smith, like all the other characters in Imperceptible, flounder in their attempts to 
repudiate stereotypes.   
The Death asks, then, what happens when we treat stereotypes as things, not instruments? 
How might the psychic effects differ? I compare these plays because, as their titles and their 
shared thematic focus suggest, Imperceptible is about the negligible if not damaging changes 
repudiating stereotypes can make, whereas The Death is about the productive if not permanent 
changes their reconfiguration enacts. By depicting the plight of characters who respond to 
stereotypes as instruments, Parks uncovers the way discrediting stereotypes easily strengthens 
their psychic and even physical violence, which is to say reproduces their dehumanizing effects. 
Given the legal policies, let alone the group-violence they sanctioned, playing with stereotypes is 
risky business. Riskier, however, might be countering stereotypes with opposing truths. French 
literary scholar Mireille Rosello notes that the “survival of a stereotype depends more on its 
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repeatability than its demonstrability” (18). She continues, “Every time someone opposes them, 
they gain in strength and consolidate their cultural positions as pseudo-truths.” How so? 
“Attacked as a unit of truth, [the stereotype] takes its revenge by forcing speaking into an act of 
mimesis. I am forced to actually repeat the statement that activates the stereotyped idea” (38). To 
defeat stereotypes demands not that we avoid repeating them but that we repeat them with a 
difference. The ruse of stereotypes is that they strengthen when we argue against their validity. 
While on the one hand, Parks, as many have claimed, “subverts and inverts… stereotypical 
representations” and “the cultural historical weight of racist imagery” (Rayner and Elam 
“Unfinished” 453; Louise 691), on the other hand, she launched her artistic career by conveying 
the dangers of such subversion. In Imperceptible we see characters dying beneath stereotypes; in 
The Death we see them using stereotypes to thrive.  
To ground us, allow me to give a brief précis of Imperceptible. Each of its four part 
features a different historical setting in which characters tragically navigate the experience of 
racialized social exclusions. The first part covers prejudiced school curriculums, recalling the 
1978 blow to Affirmative Action in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke; the second 
part is set in the middle passage or the “third kingdom”; the third part deals with urban 
gentrification and New York City redlining, which Parks compares to slave masters fatally 
confining and packing slaves in the ship’s hold; and the fourth part is about racism and 
discrimination in the military.  
The stereotypes of concern are Sambo and the black mammie. Both float as signs 
detached from their referents. The stereotypes are funny because of the way they are detached 
from their referents: they are inversions of the people and history they represent. The play 
suggests they are comically absurd because they always already function as inversions. They are 
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doubly absurd because as a stereotypist casts an inverted image of the stereotyped he also inverts 
his own of himself.  Let us look at what happens to a character named “The Naturalist,” a 
scientist who considers himself a rational modern man. He comically represents a nineteenth-
century doctor passionately dedicated to scientific racism. In order to develop a way for 
“modern” society to “accommodate” primitive people and  “insure the capturence of [these} 
subjects,”  he devises “advanced techniques” of surveillance (27). He says that these techniques 
are supposed to “enable the naturalist to conceal himself and observe the object of study—
unobserved,” but they do the very opposite. They are extremely rudimentary and conspicuous. 
He names his chosen instrument of surveillance “the fly,” for its allegedly small size.  He then 
tries to make the fly blend into the “[urban] jungle” by “modifying” it into a “cockroach… 
fashioned entirely of corrugated cardboard.” He plants this contraption in the apartment of two 
black women, whom he names Molly and Charlene, and expects them not to notice it. The first 
thing to note is that  his view of Molly and Charlene as primitive is symptomatic of his own 
irrationality. The second point is slightly bigger. In personifying “the modern world,” and by 
extension, modernity, he betrays the fact that modernity’s alignment of “rationality with the 
practice of white supremacist terror” is contradictory (Gilroy 118).   
In the 1989 production, the device surveillance, the Kafkaesque roach, was placed on 
stage and stretched about four feet to make the humor plain. Charlene adds to the comic effect 
when she casually states, “Theyre getting brave. Big too.” The point, exaggerated to absurdity, is 
that his “subjects” know that they are being watched, that the genius the scientist considers 
unique to modern man, is predicated on his own blindness. Molly points to the irony of the fact 
that the device is supposed to “monitor” her when she says, “Once there was uh me named Mona 
who wondered what she’d be like if no one was watchin.” Speaking of herself in the third person 
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preserves, none the less, a body unwatched, even if invisible. And the irony only doubles when 
The Naturalist comes to their apartment as an exterminator, Dr. Lutzky. He gets very confused as 
he misnames his subjects and misidentifies them as the roaches themselves:  
LUTZKY: You’re the one, aren’t you, Molly? Wouldn’t want to squirt the wrong 
one. Stand up straight…  
CHONA: I’m Chona! Monas on the line!—Verona? That one is Verona.  
LUTZKY: ChonaMonaVerona. Well well well. Wouldn’t want to squirt the 
wrong one…  I must be confused. (33-34)  
 
The stereotypes he constructs are detached from the people they seek to designate and 
symptomatic of his own self-delusion. Without acknowledging it, he himself starts to resemble a 
cockroach, for his feet get “stuck” in the insecticide sprayed on the floor (32). As he suspected 
when another client called him for his services, he becomes “the unwitting victim of a prank 
phone call” (31). His attempt to enslave through stereotypes results in his own “capturance.”  
The “projected” racial stereotypes are absurd inversions in another way: they invert the 
historical conditions they purport to describe. To expose their inversion of their historical 
referents, Parks turns to “the most widely used of all black male comic names”: Sambo (Boskin 
40). In the play, white slave and land owners repeatedly command a black slave to “smile,” thus 
evoking Sambo’s signification of “contentment and happiness” (9). Aretha Saxon, the slave 
woman, doubles anachronistically as a contemporary resident of New York evicted from her 
home. As many claimed, Parks might indeed be emphasizing by contrast how awful slavery was, 
but that point evades the particular nature of stereotypes. By contextualizing the commands to 
smile—to become a Sambo—in the abject conditions of slavery and its aftermath, Parks locates 
the humor of the stereotyping in the way it inverts the history it seeks to represent.   
The gentrified Aretha Saxon is enlisted by two slave owners Miss Faith and Charles to 
“calculate” the maximum number of slaves that the historical “Brookes” can carry (43). In this 
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double historical context, Aretha refers to both the captured slaves and the new tenants, who 
might be similarly dispossessed, when she repeats like a chant, “Howmy gonna greet em… Greet 
em with uh smile!”  The irony is that Aretha’s teeth have been extracted—Miss Faith has pulled 
them out. Thus when Aretha smiles in the image of Sambo, her missing teeth reveal the 
surreptitious violence behind the minstrel image of black happiness: its attempt to justify and 
conceal the forced dislocations of a people and class.   
Eventually, Aretha realizes that asserting the stereotype as false neither disempowers 
them nor empowers herself. At the end of the scene, she assumes the role of the stereotypist over 
her master Charles, commanding him to smile no matter what he feels.  
ARETHA: You know what they say about thuh hand that rocks thuh cradle?....  
CHARLES: “Rocks the cradle—rules the world,” but I didn’t rock— 
ARETHA: Dont care what you say you done, Charles. We’re makin us uh 
histironical amendment here, K? Give us uh smile. Uh big smile for the thuh 
book.  
CHARLES: Historical. An “Historical Amendment,” Ma’am….  
ARETHA: Smile! Smile! SMILE!! There. Thats nice.  
CHARLES: [The children are] crying.  
ARETHA: Dont matter none. Dont matter none at all. You say its  uh cry I say it 
uh smile. These photographics is for my scrapbook. Scrap uh graphy for my book. 
Smile or no smile mm gonna remember you. Mm gonna remember you grinning. 
(54).  
 
The amendment is “histironical” because it is no amendment at all. The other reason Aretha’s 
command that Charles impossibly smiles does not make a difference to the historical record is 
that Sambo’s “grin” is already the indication of the opposite.  
In the last scene we witness a character self-destruct as he attempts to prove a stereotype 
false. He tries to assume an identity racial stereotypes negate. Mr. Sergeant Smith wants nothing 
more than to assimilate into middle class society with the hope of receiving the wide recognition 
and approval that comes with that status. As a military officer, he works for a “distinction,” an 
award that “sets [him] apart” from the masses and brings him national acclaim. He believes civic 
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belonging and middle class membership is founded on hard work, literacy, and noble deeds—the 
very qualities negated by the stereotype of Sambo. Though still waiting for his distinction, Mr. 
Smith takes four photographs of himself at his office desk to send home as evidence that he is 
already fit for middle class life. The first “shot” shows a man “[r]eady for work”; the second, “a 
man who loves his work”; the third, his “arms folded” dignified; and the fourth, his “hands on 
books and books open, a full desk and a smiling man” (58). As if his conformity to the Protestant 
work ethic is not enough, he performs one profoundly noble deed: “saved uh life! Caught uh man 
as he was fallin out thuh sky!” (70). But in the process he “lost [his] legs” and suggestively calls 
the “medals” he gets “bars.” If becoming crippled implies the irony that his hunt for national 
belonging and economic mobility leaves him immobile and estranged, then the pun on “bars” 
suggest he is something worse: damned. In short, to assimilate as the always already excluded 
into ideals negated by racial stereotypes traumatically reinforces one’s exclusion. His final words 
to his son at the end of the play are “boy… we ain’t even turtles. Huh. We’se slugs. Slugs. 
Slugs,” a displaced image of a Sambo. His attempt to invert the already inverted is terribly self-
destructive. In Imperceptible, discrediting stereotypes is effectively no different from validating 
them. May we finally put this strategy to rest.  
 
A Time for New Grounds of Community  
Rather than employing the strategy of repudiation, the characters in The Death invest in the 
thingliness of stereotypes to reclaim their bodies and their time. The crisis that inaugurates the 
play is not only the dispossession of Black Man’s body but his loss of control over his future. He 
periodically expresses his sense of being overdetermined when he recounts the violence that took 
his life: “Turned on thuh juice on me in me in I started runnin. First just runnin then runnin 
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towards home. Couldnt find us. Think I got lost. Saw us on up uhead but I flew over thuh yard. 
Couldnt stop. Think I overshot” (109). The racial violence directs and controls his movement. 
When his wife tells him “You comed back,” he corrects her saying,  “Overshot. Overshot.” For 
the entirety of the play he tries to retrieve the agency that was literally shocked out of him, and 
he does so by harnessing a sight that crosses temporal zones: he sees the future as that which has 
already happened. He sees, in other words, the past and its evolving present from the only 
vantage point in which that persperctive would be possible: the future. The difference between 
coming back and being “overshot” is not only a difference of agency, but also one of temporal 
perspective: he is in the present and future at once. The pun on both this vantage point and the 
murder in the term “overshot” suggests that it is the violence that produced his vision. Far from 
his life being over, it extended over the shooting, a transcendence that the shot unintentionally 
produced.  
A triple temporality emerges in the puns. This crossing of time is what the puns signal, 
especially when they are about stereotypes. Hence Black Man refers to the watermelon as “Saint 
mine,” but what does this sentence mean? We might say that it points at once to both sainthood 
and objecthood. The first meaning of “saint,” ‘it is god,’ intimates that the watermelon is 
everywhere at all times, ubiquitous; the second, ‘it is not,’ implies that the melon is not present, 
that it does not belong to Black Man’s presence. The ‘not,’ in addition to modifying the 
watermelon, negates Black Man (not mine) and his present time (‘is not’). Therefore, as a saint 
the watermelon is all temporalities, but as an object it lies outside his own.  
Because he navigates a temporality that does and does not belong to the time of 
objectification, the sterotypist’s time, Black Woman uses the ambiguously inflected “comed 
back” to describe his return. She tells him “Got uhway in comed back.” “Comed” could be the 
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future imperative, the past ‘came,’ and the present ‘come.’ Thus the verb signifies his symbolic 
sainthood, his reach across multiple temporalities. The meanings of “comed back” parallels 
nicely with those of “Got uhway,” which puns as a ‘a way out,’ escape (‘got away’), and an 
entrapment (‘a way was imposed on you’). One way of reading the entire phrase, then, is to hear 
that he turned the entrapment into a freedom. His getting away was occasioned by his being 
trapped. There is yet another way of saying this, as urged by the fact that “comed back” 
syntactically follows “Got uhway.”  His temporal freedom—the temporally free “comed back” 
that describes him—was produced by his entrapment.  By analyzing these puns so closely, I am 
trying to show that in order to create a narrative space in which a recursive racism can be 
redressed, Parks first must forge a language capable of speaking to the possibilities the violence 
opens up. Her words must speak not only to the affliction, but the futures it avails.  
 How does the temporal freedom Black Man finds shape the human community staged in 
the play? Stereotyping necessarily forges community through a shared experience of cultural 
trauma. It creates affiliations through lines of affliction, and these lines go back far in time, so far 
in time they take on a sense of historical transcendence similar to the sainthood Black Man 
evokes. The question the play takes up is how to transform the grounds of that community, how 
to turn a community based on similarity into one based on difference. Gathering around a 
common pain or cultural trauma has its value and power, but it also reproduces the totalizing 
logic that drove the violence in the first place. It maintains community according to a sameness, 
despite the fact that sameness maintained the violence according to stereotypes. Essentializing 
might be strategic but it always excludes. Gender or racial essentialism is not the only condition 
that sustains community.  
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In The Death it is fittingly the chorus that establishes a new condition for community, a 
unity of differences.87 Black man articulates this unity when he unites the different choral 
members by punning on the word “kin.” The members are not only different in time, but 
different in kind. Some are concretized stereotypes, some real people, and all are born at a 
different time in history: Lots of Grease and Lots of Pork, And Bigger and Bigger and Bigger 
(after Richard Wright’s Bigger Thomas),  Prunes and Prisms (conflation of a stereotype with an 
allusion to Joyce’s Ulysses),  Before Columbus, Queen-Then-Pharaoh Hatshepsut (“the only 
woman to rule in ancient Egypt” in the fifteenth century BC (Elam 453)), the biblical Ham, and 
“Old Man River Jordan” (from the eighteenth century African American spirituals).  Speaking to 
all these figures, Black Man says, “In you all theres kin. You all kin. Kin gave the thuh first 
permission kin be givin it now still. Some things is all thuh ways gonna be uh continuin sort of 
uh some thing” (112). Notice it is “kin,” used as a verb and a noun, that empowers. In “kin” he 
sounds “can” (“the first permission kin be givin” and “You all kin). In short, he implies that in 
likeness there’s possibility. This enabling likeness is the kinship between objects and subjects, 
stereotypes and people.  
 The merging of subjects and objects stretches the bounds of the community across space 
and time. When Black Man states,  “In all you theres kin,”  the kinship lies between multiple 
“theres.” This noun which doubles as an adjective signals the existence of various places for the 
kinship, and the unusual spelling and pun on the word suggests then that these are places one 
would not be likely to look. In other words, the atypical approach to kinship is intimated by the 
very oddity of referring to a multiplicity of places as “theres.” The common ground breaks 
through the enclosures of common sense.  Rather than a space that forecloses the expression of 
                                                        
87 Harvey Young remarks, “the Greek chorus represented the citizenry…. The theatre was a place where 
society watched itself” (30). 
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subjectivity, that elides difference for the advantage of similitude, this space is ever open to 
difference, so long as one adopts a non-cognitivist perspective. Cognitive psychology and its 
corresponding positivism defines realist characterization. The absurdist grammar in the text of 
the play makes a claim for the value of anti-realist forms in redefining and extending the bounds 
of human communities. The factors of communal belonging, like the qualities of humanness, 
cannot be empirically counted, measured, and placed in neat, grammatical sentences. A unity of 
differences is a unity of contradictions and it is the contradictory nature of the community that 
necessitates the absurdist humor. This collective belonging cannot be figured in a realist form 
that avoids confusing readers about where they are in a story’s space and time: after all, to the 
extent we do not know where we are in a story we lose the sense of reality. If realism makes the 
navigation of temporal and spatial borders easy, then absurdist theatre makes us productively 
confused.  
It is better to be lost in community than found in it. This counter-intuitive claim is one 
Fred Moten begins to make in “The Case of Blackness.” There he mobilizes the merging of 
things and humans as it applies to a painting. He finds the jointure productive for a type of 
community that does not operate by rules of membership, does not legislate or regulate 
belonging. “To insist upon the distinction between the canvas as scene and the canvas as thing is 
to detach oneself from the scene as much as it is also to represent the scene. It is to establish 
something like a freedom from the community in the most highly determined, regulative, legal 
sense of that word, in the sharpest sense of its constituting a field in which the human and the 
(disorderly) thing are precisely, pathologically, theatrically indistinct” (Moten 199, emphasis 
his). In The Death the inseparability between humans and things is sounded in the phrase “theres 
kin” (kin is both a place and a collective), and this inseparability is underscored, as I discussed 
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above, by the population of this kinship. It is made up of humanly things, which is to say 
personified stereotypes like Lots of Grease and Lots of Porks, and thingly humans, which is to  
abstract people like Before Columbus. The expansion of community so that it encompasses all 
forms of life (the alive and the dead), all spaces, and all times, is symbolically enacted by 
connecting human life to the life of things.  
At stake in finding a likeness between people and things is not to suggest that the 
humanity of these people is so expansive that it also encompasses things. It is to say, rather, that 
the expanse of that humanity denies its objectification, such that the discursive signs and 
manifestations of things are also signs and manifestations of a failed abjection. In this light, the 
‘life’ of things bears striking resemblance to that of humans: both are interminable even in their 
death. Both echo the epigraph Parks chooses for the script of the play: “when I die, I won’t stay 
dead” (101). Black Man is not so much killed as transferred to alternatives spaces. I have been 
trying to show that this transfer works on an individual and collective level.  
 Staying within the chorus, we might say that the soliloquy of Ham visualizes this 
expanded community more explicitly than any other speech. If we judge it according to the 
audience’s laughter in the 1990 BACA production, this soliloquy was by far play’s funniest 
moment. Part of what is funny is again the unselfconscious fusions of subjects and objects. Ham, 
whose progeny in the Bible is damned to servitude, delivers a speech about Black Man’s family 
tree. While Black Man looks for what bears his “print” (by which he means his “look” and 
“name”), Ham speaks of “uh tree with your name on it.” He refers to its family members through 
Black English pronouns:  
Ham’s Begotten Tree (catchin up to um in medias res  that is we takin off from 
where up last time). Huh. NOW: She goned begotten One who in turn begotten 
Ours. Ours laughed one day uhloud in from thuh sound hittin thuh air smakity 
sprung up I, you, n He, She, It… Wassername she finally give intuh It and 
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together they broughted forth uh wildish one called simply Yo… Yo suddenly if 
by magic again became productive in after uh lapse of some great time came back 
intuh circulation to wiggled uhabout with Yes Missy (one of thuh crosseyed 
daughters of That and Yuh Fathuh). Yo in Yes Missy begottin ThissunRightHere, 
Us, ThatOne, She (the 3rd) and one called Uncle (who from birth was gifted with 
great singin and dancing capabilities which helped him make his way in life but 
tended tuh bring shame on his family).  (122) 
 
All the pronouns’ antecedents—people and objects—amount to the stereotype of Uncle Tom, a 
figure who is at once “gifted” and a “shame.” Although in performance Ham does not point his 
finger at his named progeny, the demonstrative pronouns certainly do. The direction in which 
they point, however, is significantly unspecified, which implies a few things: first, the general 
sense of proximity is as important as specificity, closeness being no less crucial than location; 
second, the kin could be located anywhere, an idea already articulated by Black Man; and, third, 
where they are is who they are. None of these implications would be possible without the 
conflation of object- and subjecthood.  
 That it is Ham who gives the family tree is significant for his historical status as a 
stereotype. In fact, according to Stephen Haynes no other biblical figure had more influence on 
the justification of transatlantic slavery than Ham. Yet Ham is also important for the broader 
ordering and social divisions his fictionalization enacted and symbolized. Haynes remarks, “in 
modern European and American racial discourse, Genesis 9 has been regarded primarily as a 
story of differentiation” (5). Comic in the naming of Ham’s progeny is that the illusion of 
difference mask the conflation of identities. Ham makes raucously clear that as much as 
individuals are distinct the methods by which those distinctions are recorded is inherently flawed 
and futile. He is not suggesting the commonality that exists between and among real differences, 
but the problems in the ways those differences are marked. The demonstrative pronouns 
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deployed imply that one problem in the method of differentiation is the distancing of difference: 
the contradictory attempt to know people only to keep them at a distance.  
The negation of these distancing tactics—tactics that turn kin into others—is enabled in 
the play by a mutual recognition. The cohesion of community depends on the ability to transform 
the divisive force of stereotyping, a form of misrecognition, into an opposite force. While this 
redirecting of stereotypes occurs most collectively in the chorus, it begins with an interaction 
between Black Man and Black Woman. She finally recognizes him, which the chorus celebrates 
in the play’s final scene. In other words, this idea that vehicles of racial violence might be riskily 
held, not discarded, receives the community’s sanction by the play’s end. Harnessing the humor 
of mimicry, Black Man and Black Woman exchange parting words and the community responds 
by insisting on holding the thingliness of the stereotype that each character embodies.  
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON: Miss me.  
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: Miss me.  
BLACK MAN WITH WATERMELON: Re-member me.  
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: Re-member me. Call on me  
     sometime. Call on me sometime. Hear? Hear?.... 
BLACK WOMAN WITH FRIED DRUMSTICK: Thuh black  
     man he move. He move. He hans.  
 
     (A bell sounds once) 
 
ALL: Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. Hold it. (131)  
 
How can we understand this repetition of “re-member me?” The hyphen in remember casts the 
word as a homonym with two meanings in addition to its definition as a process of remembering: 
reconstituting a community and modifying a social construct. On the one hand to “re-member” 
the pieces of a structure means putting them back in their appropriate place; on the other, it 
means adding new pieces entirely. Black Woman is not redundantly mimicking Black Man’s 
command. Rather, by replying in the same tone and the same syntactic construction, she is 
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offering up another meaning and calling it equivalent to the one Black Man intends. The 
characters remake themselves by remaking the stereotype entirely anew. 
 Given the uneasiness provoked by this method of expanding the human—expanding the 
limits of its people and the community they form—we might do well to recall Hortense Spillers’s 
discussion of the American “grammar book.” Produced by the slave trade, this grammar equates 
the captive body to a thing and burdens it with stereotypical, even mythical names, some of 
which Spillers recounts: “Sapphire, Earth Mother, Aunty, Peaches and Brown Sugar, Granny, 
Miss Ebony First,” etc. (203). The characters incompetently—comically—read this grammar to 
insist on a better way of codifying bodies. The comedy of their readings and their refusal to 
conform to a comfortable common sense forces us to take notice. We see through an uneasy 
laughter different strategies for combating racist discourse. Spillers argues that the project of 
liberation from discursive racism is driven by two passionate motivations: “1) to break apart, to 
rupture violently the laws of American behavior that make [possible] a syntax [in which people 
and things are equated] 2) to introduce a new semantic field/fold more appropriate to his/her own 
historic movement.” By Black Man, Black Woman, and their evolving community of the 
oppressed “actually claiming the monstrosity”—the stereotype that makes such an equation—
and by them subsequently giving it a different meaning entirely, they begin to rupture this 
American grammar and introduce a semantic fold where the oppressed can “speak a truer word 
concerning [themselves]” (203). In The Death of the Last Black Man in the Whole Entire World 
Parks invests in stereotypes as things indistinct from people to redefine the human and hopefully 
break the strictures of that category forever. 
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